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Standard Economics assumes that decision makers carefully reect and meditate
on each alternative. Grounded on evidence from Psychology this thesis relaxes this
assumption and develops a theoretical framework with imperfect reection. We analyse
the implications for both Positive and Normative Economics, and for Public Policy and
introduce novel applications. We begin in Chapter 1 with a review of the main arguments
and results.
Chapter 2 develops a decision-making framework with imperfect reection and stud-
ies the implications for Positive Economics. Our approach relies on two key premises:
(a) preferences parameters are endogenously determined by choices and (b) the deci-
sion maker, due to imperfect reection, may not fully internalize that e¤ect. A decision
problem is labelled Standard (SDP) when the decision maker internalizes the e¤ect
and Behavioural(BDP) when she does not. A number of general results are obtained.
First, under incomplete and acyclic preferences there exists a solution to both SDP and
BDP. Second, BDPs have testable restrictions and they are di¤erent from those of SDPs.
Third, for almost all classes of preferences, SDP and BDP are distinguishable from each
other.
Chapter 3 focuses on the normative implications of our framework in relation to the
existing normative approaches to Behavioural Economics. We show that, with imperfect
reection, revealed preferences cannot in general underpin individual welfare, though we
o¤er conditions to recover such a link. The degree of autonomyemerges as a natural
normative criterion and o¤ers theoretical grounds for public policy interventions that
aim to empower individuals.
Chapter 4 extends our framework to an N-person strategic setting. We label psycho-
social games to normal-form games in which players, due to imperfect reection, do
not internalize the e¤ect of their actions on their preferences parameters. We prove
existence under weak assumptions, link our framework to the existent literature on social
preferences and provide new examples. We associate psycho-social games to standard
normal-form games and show that, typically, the set of Nash equilibria and the set of
psycho-social equilibria of an associated psycho-social game are distinct from each other.
Finally, we show that (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies are robust to any degree
of imperfect reection.
Chapter 5 applies our framework to analyse poverty and polarization persistence
as a result of an aspirations failure. Reection involves imagination which is, in turn,
needed to form aspirations: i.e. we can only aspire to what we can imagine. Initial
circumstances such us poverty and polarization restrict the scope of peoples imagination
and consequently of their aspirations. We develop a model consistent with this argument
and study the importance of role models to break aspirations failures.
Chapter 6 combines experimental data with a survey and shows evidence that the
more frustrated people are income-wise, the lower is their propensity to cooperate to pro-
vide global (e.g. environment) and national public goods. Finally, chapter 7 concludes




"Most powerful is he who has himself in his own power"
(Seneca, 5 BC - 65 AD)
The capacity to reect is what distinguishes us from the rest of animals. As humans,
we have the ability to consciously and intentionally transform the world. The rest of
animals, in contrast, can alter aspects of the world in the process of adapting to it, but
their modication of reality is purely instinctive (Roberts, 2000, pg. 20).
Standard Economics takes careful consideration of this capacity and provides the
homo-economicuswith the gift of perfect reection. The decision maker is supposed
to embark upon a conscious mental process to carefully characterize each alternative
involved and fully evaluate all their consequences. If needed, the decision maker is
supposed to actually imagine herself experiencing each of the alternatives. As pointed
out by the Bible of any economics Ph.D. student, our decision makers make only
meditated choices(Mas-Colell et al., 1995, pg. 6).
The strength of this assumption depends crucially on the complexity of the decision
problem in question. When it comes to simple decision problems, perfect reection
would seem to be an innocuous assumption to make. In complex decisions, however, the
level of reection needed to characterize the object of choice is higher than in simple
decisions, and the assumption of perfect reection becomes di¢ cult to justify.
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At this point it is important to clarify what we mean by complexity of a decision.
We dene a complex decision problem as one in which (generally unobserved) payo¤-
relevant preference parameters are dened endogenously as part of the choice. Examples
of such endogenous preferences parameters are mental states, reference points, frames,
moods, beliefs, aspirations, attitudes, emotions, values or the environment itself. So
what characterizes a complex decision is the presence of preference parameters that are
essentially part of the consequences of the choice.
Many if not most real-life decisions are complex. Evidence from Psychology and
Behavioural Economics shows that even those decisions that look trivial at rst glance
can be tricky. Think about the choice between an apple and a banana in your local
grocery. This is the simplest decision we can think of, and as such, it requires almost
no reection: my pleasure when I eat an apple is greater than when I eat a banana, and
therefore, I choose the apple when both are available. In such a simplistic world, the
assumption of perfect reection does not a¤ect my denition of the objects of choice: i.e.
banana and apple. Suppose that the greengrocer has read Sunstein and Thalers (2008)
book, Nudge, and discovers that the position in which the types of fruit are presented
on the shelves a¤ect the consumption of the bananas and apples. The decision problem
becomes complex now, and the decision maker will require a higher level of reection
to fully dene the object of choice, which is not a particular piece of fruit anymore, but
a piece of fruit together with its position in the shelf. A decision maker with perfect
reection will, hopefully, understand this complex problem and maximize her preferences
over pairs of fruit and position on the shelfand make consistent decision choices. If
upon reection, she ranks apples over bananas even when bananas are presented as
default options, then her choices will not be liable to be manipulated by the greengrocer
and she will consistently choose the apple. Our framework di¤ers from Sunstein and
Thalers (2008) approach mainly in the fact that they propose a social planner as an
architect of the decision-maker choice.We propose, instead, that the decision maker
herself should be the architect of her own choiceor her own character planner in
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the words of Elster (1983). Our claim is not grounded only on "moral" considerations
but also on practical concerns.
Think for a moment on what Sunstein and Thalers benevolent social planner is
supposed to do. He should (a) recognize the imperfect reection of the decision maker,
(b) identify that her true preferences favour apples over bananas and (c) present the
di¤erent types of fruit in such a way that the decision maker chooses his apple. I ask to
myself, wouldnt it be too demanding for a social planner to do so? Is it really better
to transfer these tasks to a social planner instead of to the same decision maker? I
understand that a priori our proposal might sound di¢ cult to achieve, but what we are
proposing is indeed what clinical psychologists and psychotherapists do every day. A
therapeutic process begins by recognizing that there is a problem (point a), continues
with trying to identify true preferences (point b) and nishes by nding a solution to
it (point c) (see Hawton et al., 1989). Thus, if we want to understand the normative
implications of Behavioural Economics, we should become familiar with the literature of
Psychotherapy and clinical practice that studies the way in which people improve their
decisions and life. This thesis provides a rst step towards that aim.
As the reader may have noticed, the endogenous preference parameter is not re-
stricted to be a frame, label or default option as in the above example. It can also be
any psychological state like motivation, willpower or any endogenous situation or envi-
ronment. Here is another example. Imagine yourself deciding whether to go to the gym
or to stay at home watching TV. You are at home and your motivation to exercise is
actually low. If you reect enough to the extent that you are able to imagine yourself in
the gym, you will be able to anticipate that once you are in the gym your motivation to
exercise is high. A perfect reective decision maker will characterize the object of choice
as (gym, motivated to exercise) and (home, not motivated to exercise) and choose what
his preferences over these two alternatives dictate. In contrast, a decision maker with
imperfect reection will not anticipate that his motivation change with him going to the
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gym, and therefore will evaluate the options of staying at home or going to the gym,
from his perspective of a person with low motivation to exercise.Reection ensures a
full characterization of the object of choice (gym and motivation), internalizing all its
consequences.
In standard Economics, decision problems are presented as either assuming that
preference parameters are purely exogenous or, otherwise, the assumption of perfect
reection ensures that the decision maker will know how to deal with the endogeneity.
If any of these two assumptions held, we would be in the standard Economics world in
which most of what I will say in this thesis would not make sense. However neither of
these two assumptions is supported by empirical evidence.
The evidence in favour of the endogeneity of preference parameters is enormous. Most
if not all psychological therapies are about identifying appropriate coping strategies to
modify thoughts, beliefs, behaviour and environments to improve peoples psychological
states (see Hawton et al., 1989). People cope with stress, substance abuse, anger or anx-
iety, by changing their response to a situation (emotion-focused problem) or by changing
the environment (problem-focused coping) (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Baron (2006,
pg. 68) shows that emotions are (partly) under peoples control and argues that indi-
viduals can "induce or suppress emotions in themselves almost on cue." Some people
may even reshape their character, so that their emotional responses change. There is
also extensive work in Social Psychology that views human functioning as the product
of a dynamic interplay of personal, behavioural, and environmental inuence. Albert
Bandura, one of the main advocates of this view, points out that the way in which people
interpret the results of their own behaviour informs and alters their environments and
personal factors which, in turn, inform and alter subsequent behaviour through an "en-
vironmental feedback e¤ect." He labelled this view "reciprocal determinism" (Bandura,
1986, 1997, 2001). Finally, the evidence of endogenous preferences parameters is not
restrictive to Psychology. There is also evidence from Economics showing that dynam-
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ically inconsistent but sophisticated people actively manage their self-control problems
by choosing activities that reduce the likelihood of encountering cues that trigger binges.
For instance, people purchase costly pre-commitment devices like small packages of junk
food even when the unit price is lower for larger packages (Wertenbroch, 1998) or self-
impose costly deadlines to overcome procrastination (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).
The evidence against the assumption of perfect reection is more indirect than the
evidence against exogeneity of preference parameters. The main point of our framework
is that some people, in some situations, may fail to recognize that their preference
parameters are endogenous and that they are eventually under their own control. We
argue that this happens because people do not reach perfect reection. Evidence of the
existence of some systematic cognitive biases is enough as proof against perfect reection.
It has been shown that people misjudge self capacities to carry out certain actions
(Baumeister and Scher, 1988), mispredict a¤ective reactions overestimating regret and
rejoicing (Sevdalis and Harvey, 2007) and fail to bear in mind that they will adapt
(Fagerlin et al., 2005). Overall, the literature on a¤ective forecasting shows that people
make systematic inaccurate predictions about how they will feel in situations, even if
the situation people experience objectively matches the situation they imagined. This
proves reection certainly imperfect.
Based on the above empirical grounds, this thesis develops a theoretical framework
with endogenous preferences in which the assumption of perfect reection is relaxed. We
analyse the implications for both descriptive and Normative Economics and for public
policy and introduce novel applications.
Chapter 2 introduces the main formal model of the thesis and studies its implica-
tions for Positive Economics. Our approach relies on two key premises: (a) preferences
parameters are endogenously determined by choices and (b) the decision maker, due
to imperfect reection, may not fully internalize that e¤ect. The degree of reection
of the decision maker will determine two types of decision problems. A Standard De-
5
cision Problem (SDP) which is one in which the decision maker is reective enough
to internalize the e¤ect of his actions on his preference parameters and a "Behavioural
Decision Problem" (BDP) when the decision maker reects imperfectly and she does
not internalize such e¤ect. Importantly, a BDP assumes individual rationality in the
sense that actions are required to be consistent with preferences parameters, and for
xed preference parameters the decision-maker chooses an optimal action. It is argued
that the outcomes of a BDP correspond to Nash equilibria, and the outcomes of a SDP
to the Stackelberg equilibria, of an appropriately constructed intra-self game.
The chapter proposes a new equilibrium existence result in pure actions without
complete and transitive preferences. A result like that is important on its own, since
incomplete and non-transitive preferences are a common token in Behavioural Economics
models. Therefore, our framework not only allows the person to have imperfect reection,
but also to have incomplete knowledge of what she prefers.
It is shown that behavioural decisions are falsiable, which respond to some concern
in the literature that general behavioural models may not be falsiable (see Green and
Hojman, 2007). In addition, we show that standard and behavioural decision problems
have di¤erent testable implications. This is an important step towards the answer of
a more ambitious question on whether we could test if a person is solving a decision
problem reecting fully or not.
Next, it is shown that a BDP unies seemingly disconnected models in the literature,
from situations where the preference parameter corresponds to the decision makers cur-
rent state (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Shalev, 2000), beliefs (Geanakoplos et al.,
1989; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha and Brown, 2008), expected con-
sumption (Koszegi, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) or aspirations (Heifetz and Minelli,
2006), to models of adaptive preferences like Weizsäcker von (1971); Hammond (1976);
Pollak (1978). All these papers can be classied as models with endogenous preferences
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parameters and some degree of imperfect internalization of the feedback e¤ect1.
Finally, the chapter shows that, for almost all classes of preferences, SDP and BDP
are (outcome-wise) distinguishable from each other. The decision problems are indis-
tinguishable when (a) the feedback map is a constant or (b) the utility function is
additively separable in actions and preference parameters. In these two cases, relaxing
the assumption of perfect reection in a model with endogenous preferences is innocu-
ous, i.e. it does not have any descriptive or normative implications. However, these are
only isolated cases. We then explore some peculiar outcomes of distinguishable decision
problems.
Next, in Chapter 3, we move on to study the normative implications of the frame-
work proposed here. One of the dilemmas raised by Behavioural Economics is whether
preferences inferred (or revealed) from choices can still be used as a valid welfare metric.
Bernheim and Rangel (2009, 2008) and Rubinstein and Salant (2008) propose a norma-
tive framework that (a) relies only on observed choices and (b) encompasses situations in
which choices are a¤ected by frames or ancillary conditions. According to their welfare
relation, every action chosen within some welfare relevant choice domain is a weak
welfare optimum. The main drawback of their framework is that the set of weak welfare
optima can be very thick and therefore it brings little information for public policies
evaluation.
This thesis takes a di¤erent approach. As in standard Economics, we argue that the
person has true or normativepreferences which she satises under perfect reection.
In Friedmans (2003, p.5) words self-reection is the process in which, roughly, a whole
self takes a stance toward particular wants and values she nds herself to have.With
perfect reection the person fully characterizes the objects of choice, ranks them using
her true preferencesand chooses the object that maximizes this ranking. With perfect
reection there is no wedge between normativeand revealedpreferences. However,
1Another related paper is Caplin and Leahy (2001), that introduces anxiety into an economic model.
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if we allowed for imperfect reection as we do here, a wedge may certainly emerge and
challenges standard public Economics. We show that in general, revealed preferences
from choices do not represent normative preferences.Nevertheless, we o¤er the neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions under which, regardless the degree of reection, revealed
preferencesover actions are valid to construct welfare rankings. These conditions are
too strong though.
As we suggested in the beginning of this introduction, a perfect reective person
must (a) acknowledge the existence of a feedback map (i.e. that is acknowledging that
his or her preference parameter is not exogenous and she can do something to a¤ect it),
(b) identify his or her coping strategies (the set of actions that can be taken to a¤ect
the preferences parameters), (c) identify how such strategies a¤ect his or her preference
parameters (fully identication of the feedback map) and (d) implement her strategies
e¢ ciently. In that sense, perfect reection is equivalent to the concept of autonomy
studied in the literature of Philosophy and Psychology. Deeper reection implies deeper
autonomy. As argued by philosopher Friedman (2003, pg. 4) autonomous behaviour
is based on the deeper wants and commitments of the person, is partly caused by her
reections on and rea¢ rmations of them. To realize autonomy a person must rst
somehow reects on her wants and takes up an evaluative stance with respect to them.
Friedman (2003, pg. 4) makes very clear the endogeneity of preference parameters when
she argues that for choices and actions to be autonomous, the choosing and acting self
as the particular self she is must play a role in determining them [...] When wants
and desires lead to choice or action without having been self-reectively endorsed by
the person, the resulting choices and actions are not autonomous.By the same token,
Elster (1983, pg. 22) denes autonomous preferences (or desires) as those that have
been deliberately chosen, acquired or modied either by an act of will or by a process
of character planning.
In the intra-self game-theoretic interpretation of our framework, being autonomous
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can be understood as playing a la Stackelbergand being non-autonomous as playing a
la Cournot.So, what matters for welfare analysis in our framework is how the person
plays her intra-self game. If the person plays her game a la Stackelberg, then the revealed
preferences from choices will be equivalent to her normative preferences, and therefore,
can guide normative judgments.
Overall, this thesis provides a formal framework in which the degree of personal
autonomyemerges as a natural normative criterion.
We assess the autonomy criterion in light of the other existing non-choice base nor-
mative criteria such as opportunity (Sugden, 2004) or individual happiness (Kahneman
et al., 1997). We argue that the autonomy criterion encompasses the above mentioned
criteria in the following sense: if the person is autonomous (a) her choices will reveal
her true preferences, (b) more opportunities will never be bad and (c) her subjective
well-being may be a valid measure of her welfare. If the person is not autonomous, then
any of these criteria may not be appropriate as a normative criterion.
Then, we undertake a careful comparison of our framework with the choice theo-
retic models of Bernheim and Rangel (2009, 2008) and Rubinstein and Salant (2008)
in which observed choices are determined by frames or ancillary conditions. The main
concern of these models is whether such frames or ancillary conditions matter from a
welfare viewpoint. There are at least two diametrically opposite views: (a) the choices
of an autonomous decision maker will not depend on frames or ancillary conditions and
therefore when frames and ancillary conditions do a¤ect choices they could, in principle,
matter for welfare, and (b) frames or ancillary conditions are exogenous to choices and
are welfare irrelevant from a social planners viewpoint.
If the view is (a), we argue that the choice mappings studied in BR and RS correspond
to a decision problem where each frame or ancillary condition is consistent with any
action chosen by the decision-maker. In a BDP, the decision-maker treats the frame or
ancillary condition as given while in a SDP frames or ancillary conditions are considered
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to be characteristics of actions and are fully taken into account. We show that the set
of outcomes of a SDP is a subset of the set of outcomes of a BDP and the set of welfare
optima derived solely from observed choice contains all the actions corresponding to the
solution of a SDP. For a general feedback map from actions to preference parameters,
we show that the weak welfare optima derived from observed choice may have an empty
intersection with, or exclude elements of, the set of actions that correspond to the
outcomes of a SDP.
If, on the other hand, both frames and ancillary conditions are truly exogenous to
choices and welfare irrelevant for a social planner (case (b)), we argue that the choice
mappings studied in BR and RS are generated in a family of distinct decision problems
each indexed by a di¤erent preference parameter. In this case, the feedback from actions
to preference parameters is a constant, the outcomes of BDP and SDP coincide and
the set of welfare optima derived solely from observed choice is exactly the actions
corresponding to the solution of a SDP.
At the end of chapter 3, we analyze some policy implications of our argument.
Clearly, when the outcomes of both BDP and SDP coincide, there is no case for any sort
of intervention by a social planner. In contrast, in scenarios where the set of outcomes of
a SDP is contained in the set of outcomes of a BDP, we argue that the "libertarian pa-
ternalism" approach to policy interventions, advocated by Sunstein and Thaler (2008),
that only seeks to alter the frames or ancillary conditions of individuals might work.
However, we nish the chapter of normative implications arguing that policy interven-
tions should, in general, aim to ensure that decision-makers internalize the feedback
from actions to preference parameters.
So far, we have argued that the assumption of perfect reection in an individual
decision-making setting is strong. This assumption becomes even stronger in a N-person
strategic interaction setting. With this motivation in mind, chapter 4 extends the indi-
vidual decision framework to a game. A normal-form game with endogenous preference
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parameters and players who do not fully internalize the e¤ect of their actions is labelled
a psycho-social game.
Most of the interesting theoretical aspects of "psycho-social games" have been ex-
plored in the one-person setting introduced in chapter 2. Therefore, the focus of this
chapter is mostly on applications. We link our framework to the existent literature on
social preferences and develop two applications of psycho-social games introducing the
concept of individual commitment and empowerment into game theory.
On the theoretical front, we rst prove existence under weak assumptions, extending
the existence proof of Chapter 2. We associate psycho-social games to standard normal-
form games in two di¤erent ways and show that, typically, the set of Nash equilibria
and the set of psycho-social equilibria of an associated psycho-social game are distinct
from each other. We also show that a strict Nash equilibrium is robust to any kind
of imperfect reection. This result is consistent with Aumanns (1997) claim that "no
rationality at all is required to arrive at a Nash equilibrium" (pg. 4). This is true when
the normal-form game has a unique strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If the game
has weak or mixed strategy equilibria, then we show that some degree of "rationality"
in Elsters (1983) broad sense is needed to sustain a weak Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 5 applies our framework to study the interaction between peoples aspira-
tions and their initial extrinsic disadvantages. Debraj Ray once wrote poverty sties
dreams(2003, pg. 1). This painful but, in my view, real statement was highly inspi-
rational. As an economist, I thought: if poverty a¤ects dreams or aspirations and we
model them as preference parameters, then we would not be able to make sense of Rays
statement in a classic microeconomics model in which endowments and preferences are
orthogonal to each other. Moreover, suppose that we had a model in which endowments
a¤ect preferences. Would this e¤ect be permanent or temporary? In other words, are
dreams stied forever? or dreams would ourish as soon as an external policy (e.g. re-
laxing credit constraints) suddenly placed the poor above the poverty line. My rst
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impression when I started this Ph.D. was that poverty is a much more complex concept
than just being below or above an income threshold. This impression was conrmed
when I became familiar with the multidisciplinary literature covering the topic. Poverty
is a relative condition that is fundamentally self-perpetuating [...] and goes hand in
hand with lack of hopeMookherjee and Ray (2003, pg. 5). So the e¤ect of initial
disadvantage on psychological states like self-condence, aspirations and hope may pos-
sibly not be changed only by altering the external conditions that brought the individual
to that self-fullling equilibrium, but mainly by relaxing those psychological states that
are becoming an internal constraint to the individual. Empowerment policies have this
aim.
This phenomenon is studied in the literature of Psychology with the name learned
helplessness. The principle behind learned helplessness is that the individual infers on
the basis of stress or unhappy experiences of her or relevant others that she is incapable
of exerting control of his life and achieving desirable outcomes (Baumeister and Scher,
1988). The important thing is that such expectations or attributions about her capabil-
ities turn out to be maladaptive and become part of the persons identity. Due to this
e¤ect, initial disadvantages may a¤ect the autonomy of the individuals.
Chapter 6 provides a modest rst step to model this complex idea. We consider a
decision-maker who is endowed with an initial status and who has to choose between
two actions: one that perpetuates her initial status and one that has the potential of
improving her initial status. Otherwise, the decision-maker chooses an action that has
the potential of improving her status, she will reach her target with probability p and
stays with her initial status with probability 1-p where p is a combination of external
signals (e.g. a role model) and her subjective beliefs (e.g. self-condence). The decision
maker gets a benet from the nal status achieved and there is a cost of action which
depends on her initial status. Choosing the action that perpetuates the status-quo yields
no benet and is costless. Any attempt to change the status-quo is costly but (a) the
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cost of doing so is lower the higher is the initial status (so that the initial status is a
measure of the level of disadvantage of the decision-maker) and (b) the target status is
achieved with probability p and the benet function is increasing in the target status
(and hence, the aspiration level).
We rst show that initial advantage and self-condence are substitutes for aspira-
tions. That is, the more disadvantaged the decision-maker is (respectively the lower
self-condence), the higher aspirations she needs in order to nd it convenient to under-
take an action that has the potential to change her status-quo. The main implication
of this result is that initial disadvantage is associated with low aspirations and low
achievement.
Next, we allow for endogenous aspirations. We study the impact of a role model as a
way out of a deprivation trap. A role model provides direct information about p through
a successful experience of a "similar" other. The more similar the role model is to the
decision-maker the more likely will it be to break an aspiration failure. People choose
the sample from which to extract a role model, a so called cognitive neighbourhood.
It is shown that an initially disadvantaged decision-maker will nd it optimal to restrict
the size of her "cognitive neighbourhood" to those who are similar to her. We use this
result to construct an example to show that low aspirations and low achievement arise
in a polarized society. Finally, we allow for aspirations to be adaptively determined by
choices, applying the model introduced in Chaper 2. We show that for some medium
level of initial circumstances, a policy that increase the autonomy of the individual
creates a big positive change in his condition, without having to change her external
condition exogenously.
In short, Chapter 5 studies how initial circumstances and behaviour a¤ect aspira-
tions. The last chapter, instead, takes initial circumstances and aspirations as given and
explores a novel channel through which aspirations a¤ect behaviour. Precisely, Chap-
ter 6 enquires into what extent peoples real life income aspirations a¤ect their level of
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cooperation in general and, in particular, with whom they cooperate.
The intuition behind the rst part of the enquiry, that is, income aspirations a¤ecting
peoples cooperation is as follows. We conjecture that the marginal rate of substitution
between individual and collective welfare is decreasing on the extent to which individ-
uals income aspiration is satised. Importantly, note that this statement is di¤erent to
saying that individual and collective welfare are somehow complementary. Our state-
ment implies a one-way causality consistent with some implicit quasi-lexicographic order
between the two dimensions (individual welfare and otherswelfare). We want to in-
vestigate whether people care rst about satisfying some material needs or aspirations,
and as long as those needs are relatively satised, they start caring about the welfare or
needs of the others. Implicit in this statement, it is the view that people are not intrin-
sically either selsh or altruist as the existing literature seems to suggest, but their level
of cooperation depends on how satised their material aspirations are. This hypothesis
is grounded on two orthogonal and well-known theories. One is Simons (1955) idea
that people look for achieving satisfactory targets instead of maximizing utility. The
other is Maslows (1943) theory of hierarchy of needs. In this sense, individual material
aspirations would correspond to the lower steps of Maslows pyramid and social welfare
can be understood as the upper levels of the pyramid. The two theories support the
hypothesis that the marginal rate of substitution between both dimensions depends on
the extent to which the rst dimension is satised.
In addition to this hypothesis, we investigate whether geographical identity of the
recipients of a public goods (neighbours, compatriots or foreigners) a¤ect the propensity
to cooperate.
By combining experimental data with a post-experimental survey we nd evidence
that the more frustrated people are with their income, the lower is their propensity
to cooperate to provide global (e.g. environmental) and national public goods. We
show that it is the gap between aspirations and actual income that matters, and not
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the absolute value of income or aspirations. The quantitative e¤ect is considerably high.
Participants who are most frustrated are 46 percent more likely to free-ride on foreigners
than those who are satised with their income. As a parallel result, we found that the
e¤ect of group identity on cooperation depends on whether the public good is local,
national or global. Contrary to what is assumed in the literature on social identity
and cooperation, in-group identication with compatriots does not a¤ect participants
contributions to a national public good, although it does a¤ect contributions to local
and global public goods.
My hope is that, if I managed to convince you that it is worth having a look at this
thesis, you will enjoy it. This piece of work is just a snap-shot of what I have investigated
during this Ph.D. journey and by no means have all my questions been answered. Many
of them are still pending and others have now been opened as a result of this thesis. I






This chapter develops the main theoretical framework of the thesis and studies its im-
plications for descriptive Economics. Our approach relies on two key premises: (a)
preferences parameters1 are endogenously determined by choices and (b) the decision
maker, due to imperfect reection, may not fully internalize that e¤ect. The degree of
reection of the decision maker denes the procedure of choice. We consider two rather
extreme types of decision problems. A Standard Decision Problem(SDP) which is one
in which the decision maker is reective enough to internalize the e¤ect of his actions
on his preference parameters and a "Behavioural Decision Problem" (BDP) when the
decision maker reects imperfectly and she does not internalize such e¤ect2.
Our model can be considered as a reduced-form representation of an intra-personal
1Throughout the thesis we use "psychological states" or "preference parameters" interchangeably.
They should be interpreted as any pay-o¤ relevant parameter that can eventually be a¤ected by the
choice of the individual. Mood, beliefs, aspirations, attitudes, emotions or values are some examples.
2We study two extreme cases to gain theoretical understanding of the entire framework. We ac-
knowledge, though, that many "realistic" and maybe interesting situations are somewhere between
both decision problems. We consider this case in the public policy section in Chapter 3.
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game between two selves. A "conscious" self-1, who chooses actions to maximize his
utility, and an "unconscious" self-2, who chooses psychological states to minimize some
deeper psychological needs like anxiety, frustration or fear. The Nash equilibria of this
intra-personal game are equivalent to the outcomes of a BDP, while the Stackelberg
equilibrium is equivalent to the outcome of a SDP. A person who solves her intra-
personal game a la Stackelberg is autonomous3, that is, she is in control of her own
psychological states. A non-autonomous person, in contrast, is the person who solves
her own intra-personal game a la Nash, choosing an action taking the psychological
states of self-2 as given4.
The chapter begins by introducing a simple example of reference-dependent prefer-
ences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) which highlights, in a simple and intuitive way,
the key aspects of our general framework in a simple and intuitive way and it pregures
what we do in the rest of the chapter.
Section 2.3 introduces the general formal framework. Theorem 1 (sub-section 2.3.1)
proposes a new equilibrium existence result in pure actions without complete and tran-
sitive preferences. A result like that is important on its own, since incomplete and non-
transitive preferences are a common token in Behavioural Economics models. Therefore,
our framework not only allows the person to have imperfect reection, but also to have
incomplete knowledge of what she prefers. In addition, sub-section 2.3.2 studies the
testable restrictions of our theory. Proposition 1 shows that the behavioural decisions
are falsiable, which respond to some concern in the literature that general behavioural
models may not be falsiable (see Green and Hojman, 2007). It is shown that standard
and behavioural decision problems have di¤erent testable implications.
Section 2.4 shows that BDPs unify seemingly disconnected positive Behavioural Eco-
3Autonomy is the regulation by the self (Ryan and Deci, 2006). In Greek: "Auto-Nomos" - nomos
meaning "law": one who gives oneself his/her own law. We review this concept more in detail in the
last section of this chapter and notably in chapter 3.
4For the rest of the paper, we refer to the person not having control of her psychological states as
equivalent to the person taking her preference paramenters or psychological states as given.
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nomics models. This make BDPs a natural framework to study general properties of
Behavioural Economics models.
Next, we devote section 2.5 to the analysis of indistinguishability. Proposition 2
introduces the necessary and su¢ cient conditions over preferences for SDP and BDP
to be (outcome-wise) indistinguishable from each other. Theorem 2 shows that for
almost all classes of preferences, SDP and BDP are (outcome-wise) distinguishable from
each other. In particular, decision problems are indistinguishable from each other when
(a) the feedback map is a constant or (b) the utility function is additively separable
in actions and preference parameters. In these two cases, relaxing the assumption of
perfect reection in a model with endogenous preferences is innocuous, i.e. it does
not have descriptive or normative implications. Section 2.5.3 explores some peculiar
outcomes of distinguishable decision problems.
In section 2.6 we show an example that illustrates how to introduce the notion of
"coping strategies" into a general individual decision-making framework. Our account
includes models of dynamic inconsistent preferences and self-control problems (Bernheim
and Rangel, 2004, 2005) but by all means it is not restricted to them.
The chapter ends with a short review of relevant literature in Philosophy and Psy-
chology that supports our theoretical framework.
2.2 Example: Reference-Dependent Preferences
This example has two aims. It highlights the key aspects of our general framework in a
simple and intuitive way and it pregures what we do in the rest of the chapter.
Consider a person who has to decide whether to stay in the status-quo, q; or to
change, a. The cost of changing is c. The person derives utility from a K-dimensional
bundle of outcomes, x, u(x) =
P
k uk(xk):The utility that the person derives from the
decision to change, u(a), depends on the state of the world, s = 1; :::; S with a probability
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ps associated to each state of the world. The expected utility is denoted by U(x) =P
s psu(x). A person will change her status-quo if and only if the expected pay-o¤ of
changing is higher than the pay-o¤ from remaining in the status-quo, U(a) > U(q):
X
s
psu(a)  c > u(q) (2.1)
The policy implications of this problem are well-known in standard Economics. A
change in prices, information, utility parameters (e.g. risk aversion) or the cost of
changing will a¤ect individual behaviour.
Now consider the same problem in a context of a behavioural model with reference-





[uk(xk) + vk(xk   rk)] ; (2.2)
where vk(xk   rk) is a value function dened over gains and losses relative to a
reference point rk as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Think of the rst
part of the utility function
P
k uk(xk) as the outcome-based utility usually studied
in Economics and the second part
P
k vk(xk   rk) as the reference-dependent gain-loss
utility.Suppose v(x) = x if x  0, v(x) = x;  > 1 if x < 0 and v(0) = 0. Since
 > 1; v(x) is steeper in the loss side, so this functional form captures the idea of loss-
aversion: losses (or outcomes below the reference point) loom larger than corresponding
gains (or outcomes above the reference point).
For expository purposes, suppose there are only two dimensions of choice, K = 25.
The status-quo option is dened by q = (q1; q2) and the alternative option is a = (a1; a2),
5A tipical example of two possible dimensions are mugs and money.
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q1 > a1 and q2 < a2. As it happens with any reference-dependent theory, its predictions
depend crucially on what determines the reference point. One of the possible avenues is
to equate the reference point with expectations (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). If the person
expects to maintain the status-quo (respectively to change), her reference point will be
equated to the status-quo (respectively to the alternative). In this way, the reference
point or expectations is endogenously determined by the identity map  : fq; ag !
fq; ag. To complete this example, suppose the person has rational expectations so that
she is able to predict her own behavior6. Thus, the only two possible outcomes (in pure
actions) of this decision problem are (a; r = a) and (q; r = q).
If the person has expectations to remain in the status-quo, her reference point will
be r = q and given that, she will chose to remain in the status-quo if and only U(q; r =









uk(ak) + vk(ak   qk)
#
  c (2.3)
In which case (q; r = q) is a behavioural outcome.
Alternatively, if the person expects to change, she will use r = a as a reference point,
and given that, she will chose to change if and only if U(a; r = a) > U(q; r = a):
X
k









In which case (a; r = a) is a behavioural outcome.
In contrast to the unique outcome of the problem of standard Economics with which
we started the example, this problem with reference-dependent preferences has two be-
havioural outcomes: remaining in the status-quo expecting to do so (q; r = q) and
changing the status-quo expecting to do so (a; r = a). More importantly, note that the
6As Koszegi and Rabin (2006) we rule out situations where the action implied by optimal behaviour
conditional on expectations does not coincides with expectactions.
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Note that condition 2.5 is equivalent to condition 2.1: U(a; r = a) > U(q; r = q)
, U(a) > U(q). Therefore, if the person could eventually choose her reference point,
she would choose r = a and the positive and normative implications of the behavioural
decision problem would be equivalent to those of the standard decision problem.
An important message from this simple example is that this person would be (at
least weakly) better-o¤ if she internalized the feedback e¤ect from her actions to the
reference point. However, we keep the welfare analysis for next chapter, and we devote
this chapter to study the descriptive implications of the general framework.
2.2.1 Individual Decision Problem as an Intra-personal Game
Behind the model of endogenous reference-dependent preferences presented above, there
is an intra-personal game between two di¤erent selves, self-1 and self-2. Self-1 chooses
x 2 X and self-2 chooses r 2 R. Self-1, can be thought to be the "conscious" part of our
selves, the one that a third person observes making choices. Self-2, can be interpreted
as the "unconscious" part of the person, the one that aims to satisfy deeper inner
psychological needs such as anxiety, fear or peace of mind. For instance, self-2 may
prefer to expect to remain in the status-quo in order to minimize frustration, to believe
that her job is safe to reduce fear, or to be an optimist to minimize anxiety. Each self
has preferences over actions and reference-points, which may or may not conict with
each other. In the context of our example of above, preferences of self-1 are represented







[uk(xk) + vk(xk   rk)]  c (2.6)
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and preferences of self-2 can be thought of being a cost function that self-2 aims to




r2   r:x (2.7)
One can interpret self-2s "preferences" as if she looks for a balance between ex-
pectations and actions. We can think that self-2 does not like feeling frustrated if she
mispredicts her actions7. Formally, self-2s best reply is (x) = argminr02R c2(x; r0).
Consistent with the assumption of rational expectations imposed in the example, self-2
best reply is the identity map (x) = x:
Therefore, our example can be modeled as an intra-self game in which the best reply
function of self-1 is
(r) =
8><>: q whenever r = q;a whenever r = a; (2.8)
and the best reply function of self-2 is (x) = x for each x 2 X.
If the decision maker plays this intra-self game as a simultaneous move game, the
Nash equilibrium is a decision state (x; r) for which x 2 (r) and r = (x). This is
exactly the denition of a behavioural equilibrium which will be formally introduced in
next section. However, if one of the selves is allowed to control the other selfs decisions,
then the appropriate solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Suppose that
the decision maker solves her intra-self game as a "Stackelberg leader." In our example,
she will anticipate that if she plays a her self-2 would play r = a. Since (a; r = a) =
argmaxx2Xu(x; (x)), (a; r = a) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the intra-personal
game or the "Stackelberg equilibrium." Note that (a; r = a) is also the unique outcome
of the Standard Decision Problem in our example.
7This could be interpreted as a psychological foundation for rational expectations: self-2s best
response motivated by psychological needs makes the person chooses what she expects to have.
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2.2.2 Remarks from the Example
The above simple example of reference-dependent preferences highlights several impor-
tant features that motivate the rest of this chapter.
(a) Theoretical implications
(a.1) Synthesis: In the example above, the reference points are peoples expec-
tations. More generally, r can be any pay-o¤ relevant preference parameter that can
eventually be a¤ected by peoples will. This include mood, points of view, beliefs, aspi-
rations, attitudes, emotions or values. In this sense, as we show in Sub-section 2.4, this
model becomes a reduced-form representation of seemingly disconnected models in the
literature, each model assuming a di¤erent X;R; u and some implicit feedback .
(a.2.) Intra-personal normal-form game: In the same way we showed in our
example, the vast range of models that are reduced to our framework can also be modeled
as an appropriate intra-self normal-form game between two selves, one choosing actions
and the other choosing preference parameters. Whether the decision maker solves her
intra-self game a la Nash or a la Stackelberg has important positive and normative
implications.
(a.3.) Adaptive dynamics: although it is not explicit in the example, it can
be easily shown that a behavioural equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium of an intra-self
game is the steady state of an adaptive dynamics over actions and psychological states.
A behavioural equilibrium is reached after people adapt their reference-point to their
actions8.
(c) Positive implications: the way in which the person solves her intra-self
game may generate di¤erent economic predictions. We have learned that the outcome
8This may not happen in pure actions though. We allow also for counteradaptive preferences which
is the opposite phenomenon of adaptive preferences (Elster, 1983, pg. 111). Example 5 illustrates this
point.
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(q; q);given the preferences assumed in the example, would never be an outcome of a
SDP. In such case, the two decision problems are "theoretically" distinguishable from
each other. However, under some conditions over preferences, it may not matter the
degree of reection of the decision-maker. In Section 2.5, we o¤er the general conditions
on preferences under which any two decision problems with the same X;R; u and  are
distinguishable from each other.
(d) Testable implications: our framework opens new questions regarding identi-
cation of the decision process. Suppose we only observe actions chosen for any pos-
sible sub-set of actions. Can we identify whether the person is being perfectly re-
ective or not? In Section 2.3, we show that both decision problems have di¤erent
testable implications. That is, there are data that are behavioural-rationalizable and not
standard-rationalizable, every outcome that is standard-rationalizable is also behavioral-
rationalizable, and there are outcomes that are not behavioural-rationalizable.
(d) Normative implications: A status-quo bias (q; q) would not be a possible
outcome of a model in which preference parameters were endogenous and decision-makers
were assumed to be perfectly reective. Therefore, the assumption on how the decision-
maker plays her intra-personal game is crucial for normative analysis. More importantly,
the revealed preference for choosing the status-quo over changing it when the person is
trapped in a status-quo bias is not an appropriate indicator for welfare. In Chapter 3
we address this issue and characterize the general conditions on primitive preferences
under which revealed preferences can be recovered as an appropriate welfare indicator.
(e) Policy implications: this example already pins down the fact that the ex-
isting public policies of standard Economics may not be su¢ cient. In the case where
there is a status-quo bias, one could consider three distinctive policies: (a) to a¤ect r
exogenously, (b) to a¤ect the expectations formation itself or (c) to a¤ect the decision
process enhancing the abilities of the individual to choose the optimal reference point. In
economics terms, this latter policy can be interpreted as learning how to play the intra-
24
personal game as a Stackelberg leader. In philosophical and psychological terms, it can
be interpreted as gaining individual autonomy. We discuss these concerns in Chapter 3.
The rest of the chapter introduces the general model and studies in a general way
the insights highlighted by this example.
2.3 The General Framework
A (complex) decision scenario D = (A;P; ;) consists of a set A  <k of actions, a set
P  <n of psychological states9, a mapping  : A ! P modelling the feedback e¤ect
from actions to psychological states and a binary relation  ranking pairs of (a; p) in
(A P )  (A P ). It is assumed that  (a) is single-valued and non-empty for each
a 2 A; and <k and <n are nite dimensional Euclidian spaces. The binary relation 
assumes that the individuals are not only able to rank actions given a psychological state
(i.e. (a; p)  (a0; p)), but also that they are able to rank psychological states for a given
action (i.e. (a; p)  (a; p0)). This assumption is analogous to the one made by Harsanyi
(1953).
A decision state is a pair of action and psychological state (a; p) where a 2 A and
p 2 P .
The preferences of the decision-maker are denoted by. The expression f(a; p) ; (a0; p0)g 2
is written as (a; p)  (a0; p0) and is to be read as "(a; p) is weakly preferred to (equiva-
lently, weakly welfare dominates) (a0; p0) by the decision-maker".
A consistent state is a decision state (a; p) such that p = (a). Let
(A) = fp 2 P : 9 a 2 A s.t. p =  (a)g
be the set of consistent psychological states, and
9I decided to call p psychological state, but it can be interpreted more broadly as any preference
parameter that is potentially a¤ected by individual behaviour.
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 = f(a; p) 2 (A P ) : p =  (a) for all a 2 Ag
be the set of consistent decision states.
There are two types of decision problems studied here:
1. A standard decision problem (SDP ) is one where the decision-maker chooses a
pair (a; p) within the set of consistent decision states. The outcomes of a SDP are
denoted by M where
M = f(a; p) 2 
 : (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 
g :
2. A behavioral decision problem (BDP ) is one where the decision maker takes as
given the psychological state p when choosing a. Dene a preference relation p over A
as follows:
a p a0 , (a; p)  (a0; p) for p 2 P .
The outcomes of a BDP are denoted by E where
E = f(a; p) 2 
 : a p a0 for all a0 2 Ag :
Suppose P = A and a = (a). In this case, the decision problems studied here o¤er a
way of modelling situations where "the reference state usually corresponds to the decision
makers current state." (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, pg. 1046). The following
examples show that whether the decision-maker correctly anticipates the feedback e¤ect
from actions to the preference parameter or not, will have an impact on the decision
outcomes.
Example 1 (M  E)
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig ; i = 1; 2,
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and (ai; ai)  (aj; ai), j 6= i and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but
E = f(a1; a1) ; (a2; a2)g.
Example 2 (M 6= ?, E 6= ?, M \ E = ?)
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig, i = 1; 2, and
(a2; aj)  (a1; aj), j = 1; 2, and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). In words, a2 is preferred in all states
and it is better to be in state a1:Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but E = f(a2; a2)g.
Example 3 (M 6= ?, E = ?)
Consider a decision problem where A = P = fa1; a2g, (ai) = faig, i = 1; 2, and
(aj; ai)  (ai; ai), i 6= j, and (a1; a1)  (a2; a2). Then, M = f(a1; a1)g but E is empty.
2.3.1 Existence
It is not hard to check that as long as both A and P are nite and (a) is single-valued
for each a 2 A, a random equilibrium exists, i.e. E is not empty. Instead, this chap-
ter studies existence in situations where the underlying preferences are not necessarily
complete or transitive and underlying action sets are not necessarily convex. Mandler
(2005) shows that incomplete preferences and intransitivity is required for "status quo
maintenance" (encompassing endowment e¤ects, loss aversion and willingness to pay-
willingness to accept diversity) to be outcome rational. Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
argue that reference-dependent preferences may not be convex. So we allow preferences
to be incomplete, non-convex and acyclic (not necessarily transitive) and we show exis-
tence of a behavioural equilibrium in pure actions extending Ghosals (2006) result for
normal-form games to behavioural decision problems10.
10The seminal proof for existence of equilibria with incomplete preferences in Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1975) requires convexity both for showing the existence of an optimal choice and using Kakutanis x-
point theorem.
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Theorem 1 (Existence) Suppose  : A ! P is increasing in A. Under assumptions
of single-crossing, quasi-supermodularity and monotone closure, a pure action behavioral
equilibrium exists.
2.3.2 Testability
Our model is about two distinctive theories of individual behaviour: one characterized
as a Standard Decision Problem (SDP ) and the other as a Behavioral Decision Problem
(BDP ). Are these theories falsiable? If so, are the testable implications of each theory
di¤erent from each other? Below we show that the answer to these questions is Yes,
they are falsiable and have di¤erent testable implications.
A theory is falsiable if there exists some outcome that cannot be rationalized as an
equilibrium of that theory. For example, standard choice theory is falsiable if Arrows
(1959) choice axiom holds11. Arrows choice axiom states that when the set of feasible
alternatives shrinks, the choice from the smaller set consists precisely of those alterna-
tives that were selected from the larger set and remain feasible, if there are any. What
can we say about our two theories?
Take u : A P ! < as a numerical representation of ;  : A! P and a family ~A
of subsets of A. Dene two correspondences, c^ and ~c, from ~A to A as
c^(A0) = argmaxa2A0u(a; (a))
and
~c(A0) = fa : a 2 argmaxa2A0u(a; (a)g;
so, the choices of the standard (autonomous) and behavioural (non-autonomous) person,
respectively.
Assume that A, P and all A0 2 ~A are convex subsets in <. If we assume that
11For an example of a general behavioural model that is not falsibiable see Green and Hojman (2007).
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v(a) = u(a; (a)) is strictly concave, then c^(A0) is single-valued. On the other hand, if
A = P = [0; 1], (a) = a and
u(a; p) =  (a  p)2   (1=2  p)2; (2.9)
then v is strictly concave and c^(A0) = f1=2g, but ~c(A0) = A.
Then, the concern is that the explanatory power of ~c is null. Suppose that we observe
a correspondence H from ~A to A such that H(A0)  A0. One may want to test two
type of null hypothesis, one weak and the other strong. A weak null hypothesis for SDP
would be that there exist P ,  and u such that v is strictly concave and H(A0)  c^(A0).
Under this null, it must be that H is single-valued and satises the strong axiom of
revealed preferences, i.e. SDPs have strong restrictions. However, if we want to test the
weak null hypothesis for BDP that there exist P ,  and u such that v is strictly concave
and H(A0)  ~c(A0); then a BDP does not seem to be falsiable.
This latter observation does not apply if we impose a stronger hypothesis and require
that H(A0) = ~c(A0)12. So suppose that we want to test this strong hypothesis and
suppose that H captures all the choices of the person. We know that under the null that
there exist P ,  and u such that H(A0) = c^(A0), we have that
C.3: If A00  A0 and a 2 H(A0) \ A00 then a 2 H(A00); and
C.4: If fa; a0g  H(A00) \ A0 and a 2 H(A0) then a0 2 H(A0)
ConditionC.3 is analogous to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Axiom and
Condition C.4 to the Weak Congruence Axiom13. Under the null that there exist P , 
and u such that H(A0) = ~c(A0), we have that C.3 holds but C.4 doesnt hold. C.3 holds
12The cost of testing this stronger null hypothesis is that we have to assume that we observe in our
data all the points in ~c(A0) when we apply the test. Note that this assumption is not needed in the
rst case, since the null hypothesis guarantees that c^(A0) is single-valued, so if we observe one point of
c^(A0), under the null, we are observing all the points.
13(see Sen, 1971)
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because if a 2 argmaxa02A0u(a0; (a)) and a 2 A00  A0, then a 2 argmaxa02A00u(a0; (a)):
To show that C.4 doesnt hold if the null is strong, consider the following example:
A = fa1; a2; a3g, P = fp1; p2g, (a1) = (a3) = p1, (a2) = p2, and u(a; p) is:





In this case, ~c(A) = fa1g but ~c(fa1; a2g) = fa1; a2g.
We can summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Testability) If the null hypothesis is weak, then SDPs have strong
testable restrictions and BDPs do not. However, if the null hypothesis is strong, there are
data that are behavioural-rationalizable and not standard-rationalizable, every outcome
that is standard-rationalizable is also behavioral-rationalizable, and there are outcomes
that are not behavioural-rationalizable.
2.4 Reduced form Representation
The example of Section 2.2 aimed to illustrate in a simple way the positive and nor-
mative implications of the two key premises of our model: (a) preferences parameters
change with actions and (b) people may not fully internalize this change. But how rep-
resentative are these two premises of the existing literature? It can be shown that these
two premises are enough to unify seemingly disconnected models in the literature, from
situations where the preference parameter corresponds to the decision makers current
state (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Shalev, 2000), beliefs (Geanakoplos et al., 1989;
Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), emotions (Bracha and Brown, 2008), expected consumption
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(Koszegi, 2005; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006) or aspirations (Heifetz and Minelli, 2006),
to models of adaptive preferences like Weizsäcker von (1971); Hammond (1976); Pollak
(1978).
In this section, we review some of these models and show how our model can be
obtained as a reduced form representation of them.
2.4.1 Psychological games with a single active player
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) (hereafter, GPS) study psychological games where the payo¤s
of each player depend not only on the actions chosen by all other players but also on
what other players believe, on what she thinks they believe others believe and so on.
Each player takes beliefs and actions of other players as given when choosing her own
action. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to actions actually chosen. In
the special case where there is a single active player, the payo¤s of this single active
player can depend on his own actions and the beliefs of other players over his own
actions. Consider a two player psychological game. Player 1 is the active player with
a set of pure actions S and mixed actions  = (S). A belief for player 2 is denoted
by b 2 B = . The payo¤s of player 1 over pure actions is given by a utility function
u : A  B ! < with v (; b) = Ps2S  (s)u (s; b) being the corresponding payo¤s over




2   B s.t. (i) b^ = ^, (ii)








. Clearly, by setting A = P =  and  as the identity
map, a behavioral decision problem is a psychological game with one active player. GPS
show that there are robust examples where the two sets M and E di¤er.
Example of self-image
Suppose Pat is concerned with what Jane will think about him. He can take a bold
decision, which exposes him to the possibility of danger, or a timid, safe decision. Thus,
his action space is A = fbold; timidg. Pats payo¤s not only depends on what he does
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but also on what he thinks Jane thinks about his character. In other words, Pat cares
about what he thinks Jane thinks he will do. Suppose that Pat himself is a timid person,
so he would prefer to think that Jane thinks he is timid rather than bold. But he also
doesnt want to disappoint Jane, so if he thinks Jane expects him to be bold, hed rather
be bold than timid. Pat chooses bold with probability b and timid with probability 1 b.
Let q represent Janes expectations of b and ~q represents Pats expectations of q. The
game and payo¤s are described in the following matrix 2.11:
~q 1  ~q
bold timid
b bold 1 2
1  b timid 0 3
(2.11)
The consistency requirement between actions and preference parameters of a behavioral
equilibrium implies that we must have b = q = ~q. Beliefs must correspond to equilibrium
play, yet they can still exercise a decisive inuence on Pats behavior. In this game, there
are two welfare-ranked behavioral equilibria in pure strategies14. An optimal equilibrium
in which b = q = ~q = 0 with payo¤ 3, and a sub-optimal equilibrium b = q = ~q = 1
with payo¤ 1.
It would be optimal for Pat to believe that Jane believes he is timid (~q = 0), but if she
does not believe so (q = 1), Pat will meet her beliefs and play bold (b = 1) reinforcing
Janes beliefs. In such case, Pat will end up doing something that he wouldnt do, was he
able to internalize that playing timid would make Jane believe that he is indeed timid.
If Pat reected in that way, he would solve a standard decision problem in which b = 0
is the unique (Stackelberg) equilibrium. But in this behavioral decision problem, Pat is
playing a la Nash in his intra-personal game against his self-2 who set the beliefs about
what Jane believes. Self-2 "best reply" to Pat is to assign a probability equal to 1 to
14There is one equilibrium in mixed strategies, but we leave it aside for simplicity.
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what Pat does.
2.4.2 Loss aversion games with a single player
Shalev (2000) considers a class of games where players have reference dependent utilities
and the reference utility depends on the action prole chosen by all players. Shalev
denes two notions of equilibrium, a myopic loss aversion equilibrium and a non-myopic
loss aversion equilibrium. In either equilibrium notion, each player takes as given the
actions of others when choosing her actions. In a myopic loss aversion equilibrium, a
player also takes as given the reference utility when choosing her actions (even though
changing her actions might change the reference utility). In a non-myopic loss aversion
equilibrium, a player takes into account the feedback e¤ect from her actions to the
reference utility when choosing her actions. A single player version of Shalevs model




u(s) if u(s)  r
u(s)   (r   u(s)) if u(s) < r ; (2.12)
r is the reference utility and u : S ! < is a standard utility function. A consistent
reference point r satises the equation r = w(; r). Let R () = fr 2 <jr = w(; r)g.
Shalev proves that R () is single valued and its values are contained in the closed
interval [r; r]. Clearly, setting A = , P = [r; r] and (a) = R (), a behavioral decision
problem is a myopic loss aversion decision problem while a non-myopic loss aversion
decision problem corresponds to a standard decision problem. Shalev shows that in the
static version of his model M = E although the two sets di¤er in dynamic settings.
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2.4.3 Reference dependent consumption and personal equilib-
rium
In Koszegi and Rabin (2006), a persons utility depends not only on her K-dimensional
consumption bundle, c, but also on a reference bundle, r. She has an intrinsic con-
sumption utilitym(c) that corresponds to the standard outcome-based utility. Over-
all utility is given by u(cjr) = m(c) + n(cjr), where n(cjr) is gain-loss utility. In
their chapter, both consumption utility and gain-loss utility are separable across di-
mensions, so that m(c) =
P
kmk(ck) and n(cjr) =
P
k nk(ckjrk). They assume that
nk(ckjrk) =  (mk(ck) mk(rk)), where (:) satises the properties of Kahneman and
Tverskys (1979) value function. Following Koszegi (2005) they dene a personal equilib-
rium as a situation where the optimal c computed conditional on forecasts of r coincides
with r. Clearly, by setting A and P to be the set of feasible consumption bundles and
 to be the identity map, a personal equilibrium can be represented by a behavioral
decision problem15. Under the assumptions made in their paper, Koszegi and Rabin
(2006) show that in deterministic settings M = E while the two sets di¤er in stochastic
settings
2.4.4 Aspiration traps
Heifetz and Minelli (2006) study a model of aspiration traps where an individual in
period t = 0 makes a choice e 2 E 0, at a cost c(e). For a given choice e, the decision





the strategy set of the individual is X, her payo¤ function is ue : X  B ! <, and
the utility of the individual depends on her attitude (beliefs, aspirations) b 2 B. When
choosing a strategy x(e; b) at t = 1 to maximize ue, the individual takes as given both
15An analogous statement can be made for Koszegi and Rabin (2007), since the solution concepts
they use (i.e. unacclimating personal equilibrium, UPE and preferred personal equilibrium, PPE) are
examples of a "personal equilibrium" dened in Koszegi (2005). The major feature of these solution
concepts is that the decision maker does not internalize the e¤ect of her choice on her expectations (or
reference point).
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b and e. However, given e, b is determined by some preference formation mechanism
 : E 0 ! B. At t = 0, Heifetz and Minelli consider two modes of choice. When choice is
"transparent", the individual would "see through" the preference formation mechanism.
At t = 0, she would then choose e to maximize ue (x (e;  (e)))   c (e). When the
individual choice is "self-justifying", her choice of e satises a no-regret condition
ue (x (e;  (e)))  c (e)  ue (x (e0;  (e)))  c (e0) for all e0 2 E 0. (2.13)
By setting A = E 0, P = B and (a) =  (e), it is easily checked that a transparent
choice problem corresponds to a standard decision problem while a self-justifying choice
problem corresponds to a behavioral decision problem. Along the lines of example 1,
they show that M  E.
2.4.5 Adaptive Preferences
Pollak (1978) denes the concepts of short run and long run demand functions associated
with an adaptive preference mechanism. He models habit formation by assuming that a
households preference depend on its past consumption. Households preference ordering
in period t is denoted by ct 1, where ct is the consumption vector for period t. The
statement ct ct 1 c0t means that the household nds ct at least as good as c0t, given the
consumption history ct 1: The short-run demand functions are denoted by ct = h(Pt;mt;
ct 1), where Pt is the vector of prices in period t andmt is the total expenditure in period
t. The long-run demand functions c = H(P;m) are dened to be the steady-state
solution to the short-run demand functions: H(P;m) = h [P;m;H(P;m)] : What this
older literature of the 70s including Weizsäcker von (1971); Hammond (1976); Pollak
(1978) called long run preferences are equivalent to the preferences over actions given
p, when p = (a).
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2.5 Indistinguishability
How relevant is the distinction between a BDP and a SDP? In this section, we state
the conditions under which BDP and SDP are indistinguishable from each other. In
those cases, BDP and SDP are outcome-equivalent and it is not worth making the
distinction, although we show that this happens in very rare circumstances. In fact, in
smooth settings, both decision problems are generically distinguishable. We then explore
some peculiar outcomes of distinguishable decision problems.
2.5.1 Indistinguishability
A BDP is indistinguishable from a SDP if and only if M = E; i.e. the same choices
are made in each model. Note that indistinguishability is, from a normative viewpoint,
a compelling property. What matters for welfare purposes is the ranking of consistent
decision states, which is the preference relation that a fully autonomous decision maker
will use to make a decision. When M = E, the outcomes (consistent decision states) of
a SDP coincide with that of a BDP , and in that case, there is no reason to distinguish
between normative and revealed preferences.
If  (a) =  (a0) for all a; a0 2 A, a BDP is, by construction, indistinguishable from
a SDP 16. So suppose the map  has at least two distinct elements in its range. Next,
consider the following conditions:
C.1: For a; a0 2 A such that a p a0 for p = (a), (a; p)  (a0; p0) for each p = (a)
and p0 = (a0);
C.2: For (a; p); (a0; p0) 2 
 such that (a; p)  (a0; p0), (a; p)  (a0; p) for p = (a).
16In this case, all possible decision states (a; p) are consistent and therefore, the procedure of choice
(or the autonomy of the person) does not a¤ect the outcome of the decision. Both, non-autonomous
and fully autonomous decision makers will rank the outcomes in the same way and will choose the
maximum outcome of the ranking.
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C.1 ensures that no behavioural equilibrium is sub-optimal, whereas C.2 ensures
that any standard equilibrium is also a behavioral equilibrium. Note that preferences
in Example 1 violate C.1 but satisfy C.2 while the preferences in Example 2 violate
both C.1 and C.2. Shalev (2000) shows in Theorem 1 that in the static case his loss
averse preferences satisfy both C.1 and C.2. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) show that their
reference dependent preferences also satisfy both C.1 and C.2. GPS construct examples
where, with one active player, bothC.1 andC.2 are violated. Heifetz and Minelli (2006)
construct examples where C.1 is violated.
In the following proposition, we state that C.1 and C.2 are the necessary and su¢ -
cient conditions for indistinguishability.
Proposition 2 (Indistinguishability) Suppose that both E and M are non-empty.
Then, (i) E M if and only if (C1) holds. (ii) M  E if and only if (C2) holds.
2.5.2 Smooth Decision Problems
To further understand the conditions under which indistinguishability occurs, it is conve-
nient to look at smooth decision problems where decision outcomes are characterized by
rst-order conditions. We show that for the case of smooth decision problems, behavioral
decisions are generically distinguishable from standard decisions.
A decision problem is smooth if (a) both A and P are convex, open sets in <k
and <n respectively, (b) preferences over A  P are represented by a smooth, concave
(component-wise) utility function u : A P ! < and (c) the feedback map  : A! P
is also smooth and concave.
A set of decision problems that satises the smoothness assumptions is diverse if and
only if for each (a; p) 2 AP it contains the decision problem with utility function and
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feedback e¤ect dened, in a neighborhood of (a; p), by
u+ p (2.14)
and
   (a0   a) (2.15)
for each a0 in a neighborhood of a and for parameters (; ) in a neighborhood of 0.
A property holds generically if and only if it holds for an open set of decision problems
of full Lebesgue measure within the set of diverse smooth decision problems.
Theorem 2 (Genericity) For a diverse set of smooth decision problems, a standard
decision problem is generically distinguishable from a behavioral decision problem.
Eq. (3) shows in a simple quick way that BDP and SDP are indistinguishable only
in isolated cases (e.g. when (a) or u(a; p) are just constants).
Now that we know that making a distinction between BDPs and SDPs is a relevant
route to take, we will explore some interesting peculiarities of distinguishable decision
problems which pin down important policy implications. Our theoretical illustrations
can be empirically complemented with Beshears et al. (2008), who describe situations in
which revealed preferences deviate from normative preferences, or in our words, situa-
tions in which decision problems are distinguishable. They identify factors that increase
the likelihood of having distinguishable decision problems, and discuss approaches to
the identication of normative preferences when decision problems are distinguishable.
2.5.3 Distinguishable Decision Problems
We present a few examples that illustrate behavior that would be impossible to ratio-
nalize in a standard individual decision framework. In all these examples we assume, for
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simplicity, that A and P are nite sets and (a) is the identity map. The preferences of
the decision maker are represented by an utility function u : AP ! <. We distinguish
between pure and random behavioral decisions. Let (a^) = argmaxa2A u (a; a^). A pure
action behavioral equilibrium is an action prole a such that a 2 (a). Let (A)
denote the set of probability distributions over the set of actions. A random strategy is
 2 (A), where (a) is the probability attached to action a. A random distribution
over the set of psychological states is  2 (A), where (a^) is the probability attached
to psychological state a^. A random decision state is a pair (; ). Given a random







A consistent random decision state is a pair (; ) where  = . A random behavioral
equilibrium is a prole  such that  2 argmax2(A)w(; )17.
In each example, the decision problem is represented by a payo¤ table where rows
are actions and columns are the psychological states. Under the assumptions made so
far, consistent decision states are the diagonal of these payo¤ tables.
Example 4 A unique ine¢ cient behavioral decision in dominant actions: addiction





17I acknowledge feedback from the PhD examiners on the fact that this denition of random be-
havioural equilibrium assumes stochastic independence between actions and psychological states, in-
validating the feedback e¤ect. A perfect correlated equilibria might have been a better approach to
undertake. In any case, a random behavioural equilibrium has been dened to introduce some examples
as illustrations but the main results of this thesis are not a¤ected by this denition.
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We interpret these payo¤s as an example of addiction where a2 corresponds to smoking
and a1 corresponds to not smoking and pi to di¤erent health states of the individual
(p2 is less healthy than p1). In this case, in a behavioral decision problem, the decision
maker always chooses a2 as a2 is the dominant action for each value of p: if the individual
takes her health state p as given she always prefers to smoke. The unique behavioral
decision outcome is (a2; p2) with a payo¤of 0. However, note that the consistent decision
state (a1; p1) with a payo¤ of 1 is the only element of M : once the individual takes the
feedback from actions to health states into account, she always chooses not to smoke






We interpret these payo¤s as an example of a situation where the individual makes a
choice between two di¤erent lifestyle so that pi denotes a specic lifestyle and ai denotes
the action that chooses location pi. Starting from p1, the decision-maker prefers a2 to
a1 while starting from p2, the decision-maker prefers a1 to a2: the individual always be-
lieves that the grass is greener on the other side. There is no behavioral decision in pure
strategies. The decision-maker is, however, indi¤erent between both the two consistent
decision-states (a1; p1) and (a2; p2).
This example demonstrates that, in general, E may be empty even whenM isnt. How-
ever, given the discussion so far, a behavioral decision outcome can be interpreted as a
Nash equilibrium of a two person game so that as long as A and Q are nite, a mixed
strategy behavioral decision outcome always exists.
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Example 6 Equilibrium in weakly dominated actions and domination by random ac-
tions
p1 p2 p3
a1 0 0 0
a2 0 1 2
a3 0 2 1
(2.19)
In this example, there are two behavioral equilibria, one in pure actions, (a1; p1) and











p3). Note that in the pure action equilibrium (a1; p1)












p3), the decision-maker is strictly better o¤ than at (a1; p1). Note also
that there is no pure action that (strictly) dominates a1 although there are a continuum
of random actions qa2 + (1  q) a3, 0 < q < 1, that strictly dominates a1.





We interpret these payo¤s as an example of an aspiration failure. Let a1=as under-
taking an action that perpetuates the status quo and a2=undertaking that changes the
status quo, with p2 ="high aspirations" and p1 ="low aspirations" being the consistent
psychological states associated with a1 and a2 respectively. In this example, there are
two strict behavioral decision outcomes (a1; p1) and (a2; p2). Note that the pure ac-
tion equilibrium (a1; p1) is dominated by the pure action equilibrium (a2; p2). When
decision-makers aspirations are high, (a2; p2)  (a1; p2); while when her aspirations are
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low, (a2; p1)  (a1; p1). Thus, the behavioral decision outcome (a1; p1) is an instance of
an aspirations failure.
Example 8 More information may make the decision-maker worse-o¤
Consider a decision problem with payo¤ relevant uncertainty, with two states of the
world f1; 2g where the payo¤ tables are
1 !
p1 p2 p3













a3 0 0  1
(2.22)
Suppose, to begin with, the decision-maker has to choose before uncertainty is resolved.




















It follows that the unique behavioral equilibrium is (a2; p2) with expected payo¤ 3.
Next, suppose that the decision-maker knows with probability one the true state of
the world. Then, when the state of the world is 1, a3 strictly dominates all other
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actions and the unique behavioral equilibrium is (a3; p3) with payo¤ 1 and when the
state of the world is 2, a1 strictly dominates all other actions and the unique behavioral
equilibrium is (a1; p1) with payo¤ 1. Therefore, the decision-maker is worse-o¤ with
more information1819.
Example 9 Autonomy versus non-autonomy
Consider the payo¤ table in matrix 2.18. In that example, if the decision maker took
into account the feedback e¤ect from actions to the utility parameter and maximized
the induced utility function v(:), v(a1) = v (a2) = 0. Therefore, a fully autonomous
decision-maker who takes into account all the consequences of her actions would obtain
a payo¤ of 0. However when the decision-maker doesnt take this feedback e¤ect into












p2) with an expected payo¤ of 12 > 0. On the face of
it, it would seem that a non-autonomous decision-maker will be better-o¤ than a fully
autonomous decision-maker. But this interpretation isnt strictly true. In fact, if a fully
autonomous decision maker is also allowed to choose mixed strategies in the payo¤ in








As dened in the introduction of this thesis, a complex decision is one in which (generally
unobserved) payo¤-relevant preference parameters are determined endogenously as part
of the choice. All the examples and cases considered so far in this chapter assume that
18Note that in this example we are referring only to information that solves the uncertainty about
exogenous states of the world. Our statement "the decision-maker is worse-o¤ with more information"
would not be right in the case in which additional information helps the decision-maker to control her
own feedback e¤ect, i.e. to gain autonomy.
19This result is consistent with Carrillo and Mariottis (2000) results, although they use a dynamic
model with time-inconsistent preferences.
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the actions needed to a¤ect the preference parameters are all in the action set. Take
Section 2.2. example on reference-dependent preferences as an illustration of this point.
The action set there is A = fa; qg and the reference points are simply the expectation
over actions. Since the person will adapt her expectations to her choices (though she
does not anticipate so), whatever action she chooses from A will determine her reference
point. Same happens with all the models reviewed in Section 2.4. It may also be of
interest to consider complex decisions in which the set of actions needed to change the
relevant preference parameters of the decision problem is not accounted by the decision-
maker as part of the problem. Here we present an example to illustrate this point.
Suppose that the action set is A = fa1=study, a2=dont studyg and the set of
preference parameters is P = fp1=feel motivated to study, p2= dont feel motivated to
studyg. For the moment suppose that p 2 P is exogenous.
You have an exam tomorrow. There is no uncertainty and the options are very
straightforward: if you study, you pass the exam; if you dont study, you dont pass it.
Unfortunately, life is not as simple as this problem suggest. Your willingness to study
depends also on your motivation. If you are lucky enough to feel motivated to study,
you will study and get u(a1; p1) = 3. If you happen to feel unmotivated to study, you
will not study and get u(a2; p2) = 0. In this case, since p 2 P is exogenous, there is
nothing you can do to get u() = 3, but pray for a higher motivation next time!
Suppose now that p 2 P is not purely exogenous, i.e. your motivation can be a¤ected
by your own choices. Suppose that you discover that after jogging in the park, you begin
feeling motivated to study. So, if you are reective enough, you will consider A0 = fa3 =
jogging, a4 =not joggingg to be part of your original problem of studying. Moreover, you
should include the existence of a function  that maps A0 ! P , a3 7! p1 and a4 7! p2
as part of the decision problem. If you are a behavioural person, you will think that p
is exogenous to you. If you feel you are motivated to study, you will choose not to do
jogging, sit-down, study and get u(a1; a4; p1) = 2. However, by doing so you are making
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a mistake, i.e. you are disregarding the fact that your motivation is endogenous, and it
comes only when you do jogging. Since you choose to study without jogging, this will
trigger p2 via ; and you end up in the worst equilibrium you could get, (a2; a4; p2), in
which you are not motivated to study and you neither study nor do jogging. As long
as you keep believing that your motivation is exogenous to you (belief sustained with
imperfect reection), you will be trapped in a self-defeating equilibrium.
This problem can be described in the following matrix:
u(a; p) p1 p2
(a1; a3) 1  1
(a2; a3) 0  1
(a1; a4) 2  1
(a2; a4) 0 0
(2.24)
The consistent decision sates are f(a1; a3; p1); (a2; a3; p1); (a1; a4; p2); (a2; a4; p2)g:There
is one behavioural equilibrium, (a2; a4; p2) with utility = 0 and one standard equilibrium,
(a1; a3; p1) with utility = 1.
Note that in this reinterpretation of the original problem, the net utility of passing
the exam is u(a1; a3; p1) = 1 instead of u(a1; p1) = 3 as it originally was. This is because
we assume that reaching the right motivation to study has a cost, which is doing some
jogging. Of course, life would be easier if we have the gift of always being cheaply
motivated to do what we want. But, unfortunately, this is not always the case, and it
would be benecial to know how to deal with it.
Lets recapitulate and analyze what this story is telling us. The most important
part is that the person is eventually able to escape on his own from this self-defeating
equilibrium. In order to do so, she will have to re-interpret the problem in a di¤erent
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way. Namely, she must become aware that the decision problem is not anymore a simply
choice of an a 2 A given some exogenous p 2 P , but it is one in which she must choose
a pair of actions (a; a0) 2 A A0, and an endogenous p 2 P with an associated map
. When she identies that p 2 P is not exogenous as originally thought, she has
made the rst important step towards a change: realizing that there exists a map and
she would make a mistake if she does not internalize the feedback e¤ect. At this time
she will know that she can do something to change his motivation, but still she may
not know how. The second step is, then, to identify A0 and the map . She needs
to become aware that it is by jogging and not by doing other activity that brings her
the right motivation to study. In other words, she needs to identify his coping strategy.
Depending on the complexity of the map ; this learning exercise could be easier to grasp
with therapy sessions. Alternatively, this learning outcome could eventually be achieved
from observing someone similar to the decision maker who has already experimenting
the map .
Coping strategies are also mentioned in models of addiction and dynamic-inconsistent
preferences. Dynamic-inconsistent sophisticated people understand their self-control
problem and actively try to cope with it by choosing actions that reduce the likelihood of
encountering cues that trigger binges. There is evidence of people purchasing costly pre-
commitment devices like self-imposed deadlines (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002) or small
packages of junk food, even when the unit price is lower for larger packages (Werten-
broch, 1998).
2.7 Psychological and Philosophical grounds for our
Premises
Our framework relies on three key conceptual ideas. First, there is a feedback e¤ect
from actions to preference parameters that may not be fully internalized by the decision
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maker. Second, the individuals best interest is dened in the space of outcomes only
when the feedback e¤ect is internalized. Third, the individual always chooses what she
judges best for her. In this section, we briey review part of the literature in Social
Psychology and the moral Philosophy that supports these conceptual ideas.
On the Social Psychology front, there is extensive work led by Albert Bandura who
views human functioning as the product of a dynamic interplay of personal, behavioral,
and environmental inuence. Bandura points out that the way in which people interpret
the results of their own behaviour informs and alters their environments and personal
factors which, in turn, inform and alter subsequent behaviour through an "environmen-
tal feedback e¤ect." He labelled this view reciprocal determinism(see Bandura, 1997,
2001). In line with Banduras theory, there is a great deal of work favouring the hypothe-
sis that the individuals actions may a¤ect preference parameters. For example, Lazarus
and Folkman (1984) argue that people are able to cope with stress, anger or anxiety,
by changing their response to a situation (emotion-focused problem) or by changing the
environment (problem-focused coping). Baron (2006, pg. 68) shows that emotions are
partly under our control and argues that individuals can "induce or suppress emotions
in themselves almost on cue." Baron argues that some people may even reshape their
character, so that their emotional responses change.
On the philosophical front, the state of acting against ones better judgment has
been studied since Plato and it has been labelled Akrasia20. In the dialogue, Socrates
sustains that akrasia is an illogical moral concept, claiming No one goes willingly
toward the bad (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the
way she determines to be best, she will actively pursue this action. In accordance
to the normative principle advocated in this chapter, Socrates postulated that an all-
things-considered assessment of the situation will bring full knowledge of a decisions
outcome and worth linked to well-developed principles of the good. Davidson (2001),
a contemporary American philosopher, argued that when people act in akrasiathey
20In ancient Greek: Akrasia means lacking command(over oneself)
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temporarily believe that the worse course of action is better, because they have not made
an all-things-considered judgment, but only a judgment based on a subset of possible
considerations.
The concept of personal autonomy has been subject of study specially in the literature
of Philosophy (Friedman, 2003) and Psychology (Ryan and Deci, 2006). As Ryan and
Deci (2006) point out, an act to be autonomous it must be endorsed by the self, fully
identied with and owned. They also stress that "autonomy is not dened by the absence
of external inuences but rather by ones assent to such inuences or inputs. Autonomy
is thus not equivalent to independence." (pg. 1561). When autonomously functioning,
people are more deeply engaged and productive, generating human capital and welfare
(Woo, 1984). Ekstrom (2005) stress that autonomous acts proceed from ones core self,
representing those preferences and values that are wholeheartedly endorsed. Dworkin
(1988) maintains that people are autonomous only to the extent that their rst order
motives are endorsed at a higher order of reection. As Ryan and Deci (2006) illustrate, a
man who decides to "have another drink" would not be autonomous unless, in reecting
on this motive, he could fully endorse it. A lack of full endorsement would imply that
the act is not autonomous. Moreover, Dworkin (1988) underscores that autonomy does
not require behaving without or against constraints. For example, "although one might
feel constrained in stopping for a school bus, if one assents to the value of tra¢ c laws
for ensure childrens safety, one could willingly consent to the constraint and, in doing
so, lose no autonomy."
As for the empirical part, self-determination theory (SDT) in Psychology provides
a comprehensive picture of the importance of autonomy for well-being. Autonomy is
considered a basic psychological need.
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2.8 Conclusion
We o¤ered a simple individual decision-making framework which is suitable for the study
of general positive and normative implications of Behavioural Economics.
We made four contributions to the existing literature. First, we unied seemingly
disconnected models, from more recent positive Behavioural Economics models to older
models of adaptive preferences. Second, we proposed a new equilibrium existence result
in pure actions without complete and transitive preferences. Third, we showed that
behavioural decisions are falsiable and that standard and behavioural decision problems
have di¤erent testable implications. Fourth, we proved that in almost all the cases,
behavioural and standard decisions are distinguishable from each other.
The chapter leaves some theoretical and empirical questions unanswered. We shall
address some of these questions in the following chapters and identify others for future






This chapter studies the normative implications of the framework proposed in this thesis.
Standard Normative Economics employs the revealed preference approach to extract
welfare measures from behaviour. The preferences revealed from the individuals choices
are assumed to be identical to the normative preferences representing the individuals
true interest. People are assumed to choose what is best for them. Vast empirical
evidence, however, has identied an array of situations in which individuals often do
not do what is best for themselves establishing a wedge between normative and revealed
preferences1. This situation raises a fundamental problem for economic welfare analysis:
how can an appropriate criterion for analysing welfare be identied if the individuals
1Some of this evidence has been highlighted in the introduction of this thesis. For more evidence,
see Loewenstein and Ubel (2008) who point out that in the "heat of the moment," people often take
actions that they would not have intended to take and they soon come to regret. Koszegi and Rabin
(2008) give examples of people making systematic mistakes (gamblers fallacy, projection bias, etc).
Bernheim and Rangel (2005) record situations in which it is clear that people act against themselves:
an anorexic refusal to eat; some people save less than what they would like; fail to take advantage
of low interest loans available through life insurance policies; unsuccessfully attempt to quit smoking;
maintain substantial balances on high-interest credit cards; etc.
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choices fail to provide clear guidance on the individuals best interest?
In this chapter, we aim to contribute to this discussion by making use of the frame-
work introduced in Chapter 1. Our approach is the following. As it is tradition in
Economics, we argue that the person has true or normativepreferences which she sat-
ises under perfect reection. In Friedmans (2003) words self-reection is the process
in which, roughly, a whole self takes a stance toward particular wants and values she
nds herself to have(p. 5). With perfect reection the person fully characterizes the
objects of choice, ranks them using his or her true preferencesand chooses the object
that maximizes this ranking. Perfect reection ensures that normativeand revealed
preferences are equivalent concepts. However, as soon as we allow for imperfect reec-
tion, the wedge between the two concepts may certainly arise challenging traditional
public Economics. Indeed, Proposition 4 (pg. 56) of this chapter shows that in general,
without perfect reection and without further restrictions/information on the feedback
e¤ect, revealed preferences from choices do not represent normative preferences.
Nevertheless, we o¤er the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which, regardless
the degree of reection, revealed preferencesover actions are valid to construct wel-
fare rankings. It turns out, as expected, that these conditions are very strong.
In the lens of our framework, a perfect reective person must (a) acknowledge the
existence of a feedback map (i.e. her preference parameter is not exogenous and she
can do something to a¤ect it), (b) identify her coping strategies (e.g. the set of actions
that can be taken to a¤ect the preferences parameters), (c) identify how such strategies
a¤ect her preference parameters (i.e. fully identication of the feedback map) and (d)
implement her strategies e¢ ciently. Observe that reection implies autonomy. As ar-
gued by philosopher Friedman (2003, pg. 4) autonomous behaviour is based on the
deeper wants and commitments of the person, is partly caused by her reections on and
rea¢ rmations of them.To achieve autonomy a person must rst somehow reect on
her wants and take up an evaluative stance with respect to them. Friedman (2003, pg.
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4) makes very clear the endogeneity of preference parameters when she argues that for
choices and actions to be autonomous, the choosing and acting self as the particular self
she is must play a role in determining them [...] When wants and desires lead to choice or
action without having been self-reectively endorsed by the person, the resulting choices
and actions are not autonomous.By the same token, Elster (1983, pg. 22) denes au-
tonomous preferences (or desires) as those that have been deliberately chosen, acquired
or modied either by an act of will or by a process of character planning.
In the intra-self game-theoretic interpretation of our framework, being autonomous
can be understood as playing a la Stackelbergand being non-autonomous as playing
a la Cournot.So, what matters for welfare analysis is how the person plays her intra-
self game. If the person plays her game a la Stackelberg, then the revealed preferences
from choices will be equivalent to her normative preferences, and therefore, can guide
normative judgments.
We begin this chapter by relating our framework to choice theoretic models (Bern-
heim and Rangel, 2009, 2008; Rubinstein and Salant, 2008)2 in which observed choices
are determined by frames or ancillary conditions (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). The main con-
cern of these models is whether such frames or ancillary conditions matter from a welfare
viewpoint. There are at least two diametrically opposite views: (a) the choices of an
autonomous decision maker should not depend on frames or ancillary conditions and
therefore when frames and ancillary conditions do a¤ect choices they could, in principle,
matter for welfare, and (b) frames or ancillary conditions are exogenous to choices (if
they appear endogenous this only because the decision problem isnt correctly specied)
and are welfare irrelevant from a social planners viewpoint3.
2Hencerford BR and RS respectively.
3RS dene a frame as "observable information that is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the
alternatives, but nonetheless a¤ects choice" (RS, 2008, abstract). For BR an ancillary condition is "an
exogenous feature of the choice environment that may a¤ect behavior, but is not taken as relevant
to a social planners evaluation" (BR, 2008, p. 4). Further quotations: "(...) if the individuals
behavior appears to determine the ancillary condition endogenously, the decision problem has been
dened incorrectly. For example, if he can choose to make his selection .... under one of two conditions,
A or B, then it is inappropriate to describe A and B as endogenous ancillary conditions. Rather, the
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If the view is (a), we argue that the choice mappings studied in BR and RS correspond
to a decision problem where each frame or ancillary condition is consistent with any
action chosen by the decision-maker. In a BDP, the decision-maker treats the frame or
ancillary condition as given while in a SDP frames or ancillary conditions are considered
to be characteristics of actions and are fully taken into account. In Proposition 5 (pg.
59) we show that in a world the welfare criterion proposed by BR is equivalent to the
binary relation revealed from choices of a non-autonomous person. In Proposition 8 (pg.
61) we show that (i) the set of outcomes of a SDP is a subset of the set of outcomes of
a BDP and (ii) the set of welfare optima derived solely from observed choice contains
all the actions corresponding to the solution of a SDP. We conclude that the autonomy
criterion can be applied to BRs approach as an evidence-based criteria for pruning
elements of the welfare-relevant domain.
For a general feedback map from actions to preference parameters, we show that the
weak welfare optima derived from observed choice may have an empty intersection with,
or exclude elements of, the set of actions that correspond to the outcomes of a SDP.
If, on the other hand, both frames and ancillary conditions are truly exogenous to
choices and welfare irrelevant for a social planner (case (b)), we argue that the choice
mappings studied in BR and RS are generated in a family of distinct decision problems
each indexed by a di¤erent preference parameter. In this case, the feedback from actions
to preference parameters is a constant, the outcomes of BDP and SDP coincide and
the set of welfare optima derived solely from observed choice is exactly the actions
corresponding to the solution of a SDP.
Next, in Section 3.4, we assess the autonomy criterion in light of the other existing
non-choice base normative criteria such as opportunity (Sugden, 2004) or individual
happiness (Kahneman et al., 1997). We argue that the autonomy criterion encompass
correct ancillary condition describes the two-stage decision process." (BR, 2008 p. 34); "treating a
condition of choice as a welfare-relevant characteristic of available objects would seem to defy common-
sense...classifying it as an ancillary condition should be relatively uncontroversial" (p. 35).
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the above mentioned criteria in the following sense: if the person is autonomous (a) her
choices will reveal her true preferences, (b) more opportunities will be always good and
(c) her subjective well-being may be a valid measure of her welfare. If the person is not
autonomous, then any of these criteria may not be appropriate as a normative criterion.
In Section 3.5 we analyze some policy implications of our argument. Clearly, when the
outcomes of both BDP and SDP coincide, there is no case for any sort of intervention
by a social planner. In contrast, in scenarios where the set of outcomes of a SDP is
contained in the set of outcomes of a BDP, we argue that the "libertarian paternalism"
approach to policy interventions, advocated by Sunstein and Thaler (2003, 2008), that
only seeks to alter the frames or ancillary conditions of individuals might work. We
nish this chapter of normative implications arguing that policy interventions should,
in general, aim to ensure that decision-makers internalize the feedback from actions to
preference parameters.
Finally it is important to mention that although the positive models are fairly di¤er-
ent, the most closely related approach to our work is proposed by Manzini and Mariotti
(2009). They propose a particular decision-making procedure in which decision-makers
categorize alternatives before choosing (CTC). Certainly, CTC decision-makers are not
perfectly reective, and it is left to see to what extent CTC decision problems di¤er from
BDPs in terms of their axiomatic structure. In an important contribution for welfare
analysis, Manzini and Mariotti (2009) show that by means of choice data alone, they
can uniquely recover the underlying binary relation maximized in the post-categorization
stage. In that way, the CTC procedure can pin down a valid welfare ranking from choices,
under the assumption that people make decisions categorizing and then choosing.
3.2 Choice with Ancillary Conditions or Frames
Bernheim and Rangel (2009, 2008) (hereafter BR) and Rubinstein and Salant (2008)
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(hereafter RS) model choice problems where observed choices are determined by frames
(RS) or ancillary conditions (BR). Examples of frames or ancillary conditions include
the order in which candidates are listed on a ballot, default alternatives, salience of the
alternative, deadline for making a choice (RS) or the point in time at which a choice is
made, the manner in which information or alternatives are presented, the labeling of a
particular option as the status-quo, the salience of a default option, or exposure to
an anchor (BR). For both BR and RS, frames or ancillary conditions are exogenous to
the individual at the point when choices are made. Formally, in both papers, binary
relations are constructed solely on observed choice and it is shown that such derived
binary relations can be used to rank actions available to the decision-maker from a
welfare viewpoint4.
We assume that both A and P are non-empty nite sets containing at least two
elements each.
Both BR and RS study generalize (or extend) choice problems (A; p) where p is a
frame or an ancillary condition. An individuals choices5 are described by a correspon-
dence c(A0; p)  A0 where A0 2 ~A the set of all non-empty subsets of A and further,
that c(A0; p) is non-empty for all pairs (A0; p). Dene BRs binary relation P as aPb6
i¤ for all admissible (A0; p) with a; b 2 A0, b =2 c(A0; p). In BRs words a is said to be
strictly unambiguously chosen over b7. Dene aRb i¤ aPb: there is some generalized
choice problem where both a and b are present and a is chosen. Dene aIb i¤ aRb and
aRb: there is some generalized choice problem where both a and b are present and a is
chosen and some other generalized choice problem where both a and b are present and
b is chosen. BR show that R is necessarily complete: for any a and b the individual
must necessarily choose either a or b from any (fa; bg ; p). Moreover, they also show that
4There are some technical di¤erences between the two frameworks (see next section). Further, BR
focus on the welfare implications of such framework while RS relate their framework to classical model
of choice.
5RS study choice functions while BR allow for choice correspondences.
6For ease of exposition, since we allow for choice correspondences and focus on normative implications
of choice, we follow BR although we note that RS also derive a preference relation similar to P.
7In words, the statement "aPb" means that whenever a and b are available, b is never chosen.
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none of the binary relations need be transitive although they do show that P is acyclic
i.e. for any a1,...,aK , if akPak+1 then  aKPa1. BR, then, go on to make the following
denition:
Denition 1 (Weak welfare optimum, BR, 2008) It is possible to strictly improve
on a choice a 2 A if there is b 2 A such that bPa. When a strict improvement is
impossible, a is dened as a weak welfare optimum.
BR show the following result that underpins their welfare analysis:
Proposition 3 (Fact 1, BR, 2008) If a 2 c(A0; p) for some (A0; p), then a is a weak
welfare optimum.
Our framework suggests that what matters for welfare purposes is the ranking over
consistent decision states, 
. The important question is whether revealed preferences
over actions can be used to rank consistent decision states as well. Example 4 (Section
2.5.3, pg. 39) shows that this is not always the case. In that example, a2 is always chosen
and a1 is never chosen. Therefore, a2 is a strict (and hence, weak) welfare optimum as
dened by BR. However, the decision state (a2; p2) is dominated by (a1; p1) and so the
individuals revealed preferences over actions cannot be used to rank consistent decision
states in this example, and it is this latter raking that matters for welfare assessments.
The following proposition states a necessary and su¢ cient condition for revealed
preferences to rank consistent decision states.
Proposition 4 (Behavioural implies Standard) Let a 2 A be a weak welfare opti-
mum. Then, any consistent decision state containing a; weakly welfare dominates any
other decision state containing a0 6= a, a0 2 A if only if condition C.1 holds.
Recall that condition C.1 was dened in Chapter 2 to prove indistinguishability.
It is a necessary and su¢ cient condition to ensure that no behavioural equilibrium is
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sub-optimal, i.e C.1 ensures E  M . Proposition 4 is telling us that even if we lived
in a world with imperfect reection and without further restriction or information on
the feedback map, BRs binary welfare relation would yet be representative of the true
preferences of the decision-maker, if an only if her true preferences satisfy condition C.1.
The strength of this requirement will depend on the specic positive theory to which
BRs approach is applied. For example, C.1 is satised by the reference dependent
preferences introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) or by the static version of Shalevs
preferences with loss aversion (Shalev, 2000). However, C.1 is not always satised in
some psychological games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) or in models of aspirations traps
(Heifetz and Minelli, 2006).
3.2.1 Characteristics of the object of choice
Both BR and RS make the point that, in practice, it is di¢ cult to draw a distinction
between characteristics of elements in A and variables in P which could also be viewed
as characteristics of elements in A. In any actual decision problem studied in their
papers, an individual takes the frame or ancillary condition as given when choosing an
action. As already pointed out in the introduction, there are two mutually exclusive
interpretations of choice with frames or ancillary conditions.
If the starting point is that the choices of a fully reective decision-maker would never
depend on frames or ancillary conditions, it is possible to relate the choice scenarios in
BR and RS to those studied here by assuming that (a) = P for all a 2 A as each
frame or ancillary condition is consistent with any action chosen by the decision-maker.
Therefore, the outcomes of a SDP which correspond to the choices of a fully reective
decision-maker do not depend on frames or ancillary conditions as all characteristics of
actions are taken into account. In this way, the fully reective decision-maker chooses
a pair (a; p) 2 A  P . In contrast, in a BDP the objects of choice are a 2 A taking
as given p 2 P and therefore frames or ancillary conditions impact on choices and may
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matter from a welfare viewpoint.
The following two examples distinguish between the outcomes of a standard and
behavioral decision problem behavioral decision problems when (a) = P for all a 2 A.
Example 10 (Default Options) A possible interpretation of p emphasized in both
BR and RS is that of a label attached to objects of choice (such as "default options").
Consider A = fa; a0g and P = fp ="a is the default option", p0 ="a0is the default
option"g. In a standard decision problem, the individual will consider the label as a
characteristic of the available objects and choose the optimal pair (a; p) 2 A  P . In
a behavioral decision problem, however, she will take the label as given when making a
choice without considering it as a characteristic pertaining to the object, and may choose
a over a0 at p and a0 over a at p0.
Example 11 (Dynamic inconsistency) If P = ft = 1; t = 2; t = 3g and A = fa1; a2; a3g
where at ="complete task at t, do nothing at t0 6= t", t = 1; 2; 3. In a standard decision
problem, the individual will choose both (at; t) 2 A  P , while in a behavioral decision-
problem the individual will take t as given so that, for example, at t = 1; a2 will be
chosen while at t = 2, a3 will be chosen, thus being dynamically inconsistent.
Alternatively, if both frames and ancillary conditions are truly exogenous to choices
and welfare irrelevant for a social planner, it is possible to relate the choice scenarios
in BR and RS to those studied here by assuming that for all a 2 A, (a) = pc for
some xed pc 2 P . In this case, each p 2 P indexes a distinct decision problem (with a
di¤erent ) and in each of these distinct decision problems M = E.
3.3 Choice and Welfare
The framework studied in this thesis implies that welfare ranking should take place over
consistent decision states using the preference relation . The approach of RS and BR,
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on the other hand, is based solely on choice data. In this section, we compare and
contrast the normative implications of our decision model with choice with frames or
ancillary conditions.
We begin by assuming that (a) = P for all a 2 P and we maintain this restriction
on  for the next three propositions because this is the way we understand BRs and
RSs approach in the lens of our framework.
What matters for welfare for BR and RS is the binary relation P constructed solely
from choices. In contrast, what matters for welfare in our model is the ranking of
consistent decision states. The important question then is whether the ranking over
actions using their binary relation P coincides with the xed underlying true preference
relation % over the set of consistent decision states.
Lets introduce the following notation. For any A0 2 ~A, let c^ (A0)  A0 be dened as
the choice correspondence of a standard (autonomous) decision maker:
c^ (A0) = fa 2 A0 : (a; p)  (a0; p0)8a0 2 A0 and p0 2 (a0)g (3.1)
and let ~c (A0)  A0 be dened as the choice correspondence of a behavioural (non-
autonomous) decision maker:
~c (A0) = fa 2 A0 : (a; p)  (a0; p)8a0 2 A0 and some p 2 (a)g : (3.2)
Dene the "revealed standard" binary relation aP^b i¤ for all admissible (A0; p) with
a; b 2 A0, b =2 c^(A0) and dene the "revealed behavioral" binary relation a~Pb i¤ for all
admissible (A0; p) with a; b 2 A0, b =2 ~c(A0) with R^;bI and ~R;eI dened analogously.
We begin by stating the following result as an immediate consequence of the analysis
presented so far:
Proposition 5 (Equivalence of P and ~P) Suppose (a) = P for all a 2 A. Then,
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~c (A0) = [p2P c(A0; p) and ~P = P.
Proposition 5 tells us that in a world in which every frame or ancillary condition
should be considered as a characteristic of the object of choice, then the welfare criterion
proposed by BR is equivalent to the binary relation revealed from choices of a non-
autonomous person.
In what follows, we assume that the decision maker always solves a behavioral de-
cision problem so that observed choice is described by ~c(A0) for each A0  A. Let W^
denote the set of weak welfare optima corresponding to P^ and let ~W denote the set of
weak welfare optima corresponding to P and ~P. The following proposition examines
the link between W^ and ~W .
Proposition 6 (Standard implies Behavioural) Suppose (a) = P for all a 2 A.
Then, M  E, c^ (A0)  ~c (A0) and W^  ~W .8
Corollary 1 (E is non-empty) From Proposition 6 as long as M is non-empty, so is
E.
Proposition 7 (M is non-empty) Moreover, if the strict preference relation  over
A P corresponding to  is acyclic, M (and hence E) is non-empty.
The importance of Proposition 6 is that in a world in which every frame or ancillary
condition should be considered as a characteristic of the object of choice, the set of
weak welfare optima derived solely from choice contains all the actions corresponding
to outcomes of a SDP. Basically, in such a world, any standard equilibrium is also a
behavioural equilibrium (i.e. C.2 is satised). The problem here is that the reverse
of this statement may not be true. There may be weak welfare optima derived from
observed choices which do not correspond to outcomes of a SDP. The following example
illustrates such case:
8Recall that M is the set of all outcomes (a; p) of a standard decision problem and E is the set of
all outcomes (a; p) of a behavioral decision problem.
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Example 12 (Aspirations) Modify the example 7 (Section 2.5.3, pg. 41) so that
(a) = P for all a 2 A with no other changes. In this case, W^ = fa1g  ~W = fa1; a2g.
Therefore, a2 2 ~W but a2 =2 W^ .
One of the main criticisms of BRs normative criterion is that the set of individual
weak welfare optima can become very large and even may get to have the same dimension
of the set of alternatives. Proposition 6 identies autonomy as a possible compelling
criteria for pruning GCSs from the welfare-relevant domain (see BR, 2008, pg. 33).
Recall that so far we have restricted the feedback map to be the entire set of frames or
ancillary conditions, following the interpretation that every frame or ancillary condition
should be considered as a characteristic of the object of choice. In Proposition 8 we
relax this assumption to examine the conditions under which the conclusion derived in
Proposition 6 extends to the case when (a)  P for some a 2 A. In this case, it is
possible that the weak welfare optima derived from observed choices may have an empty
intersection with actions corresponding to elements in M .
In Example 4 (Section 2.5.3, pg. 39), W^ = fa1g \ ~W = fa2g is empty whereas in
Example 5 (Section 2.5.3, pg. 40), W^ = fa1; a2g but ~W is the empty set. In both
examples, the weak welfare optima derived from observed choice have no connection
with the actions corresponding to maximal consistent decision states. However, if both
examples are modied so that (a) = P for all a 2 A with no other changes, then,
in the now modied Example 4, W^ = ~W = fa2g while in the modied Example 5,
W^ = ~W = fa1; a2g.
The following proposition states that a necessary and su¢ cient condition to obtain
this conclusion for a general (:) is C:2.
Proposition 8 (Standard implies Behavioural. The general case) Suppose (a) 
P for some a 2 A. Then, W^  ~W i¤ C:2.
Finally, when for all a 2 A, (a) = pc for some xed pc 2 P . In this case, each
61
p 2 P indexes a distinct decision problem and in each of distinct decision problems,
M = E. For each p 2 P , and any A0 2 ~A, let c^ (A0; p)  A0 be dened as the choice
correspondence of a standard decision maker and let ~c (A0; p)  A0 be dened as the
choice correspondence of a behavioral decision maker. Clearly c (A0; p) = c^ (A0; p) =
~c (A0; p) and the corresponding set of weak welfare optima all coincide.
3.4 Non-choice-based Welfare Criteria
As shown above, in general, preferences revealed from choices may not represent a clear
guidance for making welfare assessments in our model, even if we applied BRs gen-
eralized criterion. Alternative criteria that base welfare on the individuals happiness
or opportunity rather than choices avoid dealing with revealed preferencesproblems.
Below we briey review these alternative criteria in light of our framework, and argue
that they would not seem to provide unambiguous welfare guidance if we relaxed the
assumption of perfect reection.
3.4.1 Criterion based on Happiness or Experienced Utility
Kahneman et al. (1997) distinguish between experienced utility, which is a revival of
the original hedonic conception of cardinal utility proposed by Bentham in 1789, and
decision utility, which reects the attractiveness of options as inferred from the individ-
uals decisions. They claim that experienced utility is both measurable and empirically
distinct from decision utility, and they propose to use the former as a relevant crite-
rion for evaluating outcomes. Kahneman (2000) argues that experienced utility is best
measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present, such
as self-reports of current well-being. The question that is generally asked to measure
subjective well-being is: how happy are you, overall?
An important concern to explore in this context is whether the measures of "sub-
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jective well-being" of an autonomous individual are comparable to those measures of a
non-autonomous individual. We conjecture that the answer is No. Here we present our
argument that is only speculative, acknowledging that future research on this topic is
highly important and needed.




Suppose the decision-maker is non-autonomous and chooses a2. If she is asked how
happy she is, she may well assess her level of happiness relative to what she thinks she
can achieve given a xed reference point p2. Since 0 >  1 she might report a high
subjective level of wellbeing because she certainly believes she cannot do better! She is
as good as she can be, given that she is solving the game a la Nash. Maybe, the level
of happiness reported is equivalent to the level of happiness reported by an autonomous
decision-maker who would compare the utility she gets, 1, with the utility she could
have gotten with an alternative action, 0: In both cases, the di¤erence of utility is +1;
so both, the autonomous and the non-autonomous person would in principle report the
same level of happiness, although clearly the non-autonomous person should be happier
if she was autonomous. There might be an intermediate situation, in which the decision
maker, for some reason, understands that she could eventually solve this game a la
Stackelberg, but she cannot. In this case, we conjecture that she might report lower
levels of happiness than if she had not realized about the endogeneity of her preference
parameters. The reason being that now she would be able to compare the happiness she
could get if she changed, 1; with what she is currently getting, 09: These thoughts can
be summarize in the following conjecture.
9This version of the model, however, does not allow a situation in which the decision maker is aware
that she could play the game in a di¤erent way but she doesnt. This type of extension of the model
will be considered for further research.
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Conjecture 1 (On subjective well-being) Subjective well-being measures may pro-
vide ambiguous welfare guidance in the context of a BDP . If one still wanted to use
such a measure, it should then be necessary to identify how autonomous the individual
is at the moment to provide an answer to the subjective well-being question.
3.4.2 Criterion based on Opportunities
Sugden (2004) proposes an "opportunity criterion" to guide welfare assessments. The
normative principle behind his approach is that both the opportunity to choose between
alternative options and the individual responsibility have moral value. Sugdens norma-
tive criterion is, therefore, not only based on the value that is attached to the "size and
the richness" of the opportunity set, but also on the assumption that each individual
"must take responsibility for how he uses his opportunities" (Sugden, 2004, pg. 1016).
The conception of responsibility is crucial to provide value to "opportunity." A person
is responsible if "at each moment in her life, she identies with her own actions, past,
present and future" (pg. 1018) whether or not her preferences change. As far as I un-
derstand, a responsible person can make mistakes, but recognizes them and internalizes
their cost. So, it seems to me that some level of reection is needed to be responsible,
though responsibility does not necessarily imply autonomy. So, if a person can be re-
sponsible but "non-autonomous" then it is possible to show with an example that more
opportunity may make the responsible (non-autonomous) person get worse.
Example 13 On opportunities






In this case, the decision-maker has a unique e¢ cient undominated action a2 and
there exists a corresponding outcome of the behavioral decision problem (a2; a2) with
payo¤ 3. Now, expand the set of choices so that the following payo¤ table represents
the decision problem
a1 a2 a3
a1  1 0 0
a2 0 3 1
a3 1 4 2
(3.4)
Note that a2 continues to strictly dominate a1 although now a3 strictly dominates
both a1 and a2. The unique behavioral equilibrium is (a3; a3) with payo¤ 2 < 3. This
means that although the action set of the decision-maker has been expanded so that (a)
the ranking of existing actions is una¤ected and (b) the new action strictly dominates
all existing actions, the individual is made worse-o¤. Note that all these features are
robust to arbitrary but small perturbations in payo¤s. This example illustrates our next
remark:
Remark 1 (On opportunities) Larger action sets may make the decision-maker worse-
o¤.
Intuitively, what matters for the welfare of a non-autonomous decision maker is how
she manages to take advantage of and use the opportunities she has at hand. We regard
this remark as being close to the essence of Amartya Sens capability approach. Sens
(1985) capability approach is a framework for the evaluation of individual welfare. Sen
proposes to assess peoples welfare in terms of their functioning and capabilities. A
functioning is dened as an achievement of a person, i.e. what she manages to do (or
be), whereas a capability reects the various functionings an individual can potentially
achieve. The space of functionings is the space of activities or state of being and the
space of capabilities is the space of potential activities or states of being. Functionings
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measure realized welfare, whereas capabilities measure potential or feasible welfare. In
that sense, the set of outcomes of a BDP could be interpreted as the set of functionings,
whereas the set of outcomes of a SDP can be thought to be the set of capabilities.
Given a Decision Problem D, an individual would be able to achieve her maximum
potential welfare when E \M 6= ? and E  M . Therefore, we would get back to a
result analogous to Proposition 4 (pg. 56), which would state that the individual will
achieve her potentiality if and only if C.1 holds (i.e. E M). However, these are only
conjectures, and the link between Sens (1985) work and ours need further investigation.
The discussion in this section would suggest that the autonomy criterion renes some
of the most widely used normative criteria, in the sense that the autonomy criterion
implies the other criteria, but the reverse is not true.
Remark 2 (Autonomy vis-a-vis other criteria) If a choice has been made by a
fully autonomous individual, then the preferences revealed from observed choices, the
individuals happiness and her opportunities can be indistinguishably used as appropriate
guidance for welfare judgements. However, the reverse of this statement is not true.
Finally, it may be of interest to compute the (theoretical) value of individual auton-
omy. Take any decision problem D. Let (a^; p^) be the outcome of the SDP , (a; p)
the outcome of the BDP and (a; p) the indirect utility function. The value of the
individuals autonomy,  2 <+; is dened as:
 =  (a^; p^)  (a; p)
When the individual is fully autonomous,  = 0. A social planner aiming to maximize
individual welfare should choose a policy to minimize . The next section discusses some
appropriate policies to achieve that aim.
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3.5 Behavioral Public Policy
What are the policy implications of behavioral decision making, i.e. when people dont
necessarily follow their own best interests?
The goal of any public policy is to maximize peoples well-being. The route a social
planner chooses to take in order to achieve that goal will depend on the social planners
presumption on the way individual chooses. In this section we (a) discuss the optimal
extent of public policy, (b) claim that the existing public policy approaches do not
necessarily maximize peoples well-being and (c) introduce an alternative type of public
policy based on empowerment.
3.5.1 Optimal extent of Public Policy
Before discussing what the appropriate policy interventions are, we wonder when a
government intervention is necessary. In particular, is there an optimal extent of public
intervention?
Take any Decision Scenario D = (A;P; ). Let v(a) = u(a; (a)). Now think of an
individual maximizing:
Maxfa2Agv(a) + (1  )u(a; p) (3.5)
where with some probability  she takes the feedback e¤ect from actions to prefer-
ence parameters into account, and with some probability (1   ) she does not. Given
this situation, let (p) denote the set of solutions to this maximization problem. An
equilibrium of this problem is a decision state (a; p) such that (i) given p; a 2 (p)
and (ii) p = (a).
The social planners goal is to maximize v(a) choosing an action a 2 A. Suppose
that the social planner has incomplete information about how reective is the decision
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maker being, i.e. whether she is taking or not the feedback e¤ect into account. In this
context, the social planner maximizes:
Maxfa2Ag0v(a) + (1  0)~v(a) (3.6)
where with some probability 0 the social planner indeed chooses the a 2 A that
maximizes the true interest or preference of the individual, and with some probability
(1  0) the social planner uses a completely wrong set of preferences ~v() 6= v():
Remark 3 (Limits of intervention) The extend of paternalism is limited by the
trade-o¤ between  and 0. If the individual is internalizing the feedback e¤ect with
very high probability (high ) and the social planner has very few information about the
individual (low 0), then there is no scope for intervention. On the other hand, if  is
low and 0 is high, then the social planner should intervene.
How this trade-o¤ can be identied is a relevant empirical question, although it is
out of the scope of this chapter.
Note that, here, we have only considered the case of "hard" paternalism, in which the
social planner chooses an action instead of the individual or, what is equivalent, forces
the individual to choose a particular action10. However, the social planner can design
soft-libertarian policies that allow the individual to internalize the feedback e¤ect. We
devote the next sub-section to explore the type of policy interventions implied by our
framework.
3.5.2 Type of Policies
We begin this section going back to the original discussion we had the introduction about
the endogenous preferences parameters as being part of the characteristics of the object
10Examples of paternalistic policies include banning narcotics, warnings on cigarettes, public health
advertising, safety regulations such as the use of helmet or seatbelts, etc.
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of choice or not. If for all a 2 A, (a) = pc for some xed pc 2 P and each p 2 P indexes
a distinct decision problem with a di¤erent , the binary relation derived from choice
data alone P is the only one that is appropriate for constructing any welfare metric.
What are the policy implications of our model when (a) = P for all a 2 A? As
we have shown in Proposition 6 (pg. 60), in this case necessarily, M  E. With
complete information about the individual preferences, if individuals choose a taking p
as given, policy interventions that aim to shift the reference points of individuals (the p0s)
will ensure that individuals eventually choose actions that correspond to choices in M .
So, our model can provide a set of conditions (complete information about preferences
and (a) = P for all a 2 A) that justies the "soft paternalism" approach to policy
interventions recently advocated by Sunstein and Thaler (2003, 2008).
However, even in this case, there is a di¤erent form of intervention, namely relaxing
the internal constraint that the individual takes p as given instead of choosing both
a and p, that would achieve the same objective but wouldnt rely on any information
about the preferences of the individual.
In general, however, with incomplete information about individual preferences and
feedback e¤ects, direct policy intervention along the lines of "soft" paternalism (changing
frames) or "hard" paternalism (making choices directly for the individual) could make
matters worse.
One possible policy recommendation in scenarios with incomplete information about
an individuals preferences is to directly act on the way in which a person internalizes
the feedback e¤ect from actions to frames11.
To x ideas, consider example 4. In this example, if the individual doesnt take
the feedback e¤ect from actions to psychological states into account, she always chooses
a2 (smoking) over a1 (not smoking); however, the reverse would be true, if she took
the feedback into account. Let , 0    1, denote the probability with which the
11An example of such policies could be psychotherapy sessions, projects aiming to foster peoples
emotional intelligence and empowerment, etc.
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individual does take the feedback e¤ect into account. A straightforward computation
shows that as long as  > 1
2
, the individual will choose a1 over a2: as long as the
individual takes the feedback e¤ect into account with a high enough probability, she will
choose not to smoke.
Likewise, in example 7 (pg.41), a policy intervention that might work may be an
"empowerment" policy, that would help the individual to become aware of her "internal
constraints" and thus "gaining control over her own life12." We shall label these policies
"soft-libertarian" which stands in between a fully libertarian and a libertarian pater-
nalistic approach. A soft-libertarian policy intervention for e¢ ciency purposes has the
following features:
(a) It is only justiable when
(i) condition C.1 does not hold, i.e., choices cannot be used to guide welfare
judgments,
(ii) the probability that the person is fully autonomous, , is low,
(iii) the probability that the social planer knows v(a); 0, is high.
(b) the intervention should not be coercive. On the contrary, it should aim to en-
hance the non-cognitive abilities needed to change the way a person solves her di¤erent
intra-personal games: from Nash to Stackelberg. If the intra-personal game is one of
aspirations traps, then a soft libertarian policy should a¤ect the capacity to aspire.
Empowering the person is one example of such policy. Stern et al. (2005) denes em-
powerment policies as those that help the person to "gain control over her own life."
In the same line, Mullainathan (2006) argues that "good institutions also help to re-
duce problems that arises within a person." Likewise, Duo (2006) claims that "what is
needed is a theory of how poverty inuences the decision making, not only by a¤ecting
the constraints, but also by changing the decision making process itself." If the intra-
12See for instance Appadurai (2004) on the "capacity to aspire" and Narayan (2002) or Stern et al.
(2005) on "empowerment".
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personal game is one of temptation, then a soft-libertarian policy should facilitate the
capacity to exert self-control. Some examples of such soft-libertarian policies can be
found in Bernheim and Rangel (2005). For example, behavioural therapies that teach
cue-avoidance to addicts have shown to be successful. In our lens, by encouraging the
adoption of new life-styles and the development of new interests, these therapies show
the addict the way to become a Stackelberg leader. As pointed out by Bernheim and
Rangel (2005), "these therapeutic strategies a¤ect addicts choices without providing
new information."
One conjecture is that this type of policies may have a more permanent impact
on the individual well-being than the other existing "soft paternalistic" policies that
propose changing the reference point exogenously, without helping the individual to do
it herself. In fact, psychological studies show that autonomy support leads to greater
program involvement, adherence and maintained change for behaviors such as smoking
cessation, weight loss, glucose control and exercise (see Williams et al., 2005)
Finally, it is important to highlight that some standard policies that have always
thought to be (at least weakly) welfare improving, may fail in our framework. For
instance, as it was illustrated in examples 8 and 13 respectively, a policy that provides
more information or more opportunities to a "non-autonomous" decision maker may
make her worse-o¤. Or coming back to our example of aspirations, as Atkinson (1998)
argues, creating jobs is not necessarily an e¤ective policy to solve an aspiration failure:
"ending social exclusion will depend on the nature of these new jobs. Do they restore a
sense of control?"
3.6 Conclusion
We showed that revealed preferences cannot, in general, underpin welfare, though we
o¤ered conditions validating such a link. When choices fail to reveal true preferences,
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we argued that normative evaluations should be based on the degree of autonomy of
the person, dened by the extent to which the person controls her own psychological
states. A policy aiming at improving individual welfare should then look for developing
peoples abilities needed to make autonomous decisions. Examples of such abilities are
capacities to aspire, to exert self-control or to correct maladaptive beliefs. Even though
the concept of autonomy has been widely studied in Philosophy and Psychology, to my
knowledge, this is the rst time that the concept is brought up to a formal economic
framework.
We acknowledge that, at the moment, our work has limitations on the empirical front.
One of the main challenges concern the identication and measurement of autonomy.
Chapter 7 discusses some ideas to address these concerns in future research.
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Chapter 4
Behavioural Games: Theory and
Applications
4.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the individual decision-making model proposed in Chapter 2 to
a N-person strategic setting. Scholars in Psychology and Social Psychology study how
preferences parameters, as dened in this thesis, are not only a¤ected by own individual
actions (i.e. Ai ! Pi) but also by others actions and preferences parameters (i.e.
A i  P i ! Pi). For instance, an employee can consider that an action of her boss
(a i 2 A i) or beliefs (p i 2 P i) are unfair to her and then feel mistreated (pi 2 Pi).
A non-autonomous employee will take her emotional state as given, act as a passive
"victim" of her own emotional forces and may choose to engage in acts of sabotage
which could eventually lead to self-defeating outcomes. An autonomous employee, on
the contrary, will do her best to manage his anger before the anger controls her1.
As Chapter 1 distinguishes Behavioural from Standard Decisions, this chapter dis-
tinguishes "psycho-social" from "standard" normal-form games. A "standard" normal-
1See Mckinney and Newman (2002) for an example of students not fully internalizing the feedback
e¤ect.
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form game is a normal-form game with endogenous preference parameters played by
autonomous players. A "psycho-social" game, instead, is a normal-form game with
endogenous preference parameters played by non-autonomous players.
Most of the interesting theoretical aspects of "psycho-social games" have been ex-
plored in the 1-person case introduced in the two previous chapters. Therefore, the focus
of this chapter is mostly on applications. By providing a general framework to incorpo-
rate insights from Social Psychology2 into Game theory, we can study the implications of
di¤erent social motivations on peoples behaviour. Examples of such social motivations
are endogenous beliefs (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), endogenous social preferences (Ra-
bin, 1993; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) or endogenous
reference-dependent preferences (Shalev, 2000). The chapter develops two new appli-
cations of psycho-social games introducing the idea of commitment and empowerment
into game theory.
In addition, we obtain some novel theoretical results. We study two di¤erent ways
of associating "psycho-social" games to "standard" normal-form games. One way is
to take any normal-form game and add the endogenous feedback e¤ect as an extra
argument on playersutility function, thus broadening the preference domain. So the
idea here is that besides the material payo¤s of the original normal-form game, there is
an extra argument (emotions, beliefs, aspirations, values) which players care about and
can eventually a¤ect. In such setting, we dene the notion of a normal-form game being
embedded in a "psycho-social" game. Then, we take any arbitrary "standard" normal-
form game and compare its set of equilibria with the set of "psycho-social" equilibria of
the psycho-social games that are embedded into this arbitrary "standard" normal-form
game. With the same argument used in Chapter 2 to show generic distinguishability of
BDP and SDP, we show that, typically, the two sets are distinct from each other, i.e. in
general, people play "psycho-social" games instead of "standard" normal-form games.
Thus, it shouldnt be surprising that most experimental evidence in normal-form games
2See for example Bandura (2001) or Forgas et al. (2003)
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reports that people dont play Nashs predictions.
Another way of modelling the same idea of a feedback e¤ect is by taking any "stan-
dard" normal-form game and restricting (instead of broadening) the preference domain
in some consistent way. If the players compute their best response using the restricted
utility, they will not internalize the externality they impose on themselves. In this case,
we show that a strict Nash equilibrium of the original "standard" normal-form game is
robust to any kind of imperfect reection. Even assuming the highest level of imperfect
reection, if a "standard" normal-form game has a unique strict Nash equilibrium, then
this equilibrium remains regardless how unreective the players are: "no rationality at
all is required to arrive at a Nash equilibrium." (Aumann, 1997, pg. 4). This is true
when the game has a unique strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If the normal-form
game has multiple or mixed strategy equilibria, then we show that some degree of "broad
rationality" is needed to3.
We then explore the relevance of the assumption of imperfect reection in some
existing games with endogenous preferences. We nd di¤erent results depending on the
game in question. For instance, in Rabin (1993), no matter how unreective the players
are, the predictions of the games do not change. The same is true in Shalev (2000).
However, in other games (e.g. with guilt or commitment) the assumption of imperfect
reection changes the predictions of the game.
Finally, using similar arguments applied in Chapter 2, we provide two di¤erent ex-
istence results of a psycho-social equilibrium: one in pure strategies with incomplete
preferences and strategic complementarity between actions and preference parameters,
and the other relaxing the assumption of strategic complementarity and showing exis-
tence of a psycho-social equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the
model in a simple way using examples taken from the existing literature. Section 4.3
3See Elster (1983) for a distinction between broad and thin rationality.
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provides the general model and the existence results. Section 4.4 shows applications
on commitment and empowerment. Section 4.5 associates "psycho-social" games with
"standard" normal-form games and provides some novel general results. Section 4.6
studies the implications of imperfect reection in some existing games and Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 A simple model with examples
Consider a simultaneous move game with two players i = 1; 2 whose payo¤ relevant
variables are:
i) the action set A = A1  A2 where Ai = [ai; ai] is an interval of <.
ii) the set of utility parameters (psycho-social states) P = P1  P2, where Pi is a
subset of some metric space. For the moment, we will keep it simple and assume that
Pi  <.
The preferences of each player i are represented by a utility function vi : APi ! <.
Each player i solves the following maximization problem:
Maxfai2Aigvi(ai; a i; pi) ; for a i 2 A i and pi 2 Pi (4.1)
This is the normal-form game that we all have seen in Micro101. In addition, as in a
complex decision problem (see pg. 25) suppose there is a feedback e¤ect from the vector
(ai; a i; p i) to pi represented by the map i : A  P i ! Pi. This map represents the
idea that players can a¤ect their own and others psychological states. If we assume that
each player i reects perfectly, when they consider a deviation from ai to a0i, they will
anticipate the appropriate change in their and others psychosocial states consistent with
a0i, and solves the following optimization problem:
Maxfai2Aigui(ai; a i) ; for a i 2 A i (4.2)
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where ui(ai; a i) = vi(ai; i(ai; a i; p i)). We call this game, a "standard" normal-
form game, and its solution concept is analogous to a Nash Equilibrium.
In our denition of a "psycho-social game", we shall assume that players do not take
into account the consequences of their actions on their own and others psychosocial
states. When evaluating a deviation, the player will not change her psychosocial state
but will take it as given.
In Chapter 1 we showed that Geanakoplos et al.s (1989) (hereafter GPS) psycho-
logical games can be reduced to a BDP (see Section 2.4, p.g. 31). It is straight forward
to show that "psycho-social" games generalize psychological games. Both games con-
sider a preference parameter that is endogenously determined within the interaction,
and in both games the parameter is taken as given at the moment to compute the best
response. However, in GPSframework preference parameters are only beliefs, whereas
in our framework, preference parameters are not restricited to beliefs, they can be any
possible endogenous states. This feature generalizes psychological games and allows to
study endogenous states that are not necessarily belief-dependent (e.g. identity, aspira-
tion, a good, the environment, etc.). Moreover, even if we wanted to work in the space
of beliefs, psycho-social games are more general than psychological games because they
also allow for 0-order beliefs (i.e. self-beliefs). These beliefs can be interpreted either
as moral values (i.e. players own beliefs about what she should play) or as players
self-condence (i.e. players own beliefs about she can play)4. We show some examples
using 0-order beliefs in next section. But for the moment, we continue our description
of other existing model that is generalized by psycho-social games.




In our understanding, there are two existing ways to incorporate social preferences into
strategic models: an exogenous distributionalapproach and an endogenous reciprocity-
guiltapproach. The former broadens playerspreferences with an exogenous social pref-
erence parameter which captures how people care about others5. The latter, in contrast,
allows social preference parameters to be determined endogenously within the strate-
gic interaction. Rabin (1993) was the rst paper who proposed this second approach
by introducing endogenous reciprocity motives into playerspreferences. A decade later,
Charness and Rabin (2002) merged endogenous reciprocity models with exogenous distri-
butional models. Recently, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) introduced guilt as another
endogenous motivation for social preferences.
"Psycho-social" games encompass these three models and o¤er a higher degree of
freedom to capture other class of social preferences that cannot be captured in the
existing literature. In what follows, we take Charness and Rabin (2002)6 general model
with n players and show that it is a special case of a psycho-social game7. In next
section we present a novel application of a psycho-social game in which there is an
interaction between two players who care about each other but for di¤erent reasons.
One has a moral commitment; the other feels sympathy.
Let Ai be player i0s pure strategies and A i =
Q
j 6=i
Aj be the set of pure strategies
of all players but player i 2 N . The material payo¤s are determined by the action
prole a  (ai; a i) where ui(a) represents Player i0s payo¤s given action prole a 2 A.
Let p  (pi; p i) be a demerit prole, with pi 2 [0; 1] being a measure of the beliefs
that all players but i have about how much player i deserves8 and p i being a vector
(p1; :::; pj; :::; pn) for all j 6= i representing player is disposition towards all the other
players. The higher the value of pi the less player i deserves. Given proles a, pi and a
5See for example Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
6Henceforth C&R
7We will work in pure strategies for expositional purposes only.
8pi (resp. p i) here is di (resp. d i) in Charness and Rabins (2002) paper.
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set of parameters  = (; ; b; k; f);player i0s preferences are dened as follows:
vi(a; p i)  (1 i)ui(a)+i
266664












where i 2 [0; 1] measures how much player i cares about pursuing the social welfare
versus his own self-interest; i 2 (0; 1) measures the degree of concern for helping the
worst-o¤ person versus maximizing the total surplus and b; k and f are nonnegative
parameters.
Given a i, p i and ; the set of player i0s actions that maximize her utility is:
Ai (a i; p i;)  fai 2 Aij ai 2 argmax vi(ai; a i; p i;)g (4.4)
So far the only endogenous variable is ai for all i 2 N and then, this is just a
model with an extended utility that incorporates exogenous distributional concerns and
exogenous concerns for reciprocity. If pi = 0 for all i 2 N , then this model becomes
a simple model without psycho-social states. However, C&R endogenizes pi and i. It
is assumed that the way player i cares about the welfare of others (i.e. i) depends
on the action prole and on how much player i thinks the others deserve. Formally,
i(a; p i) is assumed to be an upper hemi-continuous and convex-valued correspondence
from (a; p i) into the set [0; 1] such that i(a; p i)  fj ai 2 Ai (a i; p i;)g. In turn,
the function i(a; p i) is a measure of how appropriate other players feel player i behaves
when they determine how to reciprocate.
C&R derive demerit proles from these functions and assume that other players
compare each i(a; pi) with some exogenous selessness standard ^ - the weight they
feel a decent person should put on social welfare. The equilibrium of this game is
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dened as follows:
The strategy prole a is a reciprocal-fairness equilibrium if for a given parameter
prole  = (^; ; b; k; f), the following conditions hold for all i 2 N :






i 2 argmax vi(ai; a i; pi ; p i),
ii) given i , p

i 2 argmax[^  i ; 0]






i 2 i(ai ; a i; p i)
A reciprocal-fairness game is a special case of a psycho-social game in which the
general map i : A P ! < is a particular composite correspondence (i  pi) () that
assigns a value frommax[^ i(a; p i); 0] to the interval [0; 1]: It is important to point out
that when player i chooses an optimal ai, besides taking as given a i and p i, she takes
as given the endogenous pi(i(a; p i)) - i.e. how much other players think she deserves
-, which in turn depends on her optimal action via the correspondence i. Again, there
is a feedback e¤ect from player i0s action into her preference parameter that it is not
internalized when choosing a best response. Thus a reciprocal-fairness game is a special
case of a psycho-social game, all reciprocal-fairness equilibria are psycho-social equilibria
and, by transitivity, all fairness equilibria (Rabin, 1993) are psycho-social equilibria too.
In Rabins (1993) model pi = (bj; ci).
C&R dont study the case in which a player may care about the others to avoid
feeling guilt. However, guilt motivations can be represented by means of second order
beliefs pi = ci, i.e. player i0s beliefs about what player j believes player i will do. A guilt
averse person will try to minimize the guilt caused by not conforming to the expectations
of others. For example, if a guilt averse person playing a public good game believes that
the other players believe she will cooperate, then she may consider cooperating.
We are aware of the fact that reciprocal-fairness equilibria and guilt equilibria are not
only "psycho-social" equilibria but also "psychological" equilibria (Geanakoplos et al.,
1989). In Section 2.4 (pg. 33) we have shown that Loss-Aversion games (Shalev, 2000)
can be reduced to BDP, and as such, they are generalized by psycho-social games.
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However, loss-aversion games are not psychological games.
4.3 Psycho-social Games
4.3.1 The general model
Formally, the game is structured as follows. There is a nite set N = f1; :::; ng of players
(indexed by i) and for each player a nite set of (pure) actions Ai. In addition, each
player is characterized by a preference parameter (or psycho-social state) pi 2 Pi, where
Pi is a corresponding subset of some metric space. Let A =
Q





i2N Pi, P i =
Q
j2Nnfig Pj. A generic element of Ai (resp. A) is denoted by ai
(resp. a) and a generic element of Pi (resp. P ) is denoted by pi (resp. p). It is assumed
that A  <nmi and P  <ni are subsets of a nite dimensional Euclidian space9. For
the purposes of this chapter we shall consider only pure strategies.
A consistent (pure) psycho-social state for player i is a ~pi 2 Pi such that ~pi =
i(ai; a i; p i). The set of (pure) consistent psycho-social states is
~Pi =
8><>: ~pij pi = i(ai; a i; p i);for all i 2 N; a 2 A and p i 2 P i
9>=>;.
For the purpose of equilibrium existence, we will require i(ai; a i; p i) to be non
empty and close relative to P for each a i and p i.
Player i0s utility function vi : A  Pi ! < depends on the outcomes (as in the
standard literature) and also her and other players preference parameters (or psycho-
social states)10. We assume that player i seeks to maximize vi given p and a i.
9Note that if we wanted to include GPS psychological games as a particular case of a psycho-social
game, we should consider the set Pi to be a subset of a Polish space. However, this would invalidate our
proof for existence in pure strategies and so, we rather assume that Pi is a subset of a nite dimensional
Euclidean Space.
10For expositional purposes, we assume in this section that preferences can be represented by a utility
function. However, for our existence proof, we will not require preferences to be able to be represented
by a utility function, i.e. complete and transitive.
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Denition 2 Game: A normal-form game with endogenous preference parameters  =
(Ai; Pi; vi; i) consists on an action set Ai;a set of utility parameters Pi, an utility func-
tion vi : A Pi ! <; and a map i : A P i ! Pi for each player i.
Denition 3 Equilibrium: A (pure) psycho-social equilibrium of  is dened by a pair
(a; p) 2 A P if, for each i, (i) given pi ; p i, a i; ai 2 argmax vi(ai; a i; ~pi ) and (ii)






i 2 i(ai ; a i; p i)
4.3.2 Existence in pure strategies
In this section, we examine the conditions under which a psycho-social equilibrium in
pure strategies exists. To be coherent with the model we have in mind, we allow for non-
convex and incomplete set of preferences due to two main reasons. Firstly, since players
preferences depend on their psycho-social states which is a reference parameter, their
preferences sets may not be convex. Secondly, in a context in which psychological states
play a role, preferences may be more likely to be incomplete: it is more likely that I have
a complete preference relation between pears, bananas and apples than between pears
when I am stressed, bananas when I am sad and apples when I am anxious. For these
reasons, we examine the conditions for equilibrium existence allowing for incomplete and
non-convex preferences. Due to non-convexities we cannot apply Kakutanis x-point
theorem. We apply Tarskis x point theorem instead. The proof is an extension of the
existence proof introduced in chapter 2 to a strategic interaction setting. We assume
that the set A and P are compact lattices, that the preference relation is acyclic and
has an open lower section, that psycho-social states of each player are increasing in her
actions, quasi-supermodularity, single-crossing property and monotone closure.
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions mentioned above, there exists a psycho-social equi-
librium.
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4.3.3 Existence of a mixed psycho-social equilibrium
When we proved the existence of a psycho-social equilibrium in pure strategies, we paid
the cost of AS-4 to AS-7. These assumptions are appropriate for some applications
such as motivation and aspiration failures, but they do not t other motivations (e.g.
Example 2.18). Of course, with those assumptions we gained in other aspects. For
example, we did not need A and P to be convex sets and preferences to be complete
and transitive. In this section, we relax the assumptions of single-crossing, and we
look for the existence of a mixed psycho-social equilibrium. As it was the case for the
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, we will not require preferences to have
an expected utility representation. Further, we will assume that preferences have open
lower sections, which is a weaker continuity assumption than the standard assumption of
continuity proposed in the literature but it is still stronger than (AS-2) made in Theorem
3.11
Theorem 4 Under assumptions (AS-1) to (AS-4) (see Appendix), a mixed strategy
psycho-social equilibrium exists.
4.4 Applications
4.4.1 Commitment and Sympathy
In Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,Sen
(1977) discusses the view held in traditional Economics that every agent is actuated only
by self-interest.In his paper, Sen distinguishes two separate concepts: (i) sympathy and
(ii) commitment. He argues that sympathy corresponds to the case in which the concern
for others directly a¤ects ones own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes
11In general it is assumed in the literature that preferences have open graphs (see Shafer and Son-
nenschein (1975)).
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you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse o¤, but you
think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment
(p. 326).Behaviour based on sympathy is in an important sense egoistic whereas the
action based on commitment is non-egoistic. Most inuential existing models on social
preferences do not capture this distinction. Moreover, if they wanted to incorporate
individual commitment, they would need to move from a psychological game to a psycho-
social game setting. We introduce moral commitment into a game as 0-order beliefs
a¤ecting payo¤s. For some reason, players have their own beliefs about what is right
and what is wrong, and they enjoy when they choose an action that is consistent with
those beliefs. Lets consider a discrete version of the dictator game. There are two
players. Player i is the dictator who chooses either to keep (K) or give (G) to player
j his experimental endowment (say £ 1). Player j, the recipient, has no real choice
she has to simply accept the dictators decision. Now assume that the dictator has a
moral commitment with player j, and his utility depends purely on conforming to her
(endogenous) commitments. Let ~pi 2 [0; 1] be player i0s beliefs about her own actions
and pi be the probability attached to playing G:
(1 -
~











, with nal payo¤s being 1; 1 and 1
2
respectively.
When players have di¤erent motivations for social preferences, there is a possibility
of misperception of playerskindness. A player might think that she is being kind, when
in fact, the others interpret she is being unkind. The way in which player i interprets
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othersintentions will depend on player i0s moral frame. We shall illustrate this point
with the following example proposed by Sen, about two boys who nd two apples, one
large and one small.
Boy A tells boy B, You choose.B immediately picks the larger apple. A
is upset and permits himself the remark that this was grossly unfair. Why?
asks B. Which one would you have chosen, if you were to choose rather than
me?The smaller one, of course,A replies. B is now triumphant: Then
what are you complaining about? Thats the one youve got!B certainly
wins this round of the argument, but in fact A would have lost nothing from
Bs choice had his own hypothetical choice of the smaller apple been based
on sympathy as opposed to commitment. As anger indicates that this was
probably not the case (p. 328-9).
This story can be modeled as a two-person game with only one active player chosen
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Figure 4.2: Commitment and Sympathy
pA (respectively pB) represents the probability with which player A (respectively B)
chooses to keep the small apple S. For expositional purposes, we shall assume that the
material payo¤ derived from the large apple (ui(L) = 0) is the same than that derived
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from the small one (ui(S) = 0). In the standard (trivial) version of this game with just
material payo¤s, any possible strategy prole is an equilibrium prole.
Suppose now that Player A has moral commitments whereas player B just sympa-
thizes with A and she cares about being fair with her.
For some reason, player A has her own beliefs about what is right and what is wrong,
and she is committed to choose actions consistent with her own beliefs. Moreover, she
feels pleasure when B chooses an action that matches her (player A) own beliefs.
Player B, on the other hand, likes to be fair with A in her particular way. We
introduce fairness through 1st-order beliefs. Player B enjoys giving player A what player
A would choose to keep for her if she was to choose rather than player B12:
Lets see the payo¤s of this game. If player A believes that keeping the small apple
for her (i.e. playing S) is the right thing to do, then pA = 1. So if she had to make a
choice, given her values, she would choose S. If player B is the one called to choose,
A0s payo¤ is higher the closer is B0s action to A0s values. In other words, A prefers B
choosing pB = 1 rather than pB < 1, since pB = pA means that both players have the
same values and player A enjoys that. Now looking at player B0s payo¤s, she does not
feel either negative or positive emotion regardless what player A chooses, since she just
care about being fair with player A: If she had to choose, she would choose to keep the
large apple, L; since it gives the fairest outcome from her point of view. However, player
A would not consider this outcome to be fair when she compares pA = 1 with pB = 0,
since from her point of view, choosing to keep L is something "wrong" to do.
Observe that we have here two interconnected 1-active-player games. Denote G-I
(respectively G-II) to the game in which only player A (respectively B) is active. We
say that both games are interconnected because the payo¤ of the players in each game
depend on actions and beliefs held on the other game. Let bk;Ii (respectively b
k;II
i ) be
the k-order beliefs held by player i. Then, playerspayo¤s are as follows:
12Note that this interpretation of fairness di¤ers from Rabins (1993) interpretation.
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 In G-I: vA(aA; b0A(aA)); vB(aA)
 In G-II: vA(aB; b0A(aA); b1A(aB)); vB(aB; b1B(aA))
Both G-I and G-II are psycho-social games and G-II is also a GPSs psychological
game.
Each active player takes as given her beliefs and compute her best response as in
any standard psychological or psycho-social game. In G-I, player A0s best response
is aA 2 argmax vA(aA; b0A) for a given b0A. In G-II, player B0s best response is aB 2
argmax vB(aB; b
1
B) for a given b
1












This example has three psycho-social equilibria:
Type I: Player A believes that the right thing to do is to give player B the large
apple (pA = 1), so if she is the active player, she will choose to do so. When player
B is the active player, given her beliefs, she will choose to keep the large apple for her
(pB = 0). Formally, Type I equilibrium is dened by the following quadruple (aA =
SA; a











A = SA). The equilibrium payo¤s are:
 If G-I is played: (1; 0)
 If G-II is played: ( 1; 1)
Type II: Player A believes that the right thing to do is to give player B the small
apple (pA = 0), so if she is the active player, she will choose to do so. When player
B is the active player, given her beliefs, she will choose to keep the small apple for
him (p0 = 1). Formally, Type II equilibrium is dened by the following quadruple
(aA = LA; a











A = LA):The equilibrium payo¤s are:
 If G-I is played: (1; 0)
 If G-II is played: ( 1; 1)
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Type III: Player A is morally indi¤erentbetween keeping the small or the large
apple (pA = 12), so if she is active, she will randomize between her two options. When
player B is the active player, she will also randomize (pB = 12). Formally, Type III
















expected payo¤s in equilibrium are:
 If G-I is played: (1
4
; 0)
 If G-II is played: (0; 1
4
)
Type I equilibrium describes the situation of Sens example. Moreover, it can be
inferred from Sens example that both players have a di¤erent notion of fairness. Player
A whose behaviour is based on commitment, believes that player B is being fair when
she observes ex-post that jpB   pAj = 0 or unfair otherwise. On the contrary, player B
who sympathizes with A, thinks that she is being fair when jpB   pAj 6= 0 and unfair
otherwise.





















Bp ) , 0
Figure 4.3: Both players base their choices on sympathy
In the situation described by Sen, if player A0s choice of the small apple (pA = 1)
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was based on "sympathy" instead of on "commitment", player B choosing to keep the
large apple (pB = 0) would not be judged by A as being unfair since jpB   pAj 6= 0:
4.4.2 Empowerment and Paternalism
Consider a kid who needs to do a homework for school but he does not know how to
do it. He can either ask his mother to help him to understand the problem and then
solve the problem on his own (i.e. looking for empowerment), or ask his mother to do
the homework for him (i.e. looking for paternalism). His mother can choose either to
explain him how to solve the problem without solving it or she could decide to do the
homework for him. The set of actions for each player, mother and son, is constituted
by Ai = fai; aig ; ai > ai;where as and as represent the son asking her mother for a
paternalist behaviour or for empowerment, respectively, while am and am represent the
mother choosing a paternalist behaviour or empowering her son, respectively. Let Ps be
the set of "self-condence levels" of the son and Pm be the set of "self-esteem levels" of
the mother, where both Ps and Pm are intervals in <. The payo¤ of the son is a map us :
AmAsPs, which depends not only on his own actions (how he manages to have the
homework done) but also on his mothers actions and his level of condence. In addition,
there is a map s : Am  As ! Ps which generates the sons self-condence levels for
each conguration of actions of mother and son. Assume that s(am; as) is increasing
in am and as: In words, the kid will be more self-condent if he does the homework on
his own and her mother does not choose to do the homework for him. The payo¤ of the
mother is a map um : AmAsPm, which depends not only on her own actions (how she
manages to help her son to have the homework done) but also on his sons actions and
her level of self-esteem. In addition, there is a map m : AmAs ! Pm which generates
the mothers self-esteem levels for each conguration of actions of both, mother and son.
Assume that m(am; as) is increasing in am and as: In words, the mother will feel more
valuable if she helps her son to do the homework on his own and her son does not choose
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to ask her to do the homework for him. For simplicity, assume that the individuals
utility from a paternalistic behaviour ui(ai; aj; pi) is normalized to zero for all values of
aj and pi and ui(ai; aj; pi) is the gain (or loss) to each individual in deviating from a
paternalistic behaviour.
Assume that
(i) for each aj, ui(ai; aj; pi) > ui(ai; aj; p0i); pi > p
0
i
(ii) for each pi; ui(ai; aj; pi) > ui(ai; a0j; pi); aj > a
0
j
In words this means that ui(ai; aj; pi) has strictly increasing di¤erences in aj and pi,
i.e. the sons (mothers) marginal return of receiving (providing) empowerment is higher
if her mother (her son) chooses to empower him (to be empowered) and if his condence
(her self-esteem) is higher.
Let i(ai; aj) = pi(aj) and i(ai; aj) = pi(aj): Since i(ai; aj) is increasing in ai it
follows that pi(aj) > pi(aj).
For each aj and pi, let i(aj; pi) be the set of actions that maximize individual i0s
payo¤s.





i 2 i(aj ; pi ) and (ii) given ai and aj , pi 2 i(ai ; aj).
What are the psycho-social equilibria of this example?
Under the assumptions made so far, there is a unique solution, p^i(aj); for the equation
ui(ai; aj; pi) = 0 and due to conditions (i) and (ii), p^i(aj) is decreasing in aj: That is,
in equilibrium, the level of condence (self-esteem) that the son (mother) needs in order
to choose to be empowered (to empower) is higher the less his mother (her son) chooses
to empower (to be empowered) his son (by her mother).
Then, given aj, the best response correspondence of player i is determined as follows:
(i) if pi > p^i(aj); ai = i(aj; pi)
(ii) if pi < p^i(aj); ai = i(aj; pi)
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(iii) if pi = p^i(aj); fai; aig = i(aj; pi)
Since i(ai; aj) = pi(aj) and i(ai; aj) = pi(aj) and since both players are symmetric,
then, the psycho-social equilibria of this example are:
(i) if p^i(aj) > pi(aj), (a; p) = (ai; pi(aj))
(ii) if p^i(aj) < pi(aj); (a
; p) = (ai; pi(aj))
(ii) if pi(aj)  p^i(aj)  pi(aj); (a; p) =
n
(ai; pi(aj)); (ai; pi(aj))
o
The most interesting equilibrium of this example is (ai; pi(aj)); a disempowerment
equilibrium. In this situation, the son asks for help and the mother does the homework
for him. This behaviour sustains low levels of self-condence and self-esteem in son and
mother.
4.5 Nash vs. Psycho-social equilibria
"...In essence, we constantly ignore Kelley and Thibauts (1978) long
accepted observation that the people in our experiments transform the payo¤
matrices that we give them, and then they act in ways that maximize their
transformed outcomes. Yet we constantly ignore this knowledge, probably
so that we dont have to complicate our work too much." (in Murnighan and
Roth (2006, pg. 8))
What do people play when they play a normal-form game? Do they actually play
the game that the experimenter thinks they play? This is still an open question. The
vast experimental evidence showing that players do not behave as it is predicted by
Nash is still puzzling. Some scholars argue that people may misunderstand the game.
However, experimenters are very careful by making the rules and the payo¤s of the game
simple and clear in order to minimize any possible misunderstanding. Even in cases in
which the simplicity of the game is remarkable (e.g. Ultimatum or Dictator game),
91
the Nash predictions are rarely met. In this chapter we argue that people may be
playing "psycho-social" games instead, which provides a theoretical explanation of "out
of equilibrium" behaviour in the experimental settings. Indeed, we generalize what Rabin
(1993), Charness and Rabin (2002), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) or Shalev (2000)
and others have done. Rabin (1993), in particular, derives a "reciprocity" psychological
game from some basic material normal-form games providing a link between both classes
of games. However, Rabins analysis is restrictive to the particular functional form he
assumes for the map i. In principle, one could use other sensible functional forms to
derive other psycho-social games from the same normal-form game. One single normal-
form game can be associated to many psycho-social games, not just a "reciprocity"
one.
Consider the following prisoners dilemma normal-form game with X > 0:
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 4X; 4X 0; 6X
D 6X; 0 X;X
(4.5)
One could in principle derive many sensible (mathematically innite) psycho-social
games from this standard prisoners dilemma. Here we consider some examples. Let ai
be player i beliefs about what she chooses, bj player i beliefs of what player j chooses
and ci player i beliefs about what player j believes player i chooses.
Example 14 Fairness-Reciprocity Game: If pi = (bj; ci) and vi(ai; pi) = xi(ai; bj)+
i
h
fi(ai; bj) ~fj(bj; ci)
i
with i  0 being a constant measuring i0s sensitivity to reciprocate,
fi(ai; bj) being i0s kindness towards j and ~fj(bj; ci) being j0s kindness towards i; then
one can derive a "fairness-reciprocity" game from the game above (see Rabin (1993) for
further detail)
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Example 15 Guilt Game: If pi = (ci) and
vi(ai; pi) = xi(ai; bj)  imax f0; xj(ci)  xj(ai)g, with i  0 being a constant measuring
i0s guilt aversion, xj(ci) and xj(ai) being j0s material payo¤s given ci and ai respectively,
then one can derive a "guilt-aversion" game from the game above.
Example 16 Commitment Game: If pi = (ai) and
vi(ai; pi) = xi(ai; bj)  imax f0; xj(ai)  xj(ai)g, with i  0 being a constant measur-
ing i0s sensitivity to moral commitment and xj(ai) being i0s material payo¤s given ai
respectively, then one can derive a "commitment" game from the game above.
Proposition 9 A cooperative equilibrium (C,C) exists in a any of this three psycho-
social games associated with the prisoners dilemma material game. In particular, (C,C)
is a "fairness-reciprocity" equilibrium if i  4X, it is a "guilt-aversion" equilibrium if
i  12 , and it is a "commitment" equilibrium for any i  12 .
In general, one can imagine other psycho-social games being derived from any ar-
bitrary material normal-form game. In the remaining of the section, we introduce a
general way to associate a normal-form game with a psycho-social game. We show that
if we take any normal-form game and we look at the psycho-social equilibria of those
psycho-social games associated to it, we shall nd that they are generically di¤erent
from the Nash equilibria of the original normal-form game. Throughout this section we
will work just in pure strategies to simplify the notation and to gain intuition, but the
analysis shall be extended to mixed strategies in the near future.
4.5.1 Embeddedness
Let  := fAi; Pi; vi : A Pi ! <; i : A! Pig denote any nite n-person psycho-social
game as dened in Section 3.313. Let  2 	(A1; :::; An) where 	(A1; :::; An) is the
13To simplify the notation, we shall assume that preferences do not depend on p i and we shall also
rule out the possibility that p i a¤ects pi.
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set of all nite psycho-social games with strategy spaces A1; :::; An. Now, let  :=n
~Ai;ui : ~A! <
o
denote any nite n-person standard normal-form game where ~Ai is a
nite nonempty set of pure strategies. Let  2 ( ~A1; :::; ~An) where ( ~A1; :::; ~An) is the
set of all nite standard normal form games with strategy spaces ~A1; :::; ~An.
Denition 4 Embededdness: Take any  from the set  and any  from the set 	.
We say that  2  is consistently embedded into  2 	 (with the following notation: 
 !e  ) if, for all i 2 N; (1) Ai  ~Ai and (2) vi(a; pi) = ui(a) for any pi= i(a) and all
a 2 A.14
There are two other - rather extreme - ways to dene a normal form game embedded
into a psycho-social game, although we decide to work with the consistently embedded
denition for two main reasons. First, we could have said that  is weakly embedded
into  if, for all i 2 N; condition (1) and (2) hold for any pi 2 Pi, which does not
need to be a consistent pi. We rule-out this restriction since it does not have much
intuition behind. Further, we could have said that  is strongly embedded into  
if for all i 2 N; condition (1) and (2) hold for some pi = pi 2 Pi: If we consider this
denition, we are imposing the overly-strong restriction that the  has at least one
psycho-social equilibrium in pure strategies, and then we rule out games without pure
strategy psycho-social equilibrium.
Now we have dened a general way to associate a normal form game to a psycho-
social game, we shall compare the set of equilibria of both classes of games.
Proposition 10 Let NE be the set of Nash equilibrium strategy proles of  2  and
PSE be the set of psycho-social equilibrium strategy proles of  2 	. If  !e  then
generically, under standard regularity assumptions, both sets of equilibria in pure strate-
gies are distinct from each other.
14Note that there is no technical reason for which we have to imposse payo¤ equivalecebetween the
normal form game and the projected psycho-social game. It would be su¢ cient to state that a = ~a;
i.e. both are strategically equivalent. However, we prefer to work with payo¤ equivalencebecause we
think that it simplies the notation and it is innocuous.
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Both, the denition of embededdness and proposition 10 consider equilibria in pure
strategies and interior solutions. If we wanted to allow for mixed strategies, then the
rst order conditions used for the proof would not be valid any more.
4.5.2 Restricted Psycho-Social Games
In a psycho-social game, there is a feedback e¤ect arising from the interaction in the
game which is not internalized by the players when they compute their best reply.
This feedback is modelled by adding an extra endogenous argument on playersutility
function, thus broadening their preference domain. The intuition is that besides the
material payo¤s of the game there is an extra argument (emotions, beliefs, aspirations,
values) which players care about, and that is developed within the same interaction.
However players do not perfectly reect on that.
There is another way of modelling the same notion of a feedback e¤ect not being
internalized by the players. Suppose that, instead of broadening the preference domain,
we restrict it with an endogenous parameter. If the players compute their best response
using the restricted utility, they will impose an externality on themselves without in-
ternalizing it. This second approach is closer to the bounded rationality idea of Simon
(1959) than our rst approach. Simon claims that economic agents strive to maximize
their utility and instead they employ heuristics to make decisions. They do this because
their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action
"even in an extremely simple situation" (Simon, 1959, pg. 261)
Note that the two approaches di¤er in the degree of reection imposed on the players.
In the augmented approach, a non-fully reective player does not internalize the fact that
she can a¤ect, for example, her emotional reactions, while a fully reective player does.
In that sense, a fully reective player in the augmented approach is too reective, i.e. he
is cognitively and emotionally intelligent. However, the degree of reection required by
the restricted approach is lower: a fully reective player is only required to be cognitively
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intelligent.
In what follows, we study some of the implications for game theory of assuming the
second approach. We show, for example, that a strict Nash equilibrium is robust to
any kind of imperfect reection. Even assuming the highest level of irreection, if a
normal-form game has a unique strict Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium remains
regardless how irreective the players are. As stated by Aumann (1997, pg. 4), "one of
the simplest, yet most fundamental ideas in bounded rationality (indeed, in game theory
as a whole) is that no rationality at all is required to arrive at a Nash equilibrium."
Proposition 11 shows that this statement is true in our setting, although only in cases
in which there is a unique strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Proposition 12 shows
that some degree of rationality is needed in normal-form games with mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Model
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of players, and for each i 2 N , let Ai be the nonempty,
nite set of actions available to player i. For any set X (where the topology of X
is understood), (X) denotes the set of (Borel) probability measures on X. Thus,
Si := (Ai) is the set of mixed strategies of player i. Let S := i2NSi and S i :=
j 6=i2NSj; i 2 N: Each strategy prole s 2 S induces a probability distribution over the
outcome set (or set of pure strategy proles) A := i2NAi.








Given s; A0i  Ai; A0 i  A i; let






Denition 5 vi(si; s ijA0i; A0 i) is a restriction of vi(si; s i) for A0i and A0 i: A restric-
tion is consistent across i if and only if, for all i 2 N , A0 i = i2NA0i.
Denition 6 A feedback i(si; s i) is a restriction vi(si; s ijA0i; A0 i) for some A0i  Ai;
A0 i  A i. A feedback is non-trivial if either (i) A0i 6= ? or A0 i 6= ? or both, or (ii)
A0i  A0 i 6= A; otherwise the feedback is trivial. A prole of feedbacks  := (i : i 2 N)
is consistent if the underlying prole of restrictions is consistent.
Denition 7 A game G := fA1; :::; An; v1; :::; vng is nitely parametrizable if and only
if there exists ui : S <K ! < and ki : S ! < such that
vi(si; s i) = ui(si; s i; 
1
i (si; s i); :::; 
K
i (si; s i)), 8i 2 N .
Denition 8 A restricted normal form game G0 := fA1; :::; An; v1; :::; vng is a nitely
parametrizable game with i(si; s i) = i(si; s i); where i(si; s i) is a feedback.
Denition 9 An equilibrium of G is a pair (s^; ^) 2 S <K such that:
(i) ui(s^i; s^ i; ^
1
i ; :::; ^
K
i )  ui(si; s^ i; ^
1
i ; :::; ^
K





i (s^i; s^ i);8i 2 N; 8k 2 K.
Denition 10 Any two games   := fA1; :::; An; v1; :::; vng and  ^ := fA1; :::; An; v^1; :::; v^ng













Can any Nash Equilibrium of a nitely parametrizable game be preserved as an equilib-
rium of any restricted normal form game? The answer is Yes, at least when the Nash
Equilibrium is strict in pure strategies. This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Take any nitely parametrizable normal-form game   and let a =
(ai ; a

 i) be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium prole of  . There exists a "best-response"




This result may not hold if the normal form game has multiple equilibria in pure












with (U;L) and (D;R) being the two Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the game.
It easy to show that there is no strategically equivalent game such that both equilibria
can be preserved for any restriction
Proposition 11 holds for normal form games because of their bilinearity. However,
this is not necessarily true for any simultaneous move games.
The result stated in Proposition 11 assumes Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. In
Proposition 12, we show that we cannot claim an analogous result if the Nash Equi-
librium is in mixed strategies. Hence, an equilibrium in mixed strategies of a nitely
parametrizable normal form game will not necessarily be preserved as an equilibrium of
any (non-trivial) restricted normal form game.
98
Proposition 12 Take any nitely parametrizable non-trivial normal form game   and
a non-trivial non-degenerate mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium  ; s = (si ; s

 i). There
is no strategically equivalent transformation of   that preserves s as a mixed strategy
equilibrium of the transformed restricted game for any non-trivial restriction.
Of course a non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium is preserved for some restric-
tions, but in Proposition 12 we claim that this is not true for all.
Given the generality of our model, we ask ourselves if any outcome of any game could
be rationalized as a psychosocial equilibrium for some appropriate restriction. To answer
this question, it is enough to show that there exists at least one possible outcome of a
game that is not a psyschosocial equilibrium for any non-trivial restriction. In the next
proposition, we show that such an example exists, and therefore, the model is testable.
Proposition 13 Not every outcome of any game can be rationalized as an equilibrium
of any restricted game for any non-trivial consistent restriction.
4.6 Imperfect vs Perfect Reection
This section explores the relevance of the assumption of imperfect reection in some
existing games with endogenous preferences. We nd di¤erent results depending on the
game we explore. For instance, in Rabin (1993), no matter how reective the players
are, the predictions of the games do not change. The same is true in Shalev (2000).
However, in other games (e.g. with guilt or commitment) the assumption of imperfect
reection changes the predictions of the game.
4.6.1 Imperfect Reection in Social Preferences
How does the "xed pi" assumption works in the endogenous social preferences models?
The existing models on endogenous social preferences assume imperfect reection in
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players. However, it turns out that the particular specication of Rabin (1993) makes
this assumption innocuous - i.e. the set of equilibria are the same under any of the
two assumptions. It is not the case, however, with "guilt-aversion" and "commitment"
models.
Consider the following three motivations for social preferences: reciprocity, guilt
and commitment. If (a; p) is a psycho-social equilibrium prole of a "fairness with











i ) for each player i. In particular:
a) in a "fairness with reciprocity" game (Rabin, 1993), player i does not have individ-
ual incentives to deviate from playing ai i¤ vi(ai;bj; ci)  vi(a0i;bj; ci). When an irreec-
tive reciprocal player i computes the gains from deviating, she re-computes fi(a0i; bj) but
she leaves ~fj(bj; ci) unchanged, i.e. she does not fully internalize the consequence of
her deviation on her set of beliefs because ci remains xed. However, if the reciprocal
player had perfect reection, she would have incentives to deviate from playing ai i¤
vi(ai;bj; ci)  vi(a0i;bj; c0i) and a0i = c0i:15 Then, given the new set of beliefs pi = (bj; c0i),
a reective and reciprocal player i will re-compute fi(a0i; bj) and ~fj(bj; c
0
i) and evaluate
the gains from deviating. It turns out that given the particular specication of Rabin
(1993) ~fj(bj; c0i) = ~fj(bj; ci); so the set of equilibria assuming either sophisticated or my-
opic players is the same. Intuitively, it seems more reasonable to think that ~fj(bj; c0i) 6=
~fj(bj; ci). Going back to the prisoners dilemma example, one would expect (as for one
I do) that if player j is a reciprocal player, she would be less kind with player i if she
believes player i will defect (ci = D) when she cooperates (bj = C). However, Rabins
specication implies that player i thinks that j is equally generous to him when she
cooperates, whatever his beliefs are about what player i will do. This contra-intuitive
result seems to highlight a failure in the specication of Rabins model. Intuitively, one
would expect ~fj(C;D) to be higher than ~fj(C;C), but because it is not the case, Ra-
15Note that rst order beliefs b2 always are kept xed when evaluating a deviation, as in any standard
game.
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bins behavioural model does not have di¤erent normative implications from a standard
model. The descriptive and normative implications of Rabins model are robust to the
degree of reection of the players (in the sense that they do not update their beliefs
when they play the game).
b) In "guilt" and "commitment" games, it is clear that the assumption of myopia
may change the set of equilibria (see Example 15, pg. 93, for a "guilt" game). Consider
the pure "commitment" game in gure 4.1 (pg. 84). In that example, if the player were
reective enough, she would solve the following problem
Max
pi
(1  pi)(1  ~pi) + pi~pi st:pi = ~pi; pi 2 [0; 1] , (4.9)
Max
pi
(1  pi)2 + p2i s.t. pi 2 [0; 1] (4.10)
which has two corner solutions or equilibria: pi = ~pi = 0 and pi = ~pi = 1 (both with
payo¤ of 1). Note that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium in the perfect reection
case. However, the mixed strategy psycho-social equilibrium exists (with payo¤ of 1
2
)
even if we assume irreective players.
4.6.2 Imperfect Reection in Loss-Aversion Games
Besides dening a myopicloss-aversion equilibrium, Shalev (2000) also denes a dif-
ferent concept of equilibrium called non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium. Formally, a
strategy prole a is dened to be a non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium if for all i 2 N
and for all a0i 2 Ai, pi(a)  pi(a i; a0i).
A non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium is one that assumes perfect reection. Play-
ers are assumed to take into account the change on her reference point that is consistent
with her deviation. Proposition 14 states that myopic loss-aversion games are indistin-
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guishable from non-myopic loss aversion games.
Proposition 14 Under approach 1, every (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the orig-
inal game is both loss aversion psycho-social equilibrium and non-myopic loss aversion
equilibrium.
4.7 Conclusion
We have introduced a general class of simultaneous move games in which the payo¤ of
each player depends not only on her strategy prole, but also on her preference parame-
ters. The preference parameters are, in turn, endogenously determined in equilibrium.
When these games are played by players without perfect reection, they are labelled
"psycho-social games".
We linked our framework to the existent literature on social preferences and de-
veloped two applications of psycho-social games introducing the concept of individual
commitment and empowerment into game theory.
We proved equilibrium existence under weak assumptions, extending the existence
proof of Chapter 2. We associated psycho-social games to standard normal-form games
in two di¤erent ways. We showed that, typically, the set of Nash equilibria and the set of
psycho-social equilibria of an associated psycho-social game are distinct from each other.
We have also shown that a strict Nash equilibrium is robust to all degrees of imperfect
reection. This result is consistent with Aumanns (1997) claim that "no rationality at
all is required to arrive at a Nash equilibrium" (p. 4). This is true when the game has
a unique strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If the normal-form game has weak or
mixed strategy equilibria, then we show that some degree of "rationality" in Elsters
(1983) broad sense is needed to sustain a weak Nash equilibrium
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Chapter 5
Poverty Persistence and Aspirations
Failure
5.1 Introduction
In contrast to transient poverty, persistent poverty1 is not just a snapshot of those who
are poor now, but a condition that implies an understanding of a multidimensional
process which makes people poor and keeps them poor2.
An inuential literature, advocated mostly by economists studying the origins of
"poverty traps," argues that persistent poverty is due to constraints that are external
to the individual.3 Examples of such constraints are credit or insurance market im-
perfections (Loury, 1981; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1991, 1993)
coordination problems (Da Rin and Hellmann, 2002; Kremer, 1993), institutional or
governmental failures (Bardhan, 1997), malnutrition (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986), neigh-
1Persistent poverty is dened by the incapability to full basic needs during a period greater than 5
years,
2More than 300 million people world-wide have lived in persistent poverty in the late 1990s. The
Chronic Poverty Report 2004-2005 estimates that 40% of the poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is persistent.
For evidence of chronic or persistent poverty see Jalan and Ravallion (1998); Fouarge and Layte (2005);
Biewen (2006); Duncan et al. (1993), among others.
3See for example Azariadis (2004); Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) for a literature review on Poverty
Traps
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borhood e¤ects (Durlauf, 2006) or fertility decisions (Nelson, 1956).
A di¤erent approach argues that a poverty trap is perpetuated by the interaction
between extrinsic circumstances (initial disadvantage e.g. poverty or social exclusion)
and intrinsic factors such as aspirations and beliefs. The sole fact of being poor may
a¤ect preferences by constraining aspirations, self-condence or hope which may in turn
limit poor peoples ability to participate and alter their own condition.4 "Long-run
poverty is fundamentally self-perpetuating [and] the entrapment goes hand in hand with
[...] lack of hope," argues Mookherjee and Ray (2003, pg. 5).
As pointed out by the anthropologist Appadurai (2004, pg. 59), poor people may
lack the capacity to aspire to "contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty."
For Appadurai, the "capacity to aspire" is a navigational capacity which includes not
only the ability to set goals or aspirations but also the knowledge of how to achieve
them. The higher the initial advantages, the more chances an individual has to set
higher aspirations and to see the pathways which lead to their fulllment. In contrast,
the precarious life of poverty restricts the poors aspiration levels to those of necessity,
reinforcing and perpetuating the cycle of poverty and aspiration failure. A possible way
out of this trap, in Appadurais view, is to expand the poors aspiration horizon by means
of role models or to create programs which provide the poor with an arena in which to
develop capabilities and have voice. Thus the capacity to aspire is a key ingredient in
any notion of empowerment5.
4Social psychologists have documented the lack of hope and low self-esteem as a typical endogenous
characteristic in the personality of the poor population. Moreira (2006) studies the poor people in
the North-eastern Brazil and points out that as the poor lose their values, they no longer believe in
themselves. They go through a process of Nihilism [denial of hope]. He documents evidence that
shows that the greatest part of the poor population has these nihilistic characteristics and they submit
themselves to the destiny that is given by God. The work of the renowned sociologist W. J. Wilson
provides a clear evidence of the link social exclusion-lack of aspirations-poverty that was observed
in U.S. urban ghettos since 1970. Wilson (1987) makes the case that the increasing social isolation
of the poor, especially the black poor, has greatly contributed to their poverty. Out of sight, out of
mindallowed most of the non-poor to either deny or forget the conditions in the ghetto. Moreover,
Wilson argues that the causality takes the other direction as well: poverty also implies exclusion. He
claims that concentration of poverty results in the isolation of the poor from the middle class and its
corresponding role models, resources, and job networks. More generally, he argues that being poor in a
mixed-income neighbourhood is less damaging than being poor in a high poverty neighbourhood.
5Atkinson (1998) denes social exclusion as a relative concept (people are excluded from a particular
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Much of classical Economic Theory makes a sharp distinction between preference
parameters (aspirations and beliefs) and their external circumstances (initial status or
endowments) and assumes that these are both exogenous to the individual. If there
is a systematic link between initial disadvantage and aspirations and beliefs, one could
directly assume that preference parameters and external circumstances are jointly deter-
mined so that initial disadvantage and aspirations failure are inextricably linked. Such
an approach, however, requires the assumption that individuals in a state of persistent
disadvantage are intrinsically di¤erent from all other individuals: persistent poverty is
due to innate personal traits (personality characteristics, preferences etc.) and therefore
policy intervention can make little or no di¤erence. From the perspective of analysis,
such an approach implies that the economist can describe but cannot explain the ways
in which extrinsic disadvantage and internal constraints interact.
This chapter introduces a simple formal model that derives the link between ini-
tial disadvantage with aspirations, beliefs and choices6 in a tractable way while yielding
testable implications that can be checked against data collected under controlled condi-
tions.
We consider a decision-maker who is endowed with an initial status and who has to
choose between two actions: one that perpetuates her initial status and one that has the
potential of improving her initial status.7 The decision-makers initial status plus her
aspiration level denes the target status, i.e. how far in her status she wants to go. The
nal (realized) status is determined through a production function in the following way.
If the decision-maker chooses the action that perpetuates her status-quo, her nal status
will be equal to her initial status (with probability 1). If, on the contrary, the decision-
society) that involves agency (people may exclude themselves) and it implies future hopes and expecta-
tions. People are excluded not just because they are currently without a job or an income but because
they have little prospects for the future.
6Our model can be viewed as a contribution to ll in a gap in the literature pointed out by Duo
(2006, pg. 10): . . . what is needed is a theory of how poverty inuences decision-making, not only by
a¤ecting the constraints, but by changing the decision-making process itself.
7The status of an individual can be broadly interpreted as her income level, education level, wealth,
standard of living, location, type of occupation, etc. Moreover, it does not need to be material. The
individual might want to change her political power, cultural status or even her recognition.
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maker chooses an action that has the potential of improving her status, she will reach her
target with probability p and stays with her initial status with probability 1 p where p
is a combination of external signals (for example a role model) and her subjective beliefs
(self-condence). The decision maker gets a benet from the nal status achieved and
there is a cost of action which depends on her initial status. Choosing the action that
perpetuates the status-quo yields no benet and is costless. Any attempt to change the
status-quo is costly but (a) the cost of doing so is lower the higher is the initial status (so
that the initial status is a measure of the level of disadvantage of the decision-maker) and
(b) the target status is achieved with probability p and the benet function is increasing
in the target status (and hence, the aspiration level).
We rst assume that initial status, aspirations and probabilities are given to the
individual. We show that initial advantage and self-condence are substitutes for aspi-
rations. That is, the more disadvantaged the decision-maker is (respectively the lower
self-condence), the higher aspirations she needs in order to nd it convenient to under-
take an action that has the potential to change her status-quo. The main implication of
this result is that initial disadvantage is associated with aspirations failure, a combina-
tion of low aspirations and low achievement.
Next, we allow for endogenous aspirations. We study the impact of a role model
as a way out of a deprivation trap. A role model provides direct information about
p through a successful experience of a "similar" other. As in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001),8 we endow the decision-maker with a "similarity function"9 which provides a
quantication of her subjective assessment of how similar the initial status of the role
model is relative to her own initial status. The more similar the role model is to the
decision-maker, the stronger will be the positive impact of the role model on her beliefs,
8Gilboa and Schmeidler study Case-Based Decision Theory, people make decisions by analogies to
past cases, choosing acts that performed well in the past in "similar" situations, and avoiding acts that
performed poorly.
9We argue that the simillarity functions used in our paper are related to certain sample estimators
used in non-parametric econometrics.
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and the more likely will it be to break an aspiration failure.10 We then dene the decision-
makers "cognitive neighborhood" as the set of people from where she draws a role model
(e.g. peers, parents, etc.). The limits of the neighborhood are chosen optimally by the
decision-maker, and it is assumed there is a "cognitive cost" associated with it. That
is, the bigger the neighborhood, the more costly is to process the information. It is
shown that an initially disadvantaged decision-maker will nd it optimal to restrict the
size of her "cognitive neighborhood" to those who are similar to her. We use this result
to model how overlapping cognitive neighbourhoods lead to an information externality
that determines the internal constraints an individual imposes on herself and construct
an example to show how aspirations failure arises in a polarized society.
Finally, we study aspirations formation with adaptive preferences. We introduce a
feedback e¤ect from actions and initial status to aspirations, and consider two di¤erent
decision processes. One, in which the decision-maker is sophisticated enough to internal-
ize the feedback e¤ect when choosing an optimal action. We label such decision-problem
a "standard decision problem" (SDP). In this case, we show that initial disadvantage
is associated with aspirations failure and could result in a poverty trap. Alternatively,
with some degree of "myopia", the decision-maker may not internalize the e¤ect of ac-
tions into his aspirations, and make his optimal decision as if his aspirations where
exogenously given, although both actions and aspirations are required to be mutually
consistent. We call such a problem, a Behavioral Decision Problem (BDP). In a BDP,
there are two types of equilibria. For individuals with low initial status, the equilibrium
is to remain in status-quo with low aspirations ("aspiration failure equilibrium"). For
those with high initial status, the equilibrium is to change and sustain high aspirations.
For individuals in the middle, with intermediate values of initial status, there are mul-
tiple welfare ranked equilibria. We show that in this case, both aspirations and choices,
via equilibrium selection, can be determined as a (stochastic) function of the individuals
10As Ray (2006, pg. 7) argues: looking at the experience of individuals similar to me is like running
an experiment with better controls, and therefore has better content in informing my decisions and my
aspirations."
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extrinsic circumstances. We show how, with overlapping cognitive windows, the infor-
mation externality generated by a role model determines which equilibrium is chosen in
a behavioral decision problem.
Overall, our analysis suggests a view of poverty traps that relies in an essential way
on the interaction between extrinsic circumstances and intrinsic factors. It is important
to remark that this approach does not only highlights the e¤ect of initial disadvantage
on peoples aspirations and self-condence, but more importantly, it points out that
initial disadvantages may have a permanent e¤ect on peoples life through its e¤ect
on psychological traits. Our analysis implies that empowerment (the combination of
opportunity and the "capacity to aspire") is essential to the process by which individuals
exit poverty traps.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 5.3 develops the model. Section 5.4 introduces the role model e¤ect
and a cognitive neighborhood. Section 5.5 endogenizes aspirations. Section 5.6 discusses
some policy implications and Section 7 concludes.
5.2 Relation to the Literature
Based on Appadurais (2004) work, the closest work to ours is Ray (2006), who argues
that poverty and failure of aspirations may be reciprocally linked within a self-sustaining
trap. Ray (2006) also combines a discussion about the way aspirations may be formed
and the way they may a¤ect behavior. By providing a story in which individuals choose
a level of e¤ort to minimize their aspirations gap, Ray intuitively suggests that individual
investment e¤orts should be minimal for both high and low aspiration gaps. However,
no formal framework is provided in that paper.
Heifetz and Minelli (2006) is another close related paper. They study a model of
aspiration traps where an individual in period t = 0 makes a choice which will a¤ect her
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attitude for the rest of her life. Heifetz and Minellis (2006) paper does not study the
e¤ect of role models, initial disadvantage or the way in which aspirations are formed as
we do here.
This chapter is also related to the literature of relative deprivation because the con-
cept of poverty we use is a relative one.11 It is also engaged with the literature of
empowerment, since it provides an analytical framework to support the theoretical ideas
of empowerment.12
We borrow from the literature of neighborhood e¤ects (Durlauf, 2006) the idea that
persistence in economic status is generated by group-level inuences on individuals,
although we incorporate the aspiration channel.
The idea that people have aspirations that want to satisfy is not new in the Economics
literature. For instance, the literature of reinforcement learning in game theory shows
how agents can adapt by comparing payo¤s achieved from actions chosen in the past
within an aspiration level. (see Bendor et al., 2001; Karandikar et al., 1998).
Finally, this chapter is related to some particular models that take identity issues
into consideration to study poverty and social exclusion, such us Akerlof and Kranton
(2000), Ho¤ and Pandey (2004) or Ho¤ and Sen (2006)
5.3 The model
5.3.1 Set-up
In the model, we consider a decision-maker who has to choose between two actions: one
that perpetuates her initial status and one that has the potential of improving her initial
status.
11See Stark and Taylor (1991) for a general introduction to relative deprivation, Deaton (2001) for
an application to health, Stark (2006) for an application to growth. For empirical papers on relative
deprivation, see for example Duclos and Grégoire (2002).
12See for instance Stern (2004), World Bank (2002), or Alsop and Heinsohn (2005)
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The initial status of the decision-maker is denoted by 0 (with the set of all possible
initial social status denoted by ). The decision-maker aspires to achieve a new social
status and we denote the target status by b =  + 0,   0,  2 [0; K] where K is
some large but nite number. We interpret  as a measure of how high decision-maker
aspires. Low aspirations correspond to values of  close to zero while high aspirations
correspond to values of close toK. In what follows, we will refer to as the aspiration
level of the decision-maker.
The decision-maker has to choose an action a 2 fa; ag where a denotes the action
that perpetuates her initial status while a denotes an action that has the potential of
changing her initial status in a manner described below.
Let the nal or achieved status be denoted by 1. The production function for 1 is
specied as follows:
a = a) 1 = 0 with probability 1; (5.1)
a = a)

1 = 0 with probability 1  p
1 = b with probability p
where p is the probability that the decision-maker attaches to di¤erent outcomes. In
general, p will be a combination of objective data (the decision-makers own experience,
the signals she observes based on the experience of others (role models)) and prior
subjective beliefs (the degree of condence or optimism of the decision-maker). In what
follows, both interpretations of p will be used.
The payo¤s to the decision maker is given by b (1)   c (a; 0) where b (1) denotes
the benet the decision-maker obtains at the achieved social state and c (a; 0) is the
cost of action which depends on the initial status of the individual. We rewrite these
payo¤s as b ( + 0)  c (a; 0) and make the following assumption:
Assumption 1
(i) b( + 0) is continuous and increasing in  with b(0) = 0: perpetuating the
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status-quo yields no benet and the benet function is increasing in aspirations;
(ii) c(a; 0) = 0 for all 0: perpetuating the status-quo is costless.;
(iii) c(a; 0) = c(0) > 0 and continuous and decreasing in 0: any attempt to change
the status-quo is costly but the cost of doing so is lower the higher is the initial status. In
this way, the initial status is a measure of the level of disadvantage of the decision-maker.
5.3.2 Optimal Actions with Exogenously Generated Aspira-
tions
In this subsection, we take the decision-makers aspirations, subjective beliefs and initial
status as given. The individual will choose a = a if and only if
pb( + 0)  c(0)  0 (5.2)
Suppose the initial  was picked at random from [0; K] (where K is some large but
nite number) according to some continuous pdf g(p) (with associated cdf G(p)). Next,
given the p,; 0, the individual chooses a 2 fa; ag.
The following result characterizes the optimal choice of the decision-maker:
Proposition 15 (Optimal action as a function of p and 0) Suppose payo¤s
satisfy assumption 1. Then, there exists a threshold level of aspirations ^(p; 0) > 0 such
that that the decision-maker attempts to change her initial social status i¤   ^(p; 0);
moreover the threshold ^(p; 0) is decreasing in both p and 0. The probability that the
decision-maker will choose a is 1 G(^(p; 0)) which is increasing in both p; 0 as well.
Proposition 15 shows that initial advantage and self-condence are substitutes for
aspirations. That is, the more disadvantaged the decision-maker is (respectively the
lower self-condence), the higher aspirations she needs in order to nd it convenient to
undertake an action that has the potential to change her status-quo.
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Note that by assumption 1, both 0 (the initial status of the decision-maker) and
p (the probabilities that the decision-maker attaches to di¤erent outcomes) are key
characteristics of the decision-maker. The main implication of Proposition 1 is that
initial status disadvantage and low level of self-condence is positively associated with
low aspirations and as a consequence, low achievement. Specically, (i) holding initial
status xed, a person with a low p (low level of condence) requires a higher level of
aspirations than a person with a high p (high degree of condence) in order to undertake
an action that changes her status quo, (ii) holding beliefs xed, a person with a low 0
(initial disadvantage) require a higher level of aspirations than a person with a high 0
(initial advantage) in order to undertake an action that changes his status quo.
Let p0 denote the prior of the decision-maker which, we assume, the decision-maker
takes as given. Suppose p0 is picked at random from [0; 1] according to some continuous
pdf f(p) (with associated cdf F (p)). Next, given the p0,; 0, the individual chooses
a 2 fa; ag. The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of the decision-
maker:
Proposition 16 (Optimal action as a function of  and 0) Suppose payo¤s
satisfy assumption 1. If p0 is picked from [0; 1] according to some continuous pdf f(p)
(with associated cdf F (p)), the probability that the decision-maker will choose a is 1  
F (p^ (; 0)) which is increasing in both  and 0.
Note that there is no guarantee that p^ (; 0)  1. If p^ (; 0) > 1, the decision-
maker will never choose a.
The main implication of Proposition 16 is that initial status disadvantage and low as-
piration levels is positively associated with low self-condence and as a consequence, low
achievement. Moreover, initial advantage and aspirations are substitutes for condence.
Consider a simplication of the model by assuming that there are only two levels of
aspirations f0;0 > 0g.
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Suppose the decision-maker chooses a  from f0;0 > 0g taking into account the
fact that by changing  she a¤ects her own choice. The following result characterizes
the conditions under which aspirations failure emerges endogenously in such a situation:
Proposition 17 (aspirations failure) If p0 < p^ (0; 0), the decision-maker will op-
timally choose  = 0.
Proposition 17 is telling us that even if the person is rational enough to anticipate the
e¤ect of ther aspirations on her choices, for a su¢ ciently low level of initial background
or self-condence, it is optimal for the person to choose to have no aspirations to change
her status-quo.
5.4 Role models, Cognitive Neighbourhood and Po-
larization
5.4.1 Raising Aspirations: a similarity approach
Assume that the decision-maker is characterized by p0,0 so that she is in a situation of
aspirations failure. The question then becomes: how can the aspirations of the decision-
maker be raised?
In practice, one way of raising aspirations is by observing role models (Rao and
Walton 2004): individuals will draw on the aspirations of their cognitive neighbours,
and in this sense role models become an important variable in the formation of their
aspirations. But what determines which other individuals are cognitive neighbours of
the decision-maker?
Suppose the decision-maker observes an external signal which consists of the initial







. Under what con-
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ditions does the decision-maker update her prior beliefs when she observes an external
signal (j0; 
j
1)? In other words, when is such information relevant?
In order to answer this question, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001), we endow
the decision-maker with a similarity function s :    ! [0; 1] which provides a
quantication of the similarity judgement of the decision-maker, her assessment of how
similar the initial status of the role model is relative to the her own initial status. We
assume that assessing the similarity across di¤erent pairs of initial status is the main
cognitive task of the decision-maker. Importantly, the similarity function is subjective
in the same sense in which probabilities are subjective in expected utility theory. Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001) provide an axiomatic treatment of choice determined by similarity
weighted payo¤ estimation.
Nevertheless, there may be an objective element in the assessment of similarity. The
problem is familiar from econometrics where one might want to infer the conditional
distribution p (y 2 Ajx0) where the sample frequency of x0 is zero i.e. p(x0) = 0. Assume
that all variables are unidimensional. In such scenarios, it is standard in econometrics
to use a uniform kernel estimate (Hardle, 1990; Manski, 1999) which is an estimate
of the sample frequency with which y 2 A amongst those observations xi such that
jxi   x0j < d (where d is the sample specic bandwidth chosen to conne attention to
those observations in which xi is close to x0). In a sample with n observations, the
expression for the uniform kernel estimate is
PN
i=1 1 (y 2 A)1 (jxi   x0j < d)PN
i=1 1 (jxi   x0j < d)
: (5.3)
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is decreasing in the distance (in some metric) between j0 and 0.







. Given a similarity function, the decision-






























 b (0 + 0)  c (0) (5.6)
This has the interpretation that after observing the external signal, the decision-maker











Therefore, the updating of priors after observing the signal (the role model) is an example
of similarity based learning.
Remark that in the case when n = 1 (the case of a single role model, the case studied
so far),  =

; 
  < with the interpretation that x0 corresponds to 0, xi corresponds
to j0 and y 2 A corresponds to achieving 0, the expression for p1 reduces to uniform
kernel estimate for the "bandwidth" similarity function.
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 b (0 + 0)  c (0)  0









  p^ (; 0) (5.8)
Observe that if s
 
j0; 0


















However, for the individual who consists of the external signal to choose j0, by Propo-





and j0  ^(pj0; j0): (5.9)
where pj0 denotes the prior probability of the external signal.
Building on the preceding analysis, the following proposition characterizes the con-
ditions under which the external signal will act as a role model:
Proposition 18 (Role model) If 0 < ^(p0; 0) and j0  ^(pj0; j0), the external





Proposition 18 states the conditions under which the decision-maker will draw upon
the aspirations and achievements of a role model who will alter her choices, aspirations
and achievements and show her the way out of the aspirations trap. The key requirement
is that it has to be the case that the extrinsic circumstances (the initial status) of the role
model has to be similar to the extrinsic circumstances (the initial status) of the decision-
maker herself. Thus, the decision-maker will not put much weight on the experience of
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success of individuals who are characterized by very di¤erent to her.
Nevertheless, even if the initial status of the role model were similar that of the
decision-maker, the role model will need to have a higher degree of self-condence.
Therefore, one way to raise the aspirations of all individuals belonging to a disadvan-
taged group would be to alter the behavior of a carefully chosen subset of such individ-
uals. A di¤erent way would be to raise the self-condence of a disadvantaged individual
directly. The two case studies, Classical Music Orchestras for children from disadvan-
taged backgrounds and the decrease in the HIV infections in Sonagachi (Kolkatas oldest
and best established red-light district), discussed in greater detail in Section 6, illustrate
the above points.
5.4.2 Choosing the Cognitive neighbourhood
It remains to determine the cognitive window of the decision-maker. In determining
the cognitive window, note that there is a tension between (a) looking at only those
individuals who are similar and (b) observing an individual who has a higher degree of
self-condence and therefore, who has chosen a higher level of aspirations.
For simplicity, we consider a decision-maker such that p0 < p^ (0; 0) and 0 <
^(p0; 0) (for example, assume that 0 = ).
Consider the following decision-process:
Step 1: The decision maker chooses a subset from sample bandwidth d 2 0;    
at a cost C(d) where d is the radius of the subset and C(:) is a strictly increasing, con-
tinuous function that captures the idea of costly cognition.







where j0 is drawn according to the uniform distribution
from her chosen subset. After observing the role model, the decision-maker updates her






Proposition 19 (choice of the cognitive neighbourhood) Suppose 0 = , the sim-




= 0. Then, the decision maker will choose a














dj0   c (0)  C(d), is strictly
less than
   .
Strongly connected societies and aspirations
We conclude this section with a simple N -person extension that links the nature of
inequality in a society with aspirations failure. Consider a society with N (a large but





Denition 11 (Individual connectedness) Individual i is connected to j if i0 < 
j
0
but when j chooses a; j belongs to the cognitive neighborhood chosen by i.
Dene a directed graph over N where the vertices are individuals and an arc (i; j)
exists i¤ i is connected to j. A path in a directed graph is an ordered collection of arcs
and vertices in which all vertices are distinct. A directed graph is strongly connected if
for every pair of distinct vertices (i; j) there exists a path connecting i to j.
Denition 12 (Strongly connected society) A society is strongly connected if its
associated graph is strongly connected.
The distribution of individuals in a society is " dense if for " > 0, there exists a pair
i; j with
i0   j0 < ".
Proposition 20 (Connectedness and aspirations) There exists " > 0 such that if
the distribution of individuals in a society is " dense, 0 < " < ", the society is strongly
connected and all individuals in it choose a and have aspirations 0 as long as there




. More generally, the probability that all






The following example examines what happens when the distribution of individuals
fails to be su¢ ciently dispersed.
Example 17 Polarization and aspirations failure
Consider a society where a fraction  individuals are initially located at  and 1 










Then, clearly p0 < p^ (0; 0) and 0 < ^(p0; 0) for all 0 =  while p00  p^ (0; 00)
and 0  ^(p00; 00) for all 00 =  and no 00 =  is in the cognitive neighborhood of any
0 = . Aspirations failure for all individuals initially located at .
The next example examines what happens if the distribution of individuals is con-
centrated at a specic initial status.
Example 18 Equality and aspirations failure
Consider a society where all individuals are initially located at . Assume that
p^ (0; ) > 1. Then, clearly p0 < p^ (0; 0) and 0 < ^(p0; 0) for all 0 =  and
there is aspirations failure for all individuals initially located at . More generally, the
probability that all individuals choose a = a and  = 0 is 1  [F (p (0; 0))]N .
5.5 Preference formation and aspirations failure
Assume that there is some underlying preference formation process as in BDPs  :
fa; ag  [0; 1]   ! [0; K] from actions, self-condence and initial social status to
aspirations. Assume that (a; p; ) is increasing in a and  with (a; p; 0) = 0 for all
0 2  and (a; p; 0) =  (p; 0) 2 (0; K] where(p; 0) is increasing in p; 0: therefore,
we assume that aspirations can be constrained by both actions and initial status.
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We can think of two di¤erent ways in which the aspirations of the decision-maker
can be endogenized.
First, the decision-maker internalizes the preference formation process: let us label
such a decision-problem as a standard decision problem. At this point, there are two
cases to consider. In the rst instance, decision-maker chooses a  from [0; K] taking
into account the fact that by changing  she a¤ects her own choice. Alternatively,
the decision-maker chooses actions taking the feedback into account. In the rst case,
by Proposition 15, the decision-maker will anticipate that she will choose a i¤ 0 
^(p; 0) > 0. In the second case, if the decision-maker chooses a, she anticipates that
the feedback generates an aspiration level of (0). Therefore, the decision-maker will
choose (0) (equivalently, a) i¤
pb( (0) + 0)  c(0)  0 (5.10)
,
(0)  ^(p; 0). (5.11)
Second, the decision maker takes the aspirations as given while choosing action al-
though both aspirations and actions are required to be mutually consistent given the
preference formation process. This is an application of the BDP introduced in Chapter
2. In this case, if
(i) (p; 0) < ^(p; 0), the unique outcome is (a = a; = 0);
(ii) if (p; 0)  ^(p; 0) and (p; 0) < K there are two outcomes, (a = a; = 0)
and
 
a = a; = (0)

;
(iii) if ^(p; 0)  (p; 0) = K, the unique outcome is
 
a = a; = (p; 0)

.
Call (a = a; = 0) a type I outcome and
 
a = a; = (p; 0)

a type II outcome.A
type I outcome can be interpreted as an aspirations failure, a low motivation trap for
the individual.
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The set of equilibria is "weakly increasing" in . For an individual of low initial
status (low 0), the unique equilibrium is type I while for an individual with high initial
status (high 0) the unique equilibrium is type II.
For an individual in the middle, with intermediate values of , there are multiple
welfare ranked equilibria and for such an individual, the theoretical framework developed
so far doesnt pin down the equilibrium decision state i.e. the aspirations and choices
are indeterminate.
Formally, the set of low initial status is  =
n
0 :  (p; 0) < ^(p; 0)
o
, the set of
high initial status is  =
n
0 : ^(p; 0)  (p; 0) = K
o
, and the set of intermediate
status is M =
n
0 :  (p; 0)  ^(p; 0);(p; 0) < K
o
. Assume that all the three sets
; and M are non-null and constitute a partition of .
Next, we develop a simple adaptive dynamics over  that allows us to select between
the di¤erent outcomes for 0 2 M . Fix 0 2 M and consider the following adaptive
dynamics over :
Step 1: The initial  is picked at random from [0; K] (where K is some large but
nite number) according to some continuous pdf g(p) (with associated cdf G(p))
Step 2: Given the p,; 0, the individual chooses a 2 fa; ag. The new status 1 is
generated by the production function where  =  (a; p; ).
The following proposition formalizes the link between aspirations and achievement
and initial disadvantage in a behavioral decision problem.
Proposition 21 (Disadvantage and aspirations failures in BDPs) There exists
~ such that if 0 < ~, a type I outcome will have a higher probability of emerging while
if 0 > ~, a type II outcome will have a higher probability of emerging.
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5.6 Policy discussion
If economic betterment is an important goal, in addition to redistributive measures, the
aspiration neighborhood of individuals also need to be improved. Thus, policy interven-
tion should provide the mechanisms to help the individual to change her aspirations.
These mechanisms are extremely sensitive to apparently irrelevant details from the
point of view of someone who has not experienced this condition (i.e. the policy maker),
but that are very relevant for people caught within an aspiration trap.
For example, the importance of role models (Rao and Walton, 2004) cannot be
understood within the framework of a standard cost-benet analysis. Individuals will
draw on the aspirations of their cognitive neighbors, and in this sense role models become
an important variable in the formation of their aspirations.
Changing a role model to break an aspiration trap has been empirically showed to be
a very e¤ective policy of poverty reduction. One of the most remarkable examples comes
from Kolkata (Calcutta), India. The objective of the Government by the 1990s was to
decrease the HIV infections in Sonagachi, Kolkatas oldest and best established red-light
district, with over 4,000 sex workers working in 370 brothels that service about 20,000
clients a day (Rao and Walton, 2004, pg. 7). As Rao and Walton (op. cit.) points
out, during the 1990s, the Governments "interventions tended to reect the values of
the middle-class bureaucrats who crafted them. They focused on rehabilitating the sex
workers, rescuing them, and [...] training them." to be ready for an insertion in the
"good life". This strategy did not work. As Rao and Walton argues, the relatively high
earnings in sex work and the discrimination faced by former sex workers in the world
outside Sonagachi, led most women to return prostitution.
In this context, the Government implemented a very di¤erent strategy. It decides
to convince and train twelve sex workers which would pass the important information
about the use of condoms as peers education to their co-workers. This process, as argued
by Rao and Walton, led over a period of two or three years, to a "metamorphosis" in the
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sex workers aspirations. Moreover, the program was remarkably successful as a health
intervention, with almost all sex workers using condoms at least some of the time and
the HIV incidence in Sonagachi substantially decreased.
This successful health intervention can be interpreted with the lens of our model as
a change in the quality of the aspiration windows. The individuals incorporated as new
aspiration neighbors their renewed peers through a re-identication process.
In addition, the results in this chapter o¤er new insights about why programs that
look for increasing the aspirations of the people by means of improving their aspiration
neighborhood such us the Venezuelan Classical Music Orchestras for children from dis-
advantaged backgrounds or role models programs are so successful. More than 400,000
Venezuelan children, most coming from poor families have taken and take part of a
network of orchestras directed by Jose Antonio Abreu that began being carried out
30 years ago. The lessons are free of charge and a public foundation "FESNOJIV",
which is also supported by the Inter American Development Bank, provides the in-
struments. The project does not primarily aim to create professional musicians, but
to integrate poor children into the society. The recognition children get from those
who are out of their aspiration neighborhood makes them change their beliefs about
themselves. Music becomes the driver that makes the social integration of di¤erent
Venezuelan population groups possible. 96 percent of the young musicians have good
to excellent school records. They stand out as high achievers thanks to their steady
relationship with music. UNESCO awarded FESNOJIV its International Music Award
in 1993-94 and in 1998 UNDP commended it as an outstanding example of poverty
reduction. In the words of its founder: "The majority of the children and juveniles
belong to the groups that are most vulnerable and excluded in all of Venezuelan society.
Participating in the orchestral movement has made it possible for them to set up new
goals, plans, projects and dreams, and at the same time it is a way of creating meaning
and helping them in their day-to-day struggle for better conditions of life through the
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variety of opportunities that the orchestral movement o¤ers them." Antonio Abreu (see
http://www.rightlivelihood.org/recip/abreu.htm)
More generally, structural poverty reduction must consider empowering of individu-
als. Our results can provide one possible explanation of why some paternalistic policies
have failed (Narayan, 2002) and why in general, externally applied incentives lead to
"passive acceptance at best and more likely to indi¤erence or resistances" (McGregor,
1960, pg. 68).
Regarding the potential of our model for the impact on poverty reduction agenda,
our model would suggest that a policy that aims to succeed reducing structural poverty
requires additional reinforcement mechanisms to be at work: such a policy should pay
special attention to be inclusive and empower the poor. As Ellerman (2004, pg. 110)
argues, "reliance on carrots and sticks can induce an atrophy e¤ect. Any original intrinsic
motivation dries up, and the doer becomes an aid-dependent marionette responding only
to external strings."
In a related analysis, Bertrand et al. (2004) and Mullainathan (2005) point out that
small institutional barriers that would appear insignicant in a cost benet analysis
would become very psychologically costly for poor people within an aspiration trap.
Smallhassles can explain low welfare program take-up. Application processes often
signals negative identities that can reinforce the alienation and lack of aspirations of the
eventual program taker. The importance of such hassles starts to become clear in the
analysis proposed here.
In a similar vein, major policy interventions that do not consider the importance of
psycho-social constraints such aspirations may fail to break poverty traps. For instance,
creating jobs is not necessarily an e¤ective policy to solve an aspiration failure. As
Atkinson (1998) argues, ending persistent poverty will depend on the nature of these new
jobs. Do they restore a sense of control? Do they o¤er prospects for the future? Likewise,
income support programs may be exclusionary, as they could make the recipients feel
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excluded by the state.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a model that associates people initial disadvantages with
their self-condence, aspirations and decisions to change their status-quo. Our analysis
suggested a simple view of a new class of poverty traps that does not rely only on external
constraints to the individual, but also on internal psychological constraints. We found
that initial disadvantages are associated with aspirations failures, a combination of low
aspirations and low achievement. We then studied how and under what conditions a
role model can help a poor person to break her aspirations failure and climb out of
poverty. We allowed the person to select a role model and showed that, in principle, a
poor person may restrict the set from which the role model is selected. Evidence from
Anthropology, Sociology and Social Psychology supports our results and our model. The
fact that the actual condition of poverty a¤ects (and is a¤ected by) lack of aspirations
and hope is a recurrent topic in these disciplines. However, it is surprising to see that it
has been disregarded by formal economic models. The concept of empowerment has also
been understudied in Economic Theory, despite its great importance for the anti-poverty
policy agenda.
Our preliminary results are consistent with empirical evidence suggesting a tendency
of societies to polarize(see Duclos et al., 2004; Quah, 1993; Azariadis and Stachurski,
2005; Atkinson, 2003). Similarly, our results are in line with empirical evidence show-
ing that communities with higher levels of social cohesion and narrower gaps between
poor and rich produce better health and welfare outcomes than wealthier societies that
have higher levels of social disintegration (Putnam, 2000). Marmot andWilkinson (2006)
show that in addition to economic prosperity, equality and social cohesion are also power-
ful determinants of health. The case of Kerala provides further evidence suggesting that
125
the social cohesion gained by allowing the poor to participate in programs contributes







Aspirations are commonly dened by psychologists as goals, which can be either intrinsic
(e.g. meaningful relationships, personal growth, community contributions) or extrinsic
(e.g. annual income, wealth, fame, image) and long term (e.g. win the Nobel Prize) or
short term (e.g. get a degree, nish a paper).
While standard economics analysis focuses on individuals maximizing utility, the
concept of individuals satisfying aspirations has been shown to be central in under-
standing phenomena in Social Psychology (Deci and Ryan, 2000), Sociology (Sewell
et al., 1957; Sewell, 1964; Sewell and Shah, 1968), Antropology (Appadurai, 2004) and
decision theory (Simon, 1955, 1959; Selten, 1998)1. It is used to explain such phenomena
as educational and occupational choice (Sewell, 1964), the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin,
1See Traub (1999) for a review of aspirations as frames that individuals use to make decisions.
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2001), mental health (Kasser and Ryan, 1993), mental wellbeing (Ryan et al., 1999) and,
more recently, poverty persistence (Ray, 2006).
By comparison, human cooperation vs. free-riding in a context of private provision of
a public good has always been a challenge to social scientists (Dawes and Thaler, 1988).
With the globalization process, this challenge has become even more complex, since an
additional geographical dimension was added to the problem: the global dimension of
public goods. The challenge now is not only to understand whether people contribute or
not to a public good, but also if the degree of cooperation change which the geographical
level of the public good (local, national or global).
This chapter provides a rst attempt to explore (a) the link between these two central
concepts, human aspirations and cooperation, and (b) if this link changes depending on
whether the contributions are directed to a local, national or public good. Specically,
it enquires into what extent peoples real life income aspirations a¤ect their level of
cooperation in general and, in particular, with whom they cooperate.
In order to grasp the intuition behind the aspirations-cooperation link, let me give you
the following example. Susan is working to submit a paper for an important conference
tomorrow. This is her personal goal. At the same time, she has also committed herself
to spend the day cleaning a common area together with her neighbour. Susan cannot do
both task, so she has to choose one. Suppose that Susan individually prefers submitting
her paper to cooperating with neighbours, while having the common area cleaned is
unanimously preferred to leaving it as it is. Suppose also Susan is always better o¤when
some neighbour cleans than when none does. Will she cooperate with her neighbours
and leave her individual goal of submitting the paper unattained or will she simply follow
her own interest? This example is a version of an n-person prisonersdilemma, and the
answer to the question is trivial in standard Economics: Susan is rational and selsh,
and assuming no punishment, she will defect. Recent literature on social preferences
allows for the possibility of assuming that Susan may also care about the welfare of her
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neighbours (either unconditionally altruistic or by warm glow e¤ect) and so may leave
her goal unattained and cooperate. She might also care about reciprocity, and if she
thinks their neighbours have been good to her, again she may be willing to cooperate
with them. Now consider a di¤erent scenario. Say she is at a point in which she is
somehow satised with what she has written, although if she continues polishing the
paper, it can only be improved further. Would she help her neighbours in this second
scenario? Standard Economics would predict that, again, a selsh and rational Susan
will free-ride on her neighbour in this second scenario. There is neither an existing
Economic Theory nor empirical evidence that would support a di¤erent answer. The
trade-o¤ between Susans and the neighbourswelfare is assumed to be xed, and it is
independent on Susan having reached or being close to reaching a satisfaction/aspiration
target. This chapter suggests, however, the existence of such a target, and claims that
Susan would be more likely to cooperate with her neighbour in this latter scenario than
in the former. In addition, the chapter studies whether Susans decision in each scenario
would be di¤erent if instead of having to clean a common local area, she had to help
Greenpeace to clean the river that would benet citizens of a border country (global
public good) instead of her neighbours (local public good).
In order to explore these concerns, this chapter combines experimental data with
a post-experiment survey. The experimental design was constructed by Buchan et al.
(2009) and it consists in a nested PGG similar to that employed by Blackwell and McKee
(2003) in Economics and by Wit and Kerr (2002) in Psychology. In a nested PGG,
individuals have the option of keeping their endowment for themselves, contributing
some of it to a local pot (L), and/or contributing some of it to a larger pot in this case
representing either a national (N) or global pot (G). In our experiment, participants
play two interactions involving this nested PGG, one in which the contribution entails
a choice between the local and national pot (Decision N), and a second in which the
contribution entails a choice between the local and global pots (Decision W). The local
pot is comprised of the participant plus three other participants from the local area. The
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national or global pot consists of the participants local group plus two other groups of
four people from di¤erent areas of the same country (Decision N), or from di¤erent
countries around the world (Decision W). A post-experiment survey collects di¤erent
variables of interest for this chapter, such as social identity measures, demographic
measures and measures of income aspirations gap, which is dened as the proportion of
income needed by the participant in order to be satised income-wise.
We are interested in several questions. First, are participants who are more satised
income-wise more likely to provide higher contributions to a public good than those
who are less satised? If so, to what extent? Does this behaviour depend on whether
the public good is local, national or global? Second, will the in-group identication
with neighbours, compatriots or foreigners a¤ect the level of contribution to the local,
national and global public good? Third, will the perceptions of participantsposition in
the income distribution with respect to the average neighbour, compatriot or foreigner
a¤ect their contributions to each public good? Will this perception a¤ect the way in
which the income aspirations gap a¤ect their contributions?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the methodology,
describes the data and denes the hypotheses to test. Section6.3 presents the analysis
and main results. Section 6.4 discusses the robustness of the results and Section 6.5
concludes.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Experiment and Survey
Data from a linear public-good experiment was gathered and a survey conducted in Ar-
gentina. The experiment was part of a set of similar experiments conducted in six other
countries around the world2 under the umbrella of a meta-project on cooperation and
2The experiment was conducted also in Iran, England, Italy, United States, South Africa and Russia.
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globalization (Buchan et al., 2009). I only make use of the data gathered in Argentina,
where I included additional relevant questions for this chapter.
Approximately 200 subjects participated in three public goods experimental deci-
sions3 in xed order. Pilot tests found no ordering e¤ects. Subjects were drawn from the
general population in Buenos Aires (city and province)4. A quota sampling recruitment
method was used based on gender, age and socioeconomic status5. The experimental
sessions were conducted in groups of no less than eight and no more than eighteen par-
ticipants. Interactions were anonymous, and the groups with which subjects interacted
were randomly selected at the beginning of each decision. No feedback between decisions
was provided. Hence, the three decisions can be treated as independent.
In each of the two decisions studied here, subjects were given 10 tokens each6. The
task in each decision was to decide how to allocate these 10 tokens among their per-
sonalaccount (or private good) and two collectiveaccounts (or public good), whose
composition varied across the two decisions. Each token put into the personalaccount
maintained intact its value (i.e. the individual marginal return to the private good, ;
was 1). As it is standard in LPGGs, the individual marginal return to the public good,
; is lower than the marginal return to the private good, , but contributing creates
positive externalities for the other people in the group (i.e.  > ; N > ; where N is
the number of players).
In a rst decision, Decision N, subjects were asked to allocate their endowments
between their "personal" account, a "local" account (or local public good) composed of
the subject and another three anonymous randomly chosen neighbours, and a "national"
3Participantsplay three Linear Public Good Games (LPGG) or Voluntary Contributions to a Public
Good Game. For the purpose of this paper, we are going to focus only on two of the three decisions
played, simply because this two decisions have exactly the same structure of incentives and only di¤er
in the identity of the recipients of the public good.
4The locations chosen were Almagro, Boedo, Caseros, San Isidro and Las Flores. Approximately 50
subjects were recruited per location. Subjects recruitment was carried out by the CINEA, an argentine
agency specialised in survey polls and market research.
5Gender (male, female), age (18-30, 31-50, 51-70) and socio-economic status (low, medium, high).
The administration of the experiment was oral and paper-based.
6One token was worth the purchasing power equivalent of US $0.50
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account (or national public good). The "national" group was made up of the subject,
the same three "local" people beneting from the "local" account - plus eight anonymous
subjects from other parts of Argentina. Tokens allocated to the "personal" account were
saved for the individual ( = 1). Tokens placed in the "local" account were summed up,
and the total was doubled and shared equally between the four individuals of the "local"
group. Tokens placed in the "national" account were instead tripled by the experimenter
and divided equally among the 12 people of the "national" group. Thus, the marginal
return of one token allocated to the "local" account was L = 0:5 = (12)
4
; and to the
"national" account was N = 0:25 = (13)
12
. Therefore, the payo¤ for individual i in
decision N was:
Ni (xi; G) = xi + G = (10  gL+Ni ) + L(GL i + gLi ) + N(GN i + gNi ); (6.1)
where xi 2 [0; 10] is the number of tokens that player i keeps for herself (private
good), gki 2 [0; 10] for k = fN;Lg is the number of tokens player i contributes to the
k collective account (or public good) and GL i =
NP
j=1
gkj for j 6= i is the sum of the
contributions of the other members of the group. xi and gki are positive integers.
In a second independent decision, Decision W, subjects chose how much to allocate
among their "personal" account, the "local" account and the "world" account. The
structure of incentives in Decision W was exactly the same as that in Decision N (i.e.
 = 1 > L = 0:5 > N = W = 0:25) and only the composition of the group
di¤ered. The "world" group was made up of the subject, three "local" people - plus
eight anonymous subjects from di¤erent countries around the "world." Subjects were
not told which countries these other subjects were from, but were informed that these
countries could be from any of the four continents where the research was conducted7.
7Due to the logistic of research, it was impossible to run the experiments simultaneously within a
single country. Therefore, the team of scholars who designed the macro experiment had to rely on a
dynamicmatching procedure, where past decisions from other participants were used to determine
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Therefore, the payo¤ for individual i in decision W was:
Wi (xi; G) = xi + G = (10  gL+Wi ) + L(GL i + gLi ) + W (GW i + gWi ); (6.2)
Both decisions, N andW, characterize a multilevel public good dilemma. It is individ-
ually optimal to contribute nothing to the collectiveaccounts ( > k; k = fN;L;Wg)
although this goes against the social welfare of the group. In other words, the Nash equi-
librium of this game is Pareto sub-optimal. These two decisions aim to mimic a situation
in which the person has to decide wether to contribute to a local public good and/or na-
tional public good (decision N) and to a local and/or global public good (decision W).
The structure of incentives in both decisions is identical, the only change being the
nationality of the co-members of the collective accounts. This feature allows us to
identify, among other things, how the identity of the people eventually a¤ects peoples
cooperation directly or/and mediates the e¤ect of individual aspirations on the propen-
sity to cooperate. In order to maximize the validity of our results, we controlled for
the subjects understanding of the incentives and rules of the game8 and experimenter
e¤ects9.
6.2.2 Data Description
The dependent variable, "propensity to cooperate," is measured by individual contribu-
tions to the public goods, i.e. to the collectiveaccounts. The independent variables
the payo¤s of subjects currently taking part in the research. When possible, matching at the local level
happened among people taking part in the same session. An algorithm was produced that ensured that
a subjects choices entered the dataset as the experiments ensued. These decisions were used to match
peoples decisions in subsequent sessions. Starting data for these decisions was provided by pilot tests
which occurred in each country prior to the experiment and through a series of pilot tests conducted in
four countries during the prior two years. For more information about this and other particularities of
the macro experiment, please refer to Buchan et al. (2009).
8Built into the experiment instructions there was a basic understanding check, in which subjects were
asked to answer some questions about the interaction. This gave us the chance to check for subjects
comprehension of the task. Subjects (6 out of 207 subjects) who showed evident failures to understand
the task have been expunged from the dataset.
9A detailed protocol was followed by the experimentet in all the sessions.
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used in this analysis come from an individual survey that participants completed at the
end of the experiment.
Observed behaviour
Table I provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables.
Table I: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables10
mean sd. max. min. N
Total Cont. (N) 7.32 2.67 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "local" Account (N) 3.10 2.01 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "national" Account 4.22 2.65 10.00 0.00 201
Total Cont. (W) 7.02 2.72 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "local" Account (W) 3.22 2.37 10.00 0.00 201
Cont. "world" Account 3.81 2.84 10.00 0.00 201
Observation 1: high level of contributions. On average, participants con-
tributed at very high levels in both decisions. More than 70% (in decisions N and W)
of peoples endowments were allocated to their collectiveaccounts.
Observation 2: more to the nation. Even though the material incentives in
Decision N and W are exactly the same, contributions to the "world" account were
signicantly lower11 than contributions to the "national" account12.
Table II provides the frequency of the tokens contributed in di¤erent decisions.
Observation 3: few free-riders. Only a very small proportion of participants (6%)
contributed nothing at least once to the collectiveaccounts, whereas more than 25%
10Note: Total Cont. N and W stands for Total contributions to the collective accounts in Decisions
N and W, respectively.
11t = 1:5231; P r(T > t) = 0:0643
12However, as expected, no signicant di¤erence between the average contribution in Decision N and
W was found (t =  1:1097; P r(jT j > jtj) = 0:2678).
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of the people contributed all their tokens to some collectiveaccount, in at least one
decision. Moreover, only 3.5% of the participants always played their dominant strategy,
i.e. did not contribute a single token in any decision, while 30 participants allocated all
their endowments in the collectiveaccounts in all the decisions. The distribution of
free-riders across locations was even.
Observation 4: interior solutions. 65% (dec. N) and 69% (dec. W) of the
participants played interior solutions, i.e. they split their endowments. This behaviour
cannot be predicted with standard game theory in which only material payo¤s matter,
since corner solutions are the only theoretical predictions of a Linear Public Good Game.
Observation 5: preference reversals. More than 60% of the participants changed
their contributions in both decisions, although the material incentives were exactly the
same.
Table II: Frequency of Overall Contributions














Table III (see appendix) shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in
this analysis. Below there is a description of how each independent variable is measured.
Income is measured with the following question:
Below you will nd a scale of monthly income13:
$5- $350- $500- $700- $851- $1051- $1300- $1621- $2100- $3000-
$350 $500 $700 $850 $1050 $1300 $1620 $2100 $3000 $108000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I would like to know which bracket your family belongs to, including
wages, salaries, pensions, and other income. Check the income bracket that
corresponds to your family, before taxes and other deductions.
Following Ray (2006), the variable Income Aspirations Gap - denoted by "gi"- is
dened as the relative di¤erence between the standard of living that is aspired to -
measured by the variable Absolute Aspirations Level and denoted by "ai"- and the
standard of living subjects already have - measured by the variable Income denoted by
"si":- Hence, the income aspirations gap is:
gi(ai; si)  ai   si
ai
(6.3)
Information about Absolute Aspirations Level, ai; is gathered by asking subjects the
following question:
Consider the following scale of monthly income, [which is the same as
the one above] how much monthly income would your household need to
be satised? Check the income bracket that corresponds to that level of
income.
13This scale corresponds to the Argentine total household monthly income distribution by deciles at
the moment the experiment was designed (July 2006).
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Thus, the maximum level of income aspirations gap that a person can have is
gi(ai; si)  10 110 = 0:9 and the minimum level is gi(ai; si)  1 101 =  9. I allow for
negative income aspirations gap because, although highly unlikely, it is possible that
people may be satised with less income than that which they actually have. This was
indeed the case with some participants distributed across the four locations14. A person
characterized by gi(ai; si) is said to be fully gapped: she belongs to the 1st decile of
the population but aspires to be in the 10th decile. On the contrary, someone with a
gi(ai; si)  0 is said to be "fully satised" income-wise. We interpret gi(ai; si _) > 0 as a
measure of how frustrated the person is with the income of his household.
During the analysis, other sets of variables were used to capture di¤erent aspects that
may either a¤ect individual propensity to cooperate, or mediate/moderate the inuence
of income aspirations gap on it.
Income aspirations gaps may be highly correlated with life satisfaction. In order
to eliminate this source of omitted variable bias, participants were asked the standard
question used in the subjective well-being literature:
Overall, how satised are you with your life?15
Likewise, the motivations that people may have to cooperate with their compatriots
or neighbours may be di¤erent from the motivations to cooperate with a foreigner. I
collected information on individual degree of identication (social identity) with people
from their neighbourhood, Argentina and the rest of the "world" (Yuki et al., 2005, see),
with questions such us:
to what degree do you feel committed to your "neighbourhood, "Ar-
gentina" and the "rest of the world"?; to what degree do you see yourself
14The minimum g of our database was  1; and it is highly unlikely to have cases of aspirations gap
less than this value.
15(1=very unsatised; 2=somewhat satised; 3=somewhat unsatised; 4=very satised)
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as part of your "neighbourhood," "Argentina" and the "rest of the world"?,
how close do you feel to the other members of ...?16.
In addition, a question aiming to get an approximate measure of peoples perceptions
of their own income relative to the income of the average recipient of the public good
was asked. The question was as follows:
"could you please indicate in which position you think the income of
your household is with respect to the average income of a household of "your
neighbourhood", "Argentina" and the "rest of the world".17
Finally, questions on Gender, (1=Masculine or 2=Feminine) and Education (1=El-
ementary School, 2=High School, 3=Tertiary, 4=University, 5=Masters, 6-Ph.D.) were
included in the survey.
6.2.3 Estimation
Ordered Logit estimations were used to estimate whether - and eventually how - peoples
income aspirations gaps a¤ect their propensity to cooperate, ceteris paribus18. An ordi-
nal regression model was chosen to allow the distances between categories (i.e. numbers
of tokens allocated to di¤erent accounts) to di¤er19. One single regression for each de-
cision was carried out. The underlying latent variable was the individual propensity to
cooperate with each of the three groups: "local," "national" and "global" (k = L;N;W ).
16Responses were indicated on 4-point scale from "not at all " to "very or a lot."
17The options were: 1- Very below average, 2- fairly below average, 3- aprox. same as average, 4-
fairly above average, 5- very above average.
18I discuss the issue of causality in the last section of this chapter.
19I performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test on all the regressions in this paper to test the proportional
odds assumption. It turns out that in most of the cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that that
there is no di¤erence in the coe¢ cients. So, given that in almost all the cases the proportional odds
assumption holds, for simplicity we preferred to present the results using a standard rather a generalized
ordinal regression model.
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The model estimated is as follows:
gki = 1gapi + 2Si + 3Ri + 4(gapi Ri) + x0i + "i (6.4)
where gapi is income aspirations gaps, Si is social identity, Ri is perceptions of rela-
tive income, xi is a vector of control variables including demographic variables, absolute
income, and absolute aspirations, social capital, among others. gki is a continuos unob-
served number form 0 to 10 representing the propensity to contribute to k account. It
is measured in 10 "m" discrete intervals by the number of tokens each people allocate
to each k account. It is assumed that
gki = m if m 1  gki < m; for m = 0; :::; 10
The probability of contributing gi = m number of tokens to the k = fL;N;Wg
account was estimated for a given vector of exogenous variables x and assuming that "i
follows a logistic distribution.
Pr(gki = m
x) =F (m   x) F (m 1   x), where F is the cdf for " (6.5)
for gi = 0, F ( 1  x) = 0, and for gi = 10; F (1  x) = 1
6.2.4 Hypotheses
The four hypotheses tested in this chapter are the following.
H.1(Aspirations) 1 < 0: Income Aspirations Gap is negatively correlated with
peoples propensity to cooperate. In other words, it is expected that, in average, the
narrower the income aspirations gap, the higher the number of tokens contributed, ceteris
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paribus.
The intuition behind this hypothesis is clear: the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween individual and collective welfare is decreasing on the extent to which individuals
income aspiration is satised. Importantly, note that this statement is di¤erent to say-
ing that individual and collective welfare are somehow complementary. Our statement
implies a one-way causality consistent with some implicit quasi-lexicographic order be-
tween the two dimensions (individual welfare and otherswelfare). We want to investi-
gate whether people care rst about satisfying some material needs or aspirations, and
as long as those needs are relatively satised, they start caring about the welfare or
needs of the others. Implicit in this statement, it is the view that people may not be
intrinsically either selsh or altruist as the existing literature seems to suggest, but their
level of cooperation may depend on how satised their material aspirations are. This
hypothesis is grounded on two orthogonal and well-known old theories. First, it relies
on Simons (1955) idea that people look for achieving satisfactory targets instead of
maximizing utility. Simon (1955) illustrates his idea with an example of house prices.
"[An individual selling his house] may regard $15,000 as an "acceptable"
price, anything over this amount as "satisfactory," anything less as "unsat-
isfactory." In psychological theory we would x the boundary at the "aspi-
ration level"; in economic theory we would x the boundary at the price
which evokes indi¤erence between selling and not selling (an opportunity
cost concept)." (pg. 104)
In addition, the hypothesis uses the theory of Hierarchy of Needs developed by
Maslow (1943). Individual material aspirations correspond to the lower steps of Maslows
pyramid and social welfare can be understood as the upper levels of the pyramid. The
two theories support the hypothesis of a causality from satised material aspirations to
cooperation: if the person is satised income wise then her propensity to cooperate will
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increase, and not viceversa20.
As argued by Simon (1959) "the notion of satiation plays no role in classical eco-
nomic theory" (pg. 262) and neither does it in the existing theory of social preferences.
In contrast, psychological theories emphasize that the motive to act stems from drives,
and actions terminate when the drive is satised. Early in the forties, renowned psy-
chologist Maslow (1943) proposed a theory of human motivation arguing that humans
are motivated by unsatised hierarchical needs. In his words:
the appearance of one need depends on the prior satisfaction of another,
more pre-potent need. [. . . ] No need or drive can be treated as if it were
isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction of other drive.(Maslow, 1943, pg. 370)
Maslows theory is consistent with people having di¤erent preference ranking depend-
ing on which level of the pyramid they are. A person who is mainly seeking to satisfy
lower level needs (e.g. food, water, shelter) may be expected to act "more selshly" than
someone who has overcome her basic needs and is seeking higher goals in the pyramid,
such as social goals like sense of belonging, good relationships, etc.
It is argued here that people have individual material aspirations that can correspond
to the lower steps of Maslows pyramid and social aspirations which can be understood
as the upper levels of the pyramid. Each person denes her own aspirations in both
dimensions, and H.1 simply states that the marginal rate of substitution between both
targets depends on the extent to which the rst target is satised.
Besides testing H.1, this chapter test three other hypotheses that will provide a better
understanding of the situational-dependent social preference argued here.
H.2 (Social Identity) 2 > 0: Social Identity, at a particular geographic level,
positively a¤ects peoples propensity to cooperate with fellows of the same geographical
20We comment more on this issue of causality in the section of "robutness checks".
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level. On average, it is expected that the closer the people feel they are to their neigh-
bour, compatriot or foreign fellow, the higher will be the number of tokens contributed
to the local, national or global account, respectively.
As is emphasized by many scholars both at the theoretical (Brewer, 1981; Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000) and experimental (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Schopler and Insko,
1992) level, social identication increase cooperation by reducing actors tendency to
draw distinctions between their own and otherswelfare.
It is also known from the sociological and anthropological literature (Appadurai,
2004; Sewell et al., 1957) that individual aspirations are socially determined. As stated
by Ray (2006), a person draws her aspirations from the lives, achievements, or ideals
of those who belong to her cognitive world, her zone of similar, attainable individuals,
[...], her aspirations neighbourhood.
If it is the case that social identity a¤ects both cooperation and aspirations, and it
is also proved that aspirations a¤ect cooperation, then it is essential to include both
variables in the same regression to actually learn about each separate e¤ect, if any. Such
a procedure has not been followed by the existing literature, since the potential e¤ect of
individual aspirations on cooperation has been completely neglected so far.
H.3 (Income Comparison) 3 > 0. Players perceptions of their own income
relative to the income of the average recipient of the public good, at a local, national
or global level, a¤ects propensity to contribute to the local, national or global public
good, with a positive sign. That is, the richer people perceive they are relative to
their neighbour, compatriot or foreign fellow, the higher will be the number of tokens
contributed to the local, national or global account, respectively.
Similar concerns of the e¤ect of distributive justice principles on cooperation have
been studied in the Social Psychology literature. Lamm and Schwinger (1980), for
example, show empirical evidence that people contribute unequally in favor of the needier
person. In the economic literature, a similar version of this hypothesis has been put
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forward by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who suggested that some people may be inequity
averse and may be willing to sacrice their own payo¤ in order to minimize disparities
between own and others payo¤s. However, H.3 is stating something di¤erent. In this
experiment, people come to the laboratory already endowed with (a) a particular real
income level and (b) a particular perception of their income relative to the income of
the average neighbour, compatriot or foreigner. Thus, if H.3 is conrmed, it implies
that peoples experimental decisions are taken with the motivation of contributing to
minimize real income disparities among players, and not only disparities in the payo¤s
originated in the game. This creates a sharp distinction between what H.3 tests and what
is usually tested in the literature of inequality aversion. H.3. claims that a "inequality
averse" rich person will cooperate with a poor person, but may not cooperate with a
"rich" person. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), however, this "inequality averse"
person will cooperate in the same way in both experiments, because peoples perceptions
about their income relative to the others does not play a role in their model. Thus, in
the light of their model, the same person will be thought to be pure altruistic in the rst
experiment, and pure inequality averse in the second.
H.4 (Interaction) 4 < 0. Playersperception of their relative income w.t. the
income of the average recipient of the public good moderates the e¤ect of Income Aspi-
rations Gap on contributions, with a negative sign. In other words, the (negative) e¤ect
of income aspirations gap on cooperation is lower (less negative) if the person perceives
that her income is higher than the income of the average recipient of the public good.
6.3 Results
In order to test H.1, two ordered logistic regressions with Income Aspirations Gap as a
regressor and total contributions to the collectiveaccounts21 as the dependent variables
are performed. The results of these two regressions are shown in Table IV below.
21Local and National in Decision N and Local and World in Decision W.
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Table IV - Total Cooperation and Aspirations (Decisions N and W)
Dependent Variable Total Contributions Total Contributions
(Decision N) (Decision W)
Income AspirationsGap -0.737 -1.147***
(-0.507) (-0.424)
Number of Cases 197 197
Notes: Ordered logistic regression. Each column is a separate regression equation
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by Location and income decile
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Despite the sign of income aspirations gap is negative in both regressions as conjec-
tured in H.1, it is only statistically signicant in Decision W. This is surprising since
both decisions N and W are identical in all senses except for the nationality of the peo-
ple who comprise the groups that eventually fund a hypothetical public good (i.e. all
Argentines in Decision N and 66% of foreigners in Decision W), but we will come back
to this point in a moment.
Note also that the negative coe¢ cient of Income aspirations Gap in Decision W
is considerably high. For a one unit increase in income aspirations gap, a 1:14 de-
crease in the log odds of the total propensity to cooperate in decision W is expected,
ceteris paribus. The predicted probabilities suggest for example that the probability
of observing a highly unsatised participant (i.e. gi(ai; si) = 0:8) free-riding on a
foreigner is 11:5%: In contrast, the probability that a fully satised participant (i.e.
gi(ai; si) = 0) free-rides on a foreign fellow is 5%: An average participant contributes all
her endowments to a public good with probability 28:2% if gi(ai; si) = 0 and 13:6% if
gi(ai; si) = 0:8:
This analysis uses as dependent variable the sum of individual contributions in each
decision, and as such, it does not provide much information about the surprising fea-
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ture observed in Table IV. In the following regressions, peoples contributions to each
collective account (local, national or world) in each decision (N and W) are separately
used as dependent variables. Table V (see Appendix) summarizes the results obtained.
Aspirations gaps were found to explain signicantly cooperation at the "world" level
and also at the "national" level, although it does not a¤ect cooperation with neighbours
at "local" level. There may be di¤erent interpretations for this, but we will come back
to this concern at the end of this part of the section. For the moment, I want to focus
attention on the two cases where the coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero,
and study the robutness of these results.
The rst question that arises is whether it is the gap that matters, or is it simply
income or/and absolute aspirations levels which a¤ect cooperation. After all, income
aspirations gap depends non-linearly on both variables. This question can be easily
addressed by including both variables, income and aspirations, as regressors. Table
V in the appendix conrms that income aspirations gap remains highly signicant at
the "world" and "national" levels, even after controlling for these two variables and
other demographic variables such us location dummies and gender, age and education.
Furthermore, absolute aspirations levels and absolute income levels are found to be
statistically insignicant. As a consequence, our result suggests that it is the gap
instead of the absolute income or aspirations per se which matters for cooperation
with foreigners and compatriots.
The quantitative e¤ect of this result is considerably high. Figure I and Figure II
in the appendix illustrate the predicted probabilities of being a free-rider or a fully
cooperator with foreigners conditional on Income Aspirations Gap and holding xed
absolute income, aspirations and control demographic variables. From Figure II we
observe that the probability of contributing nothing to the "world" account is 9.11%
if income aspirations gap is g = 0; and it is 55.5% if income aspirations gap is very
wide, i.e. g = 0:8. Figure I shows the probability of contributing all the endowments to
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the "world" account conditional on income aspirations gap. This probability is 12.8% if
income aspirations gap is g = 0; and it is 1.2% if g = 0:8.
Marginal e¤ects are also computed. For example, the marginal probability of free-
riding on foreigners as a function of income aspirations gap:
Marginal E¤ect :






This marginal e¤ect of 0.38 represents the slope of the curve that associates income
aspirations gap with the probability of being a 100% free-rider (Figure II) evaluated at
the mean of the income aspirations gap (0.16), holding all the other variables constant
at their mean level. If the income aspirations gap of an average person increases by
1 percentual point, the probability that she/he will free-ride on foreigners increases by
0.38 percentual points.
A second question is whether the variable of interest, income aspirations gap, is
measuring something di¤erent than life satisfaction. After all, it could be expected
that both variables are highly positive correlated, and we are attributing the e¤ect
on cooperation to income aspirations gap wrongly. For that reason, life satisfaction is
included to the regressions as another control variable. Table VI shows that our results
remain robust, even controlling for life satisfaction.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore why the e¤ect of income aspirations gap
on cooperation is conditional on geographical identity. Why does not income aspirations
gap a¤ect cooperation with neighbours? We do not have an answer for this question.
One conjecture is that people may feel more committed to their neighbours than with
their compatriots or foreigners, so they are unconditional cooperators with neighbours to
some extent, regardless of how unsatised/satised their material needs are. However,
we dont have data to test that conjecture.
All this discussion can be summarized in the following result:
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Result 1: Income aspirations gaps signicantly reduce peoples propensity to cooper-
ate with foreigners and compatriots, ceteris paribus. However, it does not a¤ect peoples
propensity to cooperate with neighbours.
Hypothesis 2 attempts to explore the link between social identity and cooperation.
At the same time, including the variable Social Identity (at all geographical levels) as
regressors will help to reduce an eventual omitted variable bias in the previous result,
since, as it was argued in the preceding section, social identity may mediate the e¤ect of
aspirations on cooperation. Table VI (appendix), however, shows that Result 1 is robust
to the inclusion of social identity as another regressor. In addition, we observe that H.2
is conrmed at "local" and "world" level, but not at "national" level. The quantitative
e¤ect is considerable. The probability that a person who doesnt include the foreigners
into her cognitive "world" (i.e. Social identity index at "world" level would be equal
to 0 in this case) fully cooperates with them is 14:4%. However, if the person includes
the foreigners into her aspirations neighbourhood, then the probability that she fully
cooperates is 36:3%22.
The fact that social identication with compatriots does not a¤ect peoples propen-
sity to cooperate with them is at least puzzling. As stated in the previous section, the
existing literature argues that social identication increases cooperation by reducing ac-
torstendency to draw distinctions between their own and the welfare of others. So, it
is not clear why this argument would not be valid at any geographical level.
One challenge to this traditional explanation of how identity a¤ects cooperation
comes from Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000). They argue that identity increases coop-
eration with ingroup members by inuencing actorsexpectations about fellow ingroup
membersbehavior. That is, social identity alone is not su¢ cient to produce in-group
favoritism. Group boundaries do not a¤ect cooperation if actors have a more direct
basis for forming expectations that others will reciprocate. In light of this argument, it
22The e¤ect of Social Identity on cooperation has been already reported in other works (Brewer, 1996,
see)
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may be the case that Argentineans, regardless of how closely identied they felt with
their compatriots, expected less favourable treatment from their compatriots in return.
The role of expectations is conrmed when expectations about otherscontributions (at
all levels) were added to the regression. As can be observed from Table VI (appendix),
there is a clear strong relationship between the players level of cooperation and the ex-
pectations of the level of the average partners cooperativeness. However, social identity
remain highly signicant at "world" and "local" level, suggesting that Yamagishi and
Kiyonari (2000) hypothesis is only conrmed at "national" level. At the other levels,
the hypothesis that social identity alone is not su¢ cient to produce in-group favoritism
cannot be rejected.
The discussion above can be summarized as follows:
Result 2: Social Identity at "world" and "local" level signicantly increases the
propensity to cooperate with foreigners and neighbours, respectively. However, social
identity at "national" level does not a¤ects peoples propensity to cooperate with compa-
triots.
In order to test hypothesis 3, playersown perceptions of their income relative to
the average income of their neighbours, compatriots and foreigners are added to the
regressions. The conjecture was that people would cooperate more with those groups
who they feel are poorer than them. However, I dont nd enough evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that my conjecture is false. As can be seen in Table VI, the hypothesis
that the coe¢ cients of the Relative Income variable are signicant from zero cannot be
rejected at standards levels of signicance. In other words:
Result 3: Players perception of their relative income with respect to the income
of the average recipient of the public good (at a geographical level) does not a¤ect the
propensity to cooperate.
148
Finally, we test for the existence of an interaction between income aspirations gap
and peoples perceptions of their income relative to the income of the people who they
are playing. After including the interaction term in the four regressions, this interaction
e¤ect was found to be di¤erent, depending on the identity of the recipients of the public
good (Table VI, appendix). The coe¢ cient measuring the interaction is negative and
highly signicant, as it was conjectured in H.4, only when the recipients of the public
good are neighbours. It is positive and signicant when the recipients of the public good
are foreigners, and it is not signicant when they are compatriots. These observations
immediately highlight the complexity of human cooperation. The way inequality aver-
sion moderates the e¤ect of income aspirations gap on cooperation is conditional on the
geographical identity of the recipients of the public good. On the one hand, if it is a
neighbour, then inequality aversion will reduce the negative e¤ect that aspirations have
on cooperation. On the other hand, if it is a foreigner, inequality aversion will increase
the negative e¤ect that aspirations have on cooperation. In short,
Result 4: Playersperception of their relative income w.t. the income of the average
recipient of the public good reduces the e¤ect of Income Aspirations Gap on contributions
with their neighbours, and increases the e¤ect of Income aspirations Gap on contribu-
tions with foreigners, although it does not a¤ect the e¤ect of income aspiration gaps on
cooperation with compatriots.
Incidentally, its worth noting that in order to increase the robustness of these four
results, socio-demographic controls (e.g. age, gender, education and location dummies)
have been added to the four regressions reported here.
To conclude, the main lesson from the results obtained here is that geographical




As in any empirical study, the validity of the results of this chapter are conditional on
assumptions made. In this section, those assumptions considered to be the strongest
are discussed. The most important threats to internal validity are (a) errors-in-variables
bias, (b) simultaneous causality bias and (c) omitted variable bias from a variable that
is correlated with the regressors but is unobserved. This latter source of threat has
been extensively considered in the preceding section. Thus, this section will focus on
exploring the eventual inuence of threats (a) and (b) on the results. In addition, model
specication and concerns related to the (small) size of the sample used for estimations
are also discussed.
6.4.1 Errors-in-variables bias
One of the most important assumptions made in any estimation is that the variables are
not subject to measurement errors. Arguably, one of the main variables of this study,
income aspirations gaps, may su¤er from this error. Unfortunately, due to the lack of
empirical work on income aspirations gaps, there is no other existing measure to contrast
with. The closest one is an aspirations/attainment measure used by Easterlin (2003),
who took information from a representative survey23 of the American population that
included the following two questions:
"1. We often hear people talk about what they want out of life. Here are
a number of di¤erent things. [The respondent is handed a card with a list
of 24 items.] When you think of the good life the life youd like to have,
which of the things on this list, if any, are part of that good life as far as you
personally are concerned? 2. "Now would you go down that list and call o¤
all the things you now have?"
23These surveys are used in Schor (1998)
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The idea behind these two questions is similar to the idea used to measure income
aspirations gap in this chapter. The rst question gathers information about desires for
certain goods, which can be summarized here as desires for a certain income level. The
second question tries to capture the place in which the respondents stand in relation to
these desires, i.e. to what extent they are fullled. This question is analogous to the
question on current income made here. So, the only existing measure of "aspirations
gaps" is not far from the one used here.
Notwithstanding the comment made above, the measure used here is subject to an-
other concern. The income aspirations people are asked to comment on are not absolute
values, but relative to the income distribution in Argentina. People are asked to state in
which position of the income distribution of their country they would be satised. Thus,
the variable income aspiration is specically measuring relative income aspirations. This
approach has its positive and negative sides. On the positive side, it is perfectly in line
with the "relative income hypothesis" rst formulated by Duesenberry (1949). Accord-
ing to this, people essentially care about their relative position rather than their income
in absolute terms (see Zizzo and Oswald, 2001). People set their standards relative to the
standards of others. On the negative side, such a measure imposes an eventual articial
upper bound on peoples aspirations. A person who is already in the highest decile of
the income distribution is not allowed to aspire more than this. In order to reduce this
measurement error, all the regressions conducted in this study where replicated drop-
ping from the entire sample those subjects who belonged to the highest decile. Table
VII in the appendix shows that the results remain qualitatively the same and, more-
over, the coe¢ cient of income aspirations gap even become more signicant. Likewise,
some variables that were not signicant before (e.g. income, absolute aspirations and
life satisfaction at the national level), now became signicant.
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6.4.2 Simultaneous causality bias
The results of this chapter claim causality instead of simply correlation or association.
Therefore, it must be assumed that a reverse direction of the causality from propensity
to cooperate to income aspirations gap or social identity is not plausible. How strong is
this assumption?
As far as we understand, there is neither existing theory nor empirical evidence or
even intuition that supports the claim that because people are more prone to cooperate,
they are more satised income-wise. However, this does not imply that such a claim
can be rejected and, thus, the direction of the causality assumed in this chapter must
be taken only as a tentative direction.
Similar analysis can be done with the assumption made that social identity causes
in-group cooperation. Although several papers have experimentally proved that social
identication causes cooperation (Chen and Li, 2009), the reverse causality has not been
disproved yet. It might be the case that the sole fact of cooperating with some groups
increases the in-goup identication. An exploration of such concerns, though, is beyond
the scope of the present chapter.
6.4.3 Model specication and sample size
One of the assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regressions is that the relationship
between each pair of outcome groups is the same. In other words, ordinal logistic regres-
sion assumes that the coe¢ cients that describe the relationship between, say, the lowest
versus all higher categories of the response variable are the same as those that describe
the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories, etc. This is
called the proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression assumption. Because
the relationship between all pairs of groups is the same, there is only one set of coef-
cients (only one model). If this was not the case, we would need di¤erent models to
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describe the relationship between each pair of outcome groups. I test the proportional
odds assumption, and I use a Log Likelihood ratio test24. How does this likelihood
ratio test work? Let there be m outcomes of the dependent variable. The command
"omodel" rst estimates the ordered Logit model. Then it obtains an approximation of
log-likelihood for the ologit model an approximation to the log-likelihood for a completely
general model (in which there are di¤erent e¤ects at each cut-point for every variable).
The di¤erence between the two approximate log-likelihoods is the likelihood-ratio test
reported by omodel. The approximation to the log-likelihood value for the general model
will usually be less reliable than the rst approximation but both are underestimates
of the respective true log-likelihoods. Hence in taking the di¤erence between the two
approximations a reasonable approximation is assumed to be obtained. The likelihood-
ratio test is performed on degrees of freedom that are the di¤erence between the number
of tted parameters in the standard and general models25. A signicant p-value is evi-
dence to reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are equal across categories. In
the rst two models of Table VI we found not enough evidence to reject the assumption
of proportional odds (model column 1: chi2(136) = 147:65 and Prob > chi2 = 0:2334;
model column 2: chi2(153) = 163:48 and Prob > chi2 = 0:2664). In the last two models
(col. 3 and 4) the test rejects the null hypothesis at low signicance levels, therefore
only for these last two models, there is su¢ cient evidence that the proportional odds
assumption does not hold. However, this is not a major concern since the main results
of this chapter come from model 1 and 2 in which the assumption of proportional odds
ratio is not rejected.
Before nishing this section, it is important to comment on the size of the sample
used in this chapter. As an estimation method, ordered logit uses Maximum Likelihood
Estimation instead of Least Square Estimation. The maximum likelihood (ML) estima-
tors become minimum variance unbiased estimators as the sample size tends to innite
24stata command: omodel (Wolfe, 1997)
25(p)(m  2), where p is the number of regressors specied.
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or it is large enough (i.e. the properties hold asymptotically)26. Therefore, the ML
estimation may be biased and inferential hypothesis tests are uncertain in small sample
analyses. The question that arises is what constitutes an adequate sample size. Is a
sample of 200 observations big enough? If not, what can be said about the validity of
the results of this chapter? Hart and Clark (1999) explore the behavior of ML estimates
in probit models across di¤ering sample sizes and with varying numbers of independent
variables in Monte Carlo simulations. Their experiments show that (a) the risk of mak-
ing Type I errors (i.e. rejecting a hypothesis that should have been accepted) does not
change appreciably as sample size descends and (b) the risk of making Type II errors (i.e.
accepting a hypothesis that should have been rejected) increases dramatically in smaller
samples and as the number of regressors increases. These results, in particular the rst
result, strengthen the validity of the results shown in this chapter. In the analysis made
here, the statistical signicance of a coe¢ cient is tested and the null hypothesis is that
the coe¢ cient are equal to zero. If the risk of "rejecting a null hypothesis when it is
actually true" does not change considerably as sample size decreases, then we would
expect that those coe¢ cients that are signicantly di¤erent from zero in this chapter
will remain being di¤erent from zero if we increased the sample size. It is certainly true,
however, that we do not know if some variables that are not statistically signicant with
the sample size used here, would become statistical signicant if largest sample size is
used.
6.5 Conclusion
Theories of aspirations have been applied to a broad array of issues across the social
sciences, including Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Decision Theory. Since its
26An estimator is unbiased if we take a very large number of random samples with replacement from
a population, then the average value of the parameter estimates will be theoretically exactly equal to
the population value. An estimator has minimum variance, if it has the smallest variance, and thus the
narrowest condence interval, of all estimators of that type.
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inclusion in Economics in the early fties by Simon (1955, 1959), no systematic work has
been carried out to learn about the economic implications of a model concerned with
aspirations.
Likewise, human cooperation in a context of private provision of a public good has
always been a challenge to social scientists.
This chapter presented the rst attempt to explore the link between individual aspira-
tions and cooperation. It combined experimental data with a post-experimental survey
to measure the e¤ect of life income aspirations on individual cooperation at di¤erent
geographical levels of public goods.
It has been shown that the narrower an individuals income aspirations gap, the
greater is the propensity to cooperate providing both global and national public goods.
However, this e¤ect was not signicant in the provision of a local public good. It is the
gap that matters, instead of the absolute income or aspirations. The quantitative e¤ect
is considerably high. Participants with the widest aspirations gap were 46 percent more
likely to free-ride on foreigners than those who were fully satised with their income.
We found a parallel result suggesting that the e¤ect of social identity on cooperation
depends on the geographical level of the public good provided. The more participants
feel identied with foreigners or neighbours, the higher is their contribution levels to
providing a global and local public good. However, in-group identication with com-
patriots does not a¤ect participantscontributions to provide a national public good,
ceteris paribus.
We have made three contributions to the Economics literature. First, the results
found have important implications for the existing knowledge of private provision of
public goods, initiated with Bergstrom et al. (1986) inuential paper. We suggest that
considering the negative e¤ect of income aspirations gap on voluntary contributions to
a public good may change their results. In particular, Bergstrom et al. (1986) states
that any changes in the wealth distribution that leaves unchanged the aggregate wealth
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of current contributors will either increase or leave unchanged the equilibrium supply
of public good. However, we claim that this result may not hold in the light of our
results, since changes in the wealth distribution may have a non-linear e¤ect on peoples
cooperation through its change in income aspirations gap.
Second, we showed evidence that the motivations to contribute and the level of
contributions depend depend on the geographical type of the public good in question.
This has practical implications for regional public policies and raises some challenges for
the design of policies aiming at increasing individual contribution levels. For example,
our chapter suggests that a policy that promotes in-group identication will increase
cooperation at a local level but not at a national level. However, a policy aimed at
reducing individuals income aspirations gap will be more e¤ective at increasing both
national and global cooperation than local cooperation. In this latter case, one should be
cautious, since reducing individuals income aspirations can, on the one hand, increase
social welfare by increasing cooperation, but on the other hand, it can reduce social
welfare through the e¤ect on growth.
Third, the evidence presented here highlights a previously unobserved source of
the individual heterogeneity identied in most public good experiments. Taking the
example given in the introduction, if an econometrician does not control for Susans
unsatised aspirations, then her behaviour in both scenarios will be inferred as random
or inconsistent, when in fact it is the case of an omitted variable bias.




Conclusion and Future Research
Grounded on empirical evidence from Psychology, this thesis has relaxed the assumption
of perfect reection made in standard Economics and developed a novel theoretical
framework. The theory proposed here is general and falsiable, and a solution derived
from it is ensured to exist under weak assumptions. The main positive and normative
features of the framework have been analysed in an individual decision-making context
and in an n-person strategic setting. We unied seemingly disconnected models and
proposed new applications on individual commitment, sympathy and empowerment.
One of the main dilemmas of Behavioural Economics is whether revealed preferences
can still be used for welfare ranking. The framework introduced here provided a suitable
locus to investigate this concern and to gain a better understanding of the limits of
the revealed preferences approach. Through this investigation, the degree of personal
autonomyemerged as a natural normative criterion consistent with a vast range of
Behavioural Economics models. Even though the concept of autonomy has been widely
studied in Philosophy and Psychology, to my knowledge, this is the rst time that the
concept is brought up to a formal decision-making and game-theoretical framework.
Consistent with autonomy being the normative criterion to adopt, the thesis has
argued in favour of di¤erent types of interventions that aim to enhance or sustain indi-
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vidual autonomy. Examples of such interventions are cognitive and behavioural therapies
that teach how to manage stress, anxiety, temptation and self-condence or correct mal-
adaptive beliefs that can lead to systematic self-defeating behaviour. Interventions with
this type of aims are not only restricted to psychotherapies, though. Social programs
aiming at increasing participantsself-condence or aspirations can also be autonomy
supportive. In general, these interventions have the explicit objective of empowering
people, i.e. to help them to increase the sense of control over their lives. Policies such as
fostering empowerment or emotional intelligence have been largely advocated in other
social disciplines but somehow disregarded in the literature of Economics.
This thesis has also proposed a model of aspirations failure where initial disadvantage
results in low aspirations and low achievement. The features that characterize a role
modelwere studied and the importance of role models for aspirations formation was
investigated. The e¤ect of the degree of connectedness in the society on the aspirations
formation process was also investigated.
Finally, this thesis reported the rst investigation on the empirical link between
aspirations and cooperation.
I expect that the analysis presented here represents a substantial original contribution
to knowledge as required for the standards of a Ph.D. degree. Inevitably, this thesis
leaves some theoretical and empirical questions unanswered. It is my hope, however,
that this piece of work is su¢ cient to suggest that the line of enquiry advocated here is
a promising one, and that it will stimulate new undertakings.
I identify several directions for fruitful future research. The main challenge, in my
view, concerns the identication and measurement of autonomy. In the near future, I
plan to investigate if observed choices alone can be enough to infer whether a person
is making decisions autonomously or not. My conjecture is that observed behaviour
could provide information about the way the person makes choices. For example, if we
observe that a smoker pays for costly treatments to quit smoking but fails to quit, we
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could reject the hypothesis that her choice to smoke is fully autonomous. This issue
has to be further investigated, but in principle, one could look at the choices made by a
person to extract further information valid for welfare analysis, which goes beyond the
revealed preferenceparadigm. That is, instead of extracting revealed preferences,
we could extract revealed decision processesthat are informative for welfare purposes1.
Another interesting idea along this line of thought is to investigate whether it could be
advisable to combine choice and non-choice-based approaches to construct a valid welfare
measure. This combination may depend on the complexity of the decision in question,
on the primitive preferences of the decision-maker and on her extrinsic circumstances.
In relation to how autonomy should be measured, the plan is to develop a mea-
surement theory of autonomy along the lines of Duclos et al.s (2004) measurement of
polarization. The idea is also to review the existing subjective measures already devel-
oped by psychologists like Deci and Ryan (2002) and to assess the extent to which their
measure corresponds to the concept of autonomy derived from the framework presented
in this thesis.
On the applications front, it would be interesting to link more closely our model
with the literature of clinical Psychology. My plan is to develop novel applications
grounded on evidence-based successful therapies that aim to increase the autonomy of the
individual. Likewise, it is in the agenda to apply our framework to introduce the concept
of empathy into game theory. The capacity to empathize, that is, to simulate others
internal decision process, should help players to predict and understand others actions
and intentions, with important economic implications. My guess is that the lack of
empathy creates potentially avoidable social conicts. Finally, grounded on the evidence
reported in Chapter 6, it would be interesting to develop a model of private provision of
a public good at di¤erent regional levels that considers the e¤ect of income aspirations
gaps, social identity and relative needs. This would help us to better understand the
1The approach we plan to pursue is along the lines of Manzini and Mariottis (2009) approach. The
idea is to fully characterize BDPs and test the axioms in the lab against the axioms of SDPs.
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e¤ect of these variables on optimal provision of a public good.
This thesis denitively opens new routes to explore in Experimental Economics and
Neuroeconomics. In collaboration with Prof. Ghosal and Dr. Mani, I am currently con-
ducting experimental research addressing the factors that a¤ect the aspirations formation
process. We are also designing policy experiments with randomized control groups to
evaluate the impact of di¤erent policies on the autonomy, aspirations and self-condence




A.1 Results from Chapter 2
Proof. Theorem 1
This proof is an adaptation of Ghosal (2006) for BDPs.
Recall that the preferences of the decision-maker is denoted by  a binary relation
ranking pairs of decision states in (A P )  (A P ). As the focus is on incomplete
preferences, in this section, instead of working with , we nd convenient to specify two
other preference relations,  and . The expression (a; a0) 2p is written as a p a0 and
is to be read as "a is preferred to a0 by the decision-maker when the utility parameter
is p". Dene the sets p (a) = fa0 2 A : a0 p ag (the upper section of p),  1p (a) =
fa0 2 A : a p a0g (the lower section of p). It is assumed that for each p 2 P , (i) p




such that at 1 p at, t = 2; :::; T , and
aT p a1, and (ii)  1p (a) is open relative to A i.e. p has an open lower section1. Write
a0 =2p (a) as a p a0.
Dene a map 	 : P ! A, where 	(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = ;g: for each p 2 P , 	(p) is
the set of maximal elements of the preference relation p.
Consider the following extension of : for each p, dene p on A by
a p a0 , a0 p a:
1The continuity assumption, that p has an open lower section, is weaker than the continuity
assumption made by Debreu (1959) (who requires that preferences have both open upper and lower
sections), which in turn is weaker than the assumption by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) (who assume
that preferences have open graphs). Note that assuming p has an open lower section is consistent
with p being a lexicographic preference ordering over A.
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As for each p, p is acyclic and therefore irreexive, it follows that p is complete. Let
^pdenote the strict preference relation corresponding to p i.e. a^pa0 if and only if
a p a0 but a0 p a. For each p 2 P and a; a0 2 A, a p a0 if and only if a^pa0.
Dene a map 	^ : P ! A, where 	^(p) = fa0 2 A : ^p (a0) = ;g: for each p 2 P , 	^(p) is
the set of maximal elements of the preference relation ^p.
The following lemma establishes that for each p, p and ^p are equivalent and have the
same set of maximal elements:
Lemma 1: For each p 2 P and a; a0 2 A, a p a0 if and only if a^pa0 and therefore,
	(p) = 	^(p).
Proof: Fix p 2 P . Consider a pair a; a0 2 A such that a p a0. Then, a0 p a and
therefore, a p a0 and as p is acyclic, a0 p a. It follows that a^pa0. Next, consider
a pair a; a0 2 A such that a^pa0. Then, a p a0 and a0 p a. Therefore, a0 p a and
a p a0. 
With this result in place the decision problem with incomplete but acyclic preferences is
rephrased as a decision problem with complete and acyclic but not necessarily transitive
preferences.
Consider the following assumptions:
(A1) A is a compact lattice with the vector ordering2;
(A2) For each p, and a; a0, (i) if a p inf(a; a0), then sup(a; a0) p a0 (ii) if a p sup (a; a0)
then inf (a; a0) p a0 (quasi-supermodularity);
(A3) For each a  a0 and p  p0, (i) if a p0 a0, then a p a0 and (ii) if a0 p a then
a0 p0 a (single-crossing property);
(A4) For each p and a  a0, (i) if p (a0) = ; and a p a0, then p (a) = ;, and (ii)
p (a) = ; and a0 p a, then p (a0) = ;,(monotone closure).
(A5) P is a compact lattice and  is a non-decreasing function.
Assumptions (A2)-(A3) are quasi-supermodularity and single-crossing property dened
by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Assumption (A4) is new. It requires that for each p, in
any mutually unranked pair of vector ordered actions, either both actions are maximal
elements of por neither action is. The role played by assumption (A4) in obtaining the
monotone comparative statics with incomplete preferences is claried by the following
example.
2A lattice is a partially ordered subset of <k with the vector ordering (the usual component wise
ordering: x  y if and only if xi  yi for each i = 1; ::;K, and x > y if and only if both x  y and
x 6= y, and x  y if and only if xi > yi for each i = 1; ::;K). A lattice that is compact (in the usual
topology) is a compact lattice.
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Example: P is single valued and A is the four point lattice in <2
f(e; e) ; (f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g
where f > e. Suppose that (f; f)  (e; e) but no other pair is ranked. Then, 	 consists
of f(f; e) ; (e; f) ; (f; f)g clearly not a lattice. Note that in this case, preferences satisfy
acyclicity and quasi-supermodularity (and trivially, single-crossing property). However,
preferences do not satisfy monotone closure: (f; e)  (e; e), with  ((f; e)) = ; and
(e; e)  (f; e), but  ((e; e)) 6= ;.
The preceding example demonstrates that with intransitive preferences, quasi-supermodularity
on its own, is not su¢ cient to ensure that the set of maximal elements of  is a sublat-
tice of A even when  is acyclic. The example also demonstrates that  can be acyclic
without necessarily satisfying monotone closure and therefore, the two are distinct con-
ditions on preferences.
The following result shows that assumptions (A1)-(A4), taken together, are su¢ cient
to ensure monotone comparative statics with incomplete preferences and together with
(A5) ensure the non-emptiness of E.
Theorem. Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), each p 2 P , 	(p) is non-empty and a com-
pact sublattice of A where both the maximal and minimal elements, denoted by a(p)
and a(p) respectively, are increasing functions on P . Moreover, E 6= ?.
Proof. By assumption, for each p, p is acyclic,  1p (a) are open relative to A and
A is compact. By Bergstrom (1975), it follows that 	(p) is non-empty. As Bergstrom
(1975) doesnt contain an explicit proof that 	(p) is compact, a proof of this claim
follows next. To this end, note that the complement of the set 	(p) in A is the set
	c(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) 6= ;g. If 	c(p) = ;, then 	(p) = A is necessarily compact.
So suppose 	c(p) 6= ;. For each a0 2 	c(p), there is a00 2 A such that a00 p a0. By
assumption,  1p (a00) is open relative to A. By denition of 	(p),  1p (a00)  	c(p).
Therefore,  1p (a00) is a non-empty neighborhood of a0 2 	c(p) and it is clear that
	c(p) is open and therefore, 	(p) is closed. As A is compact, 	(p) is also compact.
Next, I show that for p  p0 if a 2 	(p) and a0 2 	(p0), then sup (a; a0) 2 	(p) and
inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0). Note that as a0 2 	(p0), a0 p0 inf (a; a0). By quasi-supermodularity,
sup (a; a0) p0 a. By single-crossing, sup (a; a0) p a. As a 2 	(p), p (a) = ; and there-
fore, by monotone closure, as sup (a; a0) p a, p (sup (a; a0)) = ; and sup (a; a0) 2 	(p).
Next, note that as a 2 	(p), a p sup (a; a0). By single-crossing, a p0 sup (a; a0) and
by quasi-supermodularity, inf (a; a0) p0 a0. As a0 2 	(p0), p0 (a0) = ;, and therefore,
by monotone closure, as inf (a; a0) p0 a0, p0 (inf (a; a0)) = ; and inf (a; a0) 2 	(p0).
Therefore, (i) 	(p) is ordered, (ii) 	(p) is a compact sublattice of A and has a maximal
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and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering) denoted by a(p)
and a(p), and (iii) both a(p) and a(p) are increasing functions from P to A. Now
dene a map 	 : A  P ! A  P , 	(a; p) = (	1(p);	2(a)) as follows: for each (a; p),
	1(p) = fa0 2 A :p (a0) = g and 	2(a) =  (a). By (A5) it follows that for each a,
 (a) has a maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise vector ordering)
denoted by (a) and (a) respectively. Therefore, the map (a(p); (a)) is an increasing
function from A P to itself and as A P is a compact (and hence, complete) lattice,
by applying Tarskis x-point theorem, it follows that (a; p) = (a(p); (a)) is a x-point














respectively the largest and smallest x-points of 	.
Proof. Proposition 2 (Indistinguishability)
(i) Suppose (a; p) 2 E. By denition, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for some p = (a). By
(C1), for all a0 2 A, (a; p)  (a0; p0) for each p = (a) and p0 = (a0). It follows that
(a; p) 2 M . Next, suppose, by contradiction, (a; p) 2 E \M but (C1) doesnt hold.
As (a; p) 2 E, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for p = (a). As, by assumption, (C1) doesnt
hold there exists a0 2 A such that a p a0 for p = (a) but (a; p)  (a0; p0) for p = (a)
and p0 = (a0). But, then, (a; p) =2 M , a contradiction. (ii) Suppose (a; p) 2 M . As
(a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 A(A), by (C2), (a; p)  (a0; p) for p = (a). It follows
that (a; p) 2 E. Next, suppose, by contradiction, (a; p) 2M \E but (C2) doesnt hold.
As (a; p) 2 M , (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 A  (A). As, by assumption, (C2)
doesnt hold, there exists a0 2 A such that a0 p a for p = (a). But, then, (a; p) =2 E,
a contradiction.
Proof. Theorem 2 (Genericity)
Let v(a) = u(a; (a)). The outcome (a^; p^) 2M satises the rst-order condition
@av(a^) = @au(a^; (a^)) + @pu(a^; (a^))@a(a^) = 0 (A.1)
while the outcome (a; p) 2 E satises the rst-order condition
@au(a
; p) = 0; p = (a): (A.2)
For (a; p) = (a^; p^), it must be the case that
@pu(a^; (a^))@a(a^) = 0: (A.3)
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It is easily checked that requiring both (C1) and (C2) to hold is equivalent to requir-
ing that equation A.3 also holds. Consider a decision problem with (a; p) = (a^; p^).
Perturbations of the utility function and the feedback e¤ect do not a¤ect eq. A:2 and
hence (a; p) but they do a¤ect eq. A:3 and via eq. A:1 a¤ect (a^; p^). Therefore,
(a; p) 6= (a^; p^) generically.
A.2 Results from Chapter 3
Proof. Proposition 4
Suppose for each a0 2 A (other than a), a is chosen with a0 present (a0 may be chosen
as well). By assumption, for all a0 2 A, a p a0 for p = (a). By (C1), for all a0 2 A,
(a; p)  (a0; p0) for each p = (a) and p0 = (a0). It follows that any consistent decision
state containing a weakly welfare dominates any other decision state containing a0 6= a,
a0 2 A. Next, suppose, by contradiction, for each a0 2 A (other than a), a is chosen
with a0 present (a0 may be chosen as well), but (C1) doesnt hold. By assumption, for
all a0 2 A, a p a0 for p = (a). As (C1) doesnt hold, there exists a0 2 A such that
a p a0 for p = (a) but (a; p)  (a0; p0) for p = (a) and p0 = (a0), a contradiction.
Proof. Proposition 5
Since (a) = P for all a 2 A; any pair (a; p) is a consistent decision state. Thus, for
each p if the decision maker solves the decision problem in a behavioral way, for each
A0  A, each chosen action will be an element of c(A0; p) and therefore, every choice will
be a weak individual welfare optimum in A.
Proof. Proposition 6
If (a) = P , then (a; p) 2 M implies that (a; p)  (a0; p) for all a0 2 A and therefore,
(a; p) 2 E. That c^ (A0)  ~c (A0) is a direct consequence of M  E. Finally, as c^ (A0) 
~c (A0), b =2 ~c (A0) implies b =2 c^ (A0). It follows that if a 2 W^ there is no b 2 A such
that bP^a. Therefore, for every b 2 A, there exists a non-empty A0  A with a; b 2 A0
such that a 2 c^ (A0). As c^ (A0)  ~c (A0), it also follows that there is no b 2 A such that
b~Pa:Therefore, a 2 ~W and W^  ~W .
Proof. Proposition 7
As both A and P are nite, and  is acyclic, M (which corresponds to the maximal
elements of ) is non-empty. As M  E, so is E.
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Proof. Proposition 8
Step 1: We begin by showing that M  E i¤ the following condition (condition C2)
holds: for (a; p); (a0; p0) 2 A P such that (a; p)  (a0; p0), then (a; p)  (a0; p) for some
p 2 (a). Suppose (a; p) 2 M . As (a; p)  (a0; p0) for all (a0; p0) 2 A  P such that
p0 2 (a0), by (C2), (a; p)  (a0; p) for some p 2 (a). It follows that (a; p) 2 E. Next,
suppose, by contradiction, M  E but (C) doesnt hold. As (a; p) 2M , (a; p)  (a0; p0)
for all (a0; p0) 2 A  P such that p0 2 (a0). As, by assumption, (C2) doesnt hold,
there exists a0 2 A such that (a0; p)  (a; p) for some p 2 (a). But, then, (a; p) =2 E, a
contradiction.
Step 2: Clearly, if M  E, c^ (A0)  ~c (A0) and by using argument similar to those in
Proposition 8, W^  ~W . Next, suppose that W^  ~W but M  E. As M  E, by
step 1 of the argument, it is equivalent to assume that condition (C2) doesnt hold.
As (C2) doesnt hold, there exists a 2 A such that (a; p)  (a0; p0) for some p 2 (a)
and p0 2 (a0) but (a; p)  (a0; p) for all p 2 (a). It follows that there exists some
non-empty A0  A, such that a 2 c^ (A0) but a =2 ~c(A0) and therefore, c^ (A0)  ~c(A0).
But, then, there exists b 2 A (take b = a0) and a non-empty subset of A, A0, such that
a 2 c^ (A0) but a =2 ~c(A0). Therefore, a 2 W^ but a =2 ~W , a contradiction.
A.3 Results from Chapter 4
Proof. Theorem 3
Lets dene an individual psycho-social state as i = (p; a i) where p = (p1; :::; pi; :::; pn) 2
P and a i 2 A i. The primitives of the model are two maps, i;i : P  A i ! Ai  Ai
and i : A  P i ! Pi. The rst map is a preference relation over Ai. The expression
(ai; a0i) 2 i;iis written as ai i;i a0i and is to be read as ai is preferred to a0i when
the psycho-social state is p and the actions chosen by other players are a i.Note that
in the general model, we assume that preferences of player i are not only determined by
her actions and psycho-social states, but also by the psycho-states of the other players.
Dene the sets i;i (ai) = fa0i 2 Ai : a0i i;i aig (the upper section of i;i) and
 1i;i (ai) = fa0i 2 Ai : ai i;i a0ig (the lower section of i;i). We write a0i =2i;i (ai) as
ai i;i a0i and a0i 2i;i (ai) as a0i i;i ai. The second map species the set of psycho-
social states consistent with the actions chosen by each individual and the psycho-social
states of the others. Throughout this section, it is assumed that i;a;p i is non-empty
and closed relative to P for each a and p i.
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As stated above, a (pure) psycho-social equilibrium is a pair (a; p) such that for each




Consider the following additional set of assumptions:
Assumption 1 (AS-1): For each i 2 N , both Ai and P are compact lattices and for each
p i and a, i;a;p i is a compact sublattice of P .
Assumption 2 (AS-2): For each i 2 N , p and a i;  1i;i (ai) is open relative to Ai, i.e.
 1i;ihas an open lower section.
Assumption 3 (AS-3): For each i 2 N , p and a i, iiis acyclic, i.e. there is no nite set
fa1i ; :::; ani g such that aki ii ak 1i ; k = 2; :::; n and a1i ii ani .
Assumption 4 (AS-4): For each i 2 N , p i, a i and ai  a0i, if pi 2 i;a;p i and
p0i 2 i;a0i;a i;p i ; then sup(pi; p0i) 2 i;a;p i and inf(pi; p0i) 2 i;a0;p i . (psycho-social
states of each player are increasing in her actions)
Assumption 5 (AS-5): For each i 2 N , p, a iand each pair of actions ai; a0i 2 Ai;
(i) if inf (ai; a0i) i;i ai; then a0i i;i sup (ai; a0i) ; and (ii) if sup (ai; a0i) i;i ai; then
a0i i;i inf (ai; a0i). (quasi-supermodularity)
Assumption 6 (AS-6): For each i 2 N , ai  a0i, a i  a0 i, pi  p0i and p i  p0 i;
(i) if a0i i;ai;a0 i;p ai; then a i;i ai; (ii) if ai i;i a
0
i; then ai i;ai;a0 i;p a
0
i, (iii) if
a0i i;a;p0i;p i ai; then a
0
i i;i ai; (iv) if ai i;i a0i; then ai i;a;p0i;p i a
0
i, (v) if a
0
i i;a;pi;p0 i ai;
then a0i i;i ai; (vi) if ai i;i a0i; then ai i;a;pi;p0 i a
0
i (single-crossing property in actions
and psycho-social states3)
Assumption 7 (AS-7): For each i 2 N , p, a i and ai  a0i, (i) if i;i (a0i) \ Ai = ? and
a0i i;i ai; then i;i (ai) \ Ai = ?, and (ii) if i;i (ai) \ Ai = ? and a0i i;i a0i; then
i;i (a0i) \ Ai = ? (monotone closure)
Step 1. Dene a map 	 : A P ! A P as follows:
	(a; p) = (	1(a; p); :::;	i(a; p); :::;	n(a; p)), where
	i(a; p) = (	i1(a i; p);	
i
2(a; p i)) and for each i; a and p,
	i1(a i; p) =

a0i 2 Ai :i;i (a0i) \ Ai = ?
	
, and 	i2(a; p i) =
n
p0i 2 P : p0i 2 i;a;p i
o
.
Step 2. We want to show that 	i1(a i; p) is a closed and compact sublattice of A.
Since for each i; p and a i i;iis acyclic (AS-3 ),  1i;i (ai) is open relative to Ai (AS-2 )
and Ai is compact (AS-1 ), then by Bergstrom (1975), 	1i (a i; p) is not empty. Note that
the complement of the set	i1(a i; p) inAi is the set	
i;c
1 (a i; p) =

a0i 2 Ai :i;i (a0i) \ Ai 6= ?
	
.
If	i;c1 (a i; p) = ?; then	
i;c
1 (a i; p) = Ai is necessarily compact. So suppose	
i;c
1 (a i; p) 6=
?. For each a0i 2 	i;c1 (a i; p); there is a a00i 2 Ai such that a00i i;i a0i; i.e. a0i  1i;i (a00i ): By
(AS-2 ) 1i;i (a00i ) is open relative toAi. By denition of	1(a; p); 1i;i (a00i )  	i;c1 (a i; p).
Therefore,  1i;i (a00i ) is a non-empty neighborhood of a0i 2 	i;c1 (a i; p). Now, consider




aki : k  1
	
such that for each k  1; aki 2 	i1(a i; p) but limk!1 aki =
a^i 2 	i;c1 (a i; p). Now, by assumption, for each a0i 2 	i;c1 (a i; p); i;i (a0i) \ Ai is open
relative to Ai and therefore, there exists a neighborhood of a^i, N (a^i)  	i;c1 (a i; p), a
contradiction as there exists a K > 1 such that for each k > K; aki 2 N (a^i). It follows
that a^i 2 	i1(a i; p) and therefore, 	i1(a i; p) is closed and since A is compact4 (AS-1),
	i1(a i; p) is also compact. Moreover, as i;iis quasi-supermodular (AS-5), 	i1(a i; p)
is also ordered and therefore is a compact (and hence, complete) sublattice of A. Thus,
	i1(a i; p) has a maximal and a minimal element denoted by ai(a i; p) and ai(a i; p)
respectively.
Step 3. Fix p. For a i  a0 i, let ai 2 	i1(a i; ) and a0i 2 	i1(a0 i; ): We want to show
that sup(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(a i; ) while inf(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(a0 i; ).
First, note that since a0i 2 	i1(a0 i; ), inf(ai; a0i) i;ai;a0 i;p a0i. By part (i) of quasi-
supermodularity (AS-5), it follows that ai i;ai;a0 i;p sup (ai; a
0
i). By part (i) of single-
crossing (AS-6), it follows that a i;i sup (ai; a0i). Since ai 2 	i1(a i; ), i;i (ai)\Ai =
? and therefore, by part (i) of monotone closure (AS-7) since ai i;i sup (ai; a0i) ;
i;i (sup (ai; a0i)) \ Ai = ?. It follows that sup (ai; a0i) 2 	i1(a i; ):
Next, note that since ai 2 	i1(a i; ); sup(ai; a0i) i;i ai: By part (ii) of single-crossing
property, it follows that sup(ai; a0i) i;ai;a0 i;p ai:By part (ii) of quasi-supermodularity,




i 2 	i1(a0 i; ); i;ai;a0 i;p (a0i) \ Ai = ?





i) \ Ai = ?. It follows that inf (ai; a0i) 2 	i1(a0 i; ):
Step 4. Fix a i and p i. For pi  p0i, let ai 2 	i1(a i; pi; p i) and a0i 2 	i1(a i; p0i; p i).
We want to show that sup(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(pi; ) while inf(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(p0i; ).
First, note that since a0i 2 	i1(p0i; ), inf(ai; a0i) i;a;p0i;p i a0i. By part (i) of quasi-
supermodularity, it follows that ai i;a;p0i;p i sup (ai; a
0
i). By part (iii) of single-crossing,
it follows that ai i;i sup (ai; a0i). Since ai 2 	i1(pi; ), i;i (ai)\Ai = ? and therefore,
by part (i) of monotone closure, as ai i;i sup (ai; a0i) ; i;i (sup (ai; a0i)) \ Ai = ?. It
follows that sup (ai; a0i) 2 	i1(pi; ):
Next, note that since ai 2 	i1(pi; ); sup(ai; a0i) i;i ai: By part (iv) of single-crossing
property, it follows that sup(ai; a0i) i;a;p0i;p i ai: By part (ii) of quasi-supermodularity,




i 2 	1i (p0i; ); i;a;p0i;p i (a0i) \ Ai = ?





i) \ Ai = ?. It follows that inf (ai; a0i) 2 	1i (p0i; ):
Step 5. Fix a i and pi. For p i  p0 i, let ai 2 	i1(a i; pi; p i) and a0i 2 	i1(a i; pi; p0 i).
We want to show that sup(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(p i; ) while inf(ai; a0i) 2 	i1(p0 i; ).
First, note that since a0i 2 	i1(p0 i; ), inf(ai; a0i) i;a;pi;p0 i a0i. By part (i) of quasi-
4If Ai is compact, A =
Q
i2I Ai is also compact.
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supermodularity, it follows that ai i;a;pi;p0 i sup (ai; a
0
i). By part (v) of single-crossing, it
follows that ai i;i sup (ai; a0i). Since ai 2 	i1(p i; ), i;i (ai) \ Ai = ? and therefore,
by part (i) of monotone closure, as ai i;i sup (ai; a0i) ; i;i (sup (ai; a0i)) \ Ai = ?. It
follows that (sup (ai; a0i)) 2 	i1(p i; ):
Next, note that since ai 2 	i1(p i; ); sup(ai; a0i) i;i ai:By part (vi) of single-crossing
property, it follows that sup(ai; a0i) i;a;pi;p0 i ai: By part (ii) of quasi-supermodularity,




i 2 	1i (p0 i; ); i;a;pi;p0 i (a0i) \ Ai = ?





i) \ Ai = ?. It follows that inf (ai; a0i) 2 	1i (p0 i; ):
Step 6. It follows that both ai(a i; p) and ai(a i; p) are increasing in p and in a i. Fur-
ther, since for each p i and a, i;a;p i is a compact (and therefore complete) sublattice
of P (AS-1), 	i2(a; p i) has a maximal and a minimal element (in the usual component
wise vector ordering): denote these by pi(a; p i) and pi(a; p i) respectively. As i;a;p i is
increasing in ai (AS-4), both pi(a; p i) and pi(a; p i) are increasing in ai as well. It
follows that the (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i)) is an increasing function from A P to itself and
since A  P is compact (and hence, complete) lattice, by applying Tarskis x-point
theorem (Tarski, 1955), it follows that (a; p) = (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i)) is a x-point of 	.
By a symmetric argument (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i )) is an increasing function from A  P
to itself and therefore, (a; p) = (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i)) is also a x-point of 	: Moreover,
(a; p) = sup f(a; p) 2 A P : (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i))  (a; p)g
and
(a; p) = inf
n
(a; p) 2 A P : (ai(a i; p); pi(a; p i))  (a; p)
o
Therefore, (a; p) and (a; p) are, respectively, the largest and smallest (in the usual com-
ponent wise vector ordering) x-points of 	.
Proof. Theorem 4
As before, for each i 2 N = f1; :::; ng there are two sets, a set Ai of pure actions, Ai
 <mi and a set Pi of psycho-social states, Pi  <i ; where <mi and <i are nite di-
mensional Euclidian spaces. For each i 2 N; there is a preference map i;i : P A i !
Ai  Ai, where for each p and a i, describes a preference relation over Ai Recall that
P =
Q
i2N Pi. Let the space of all Borel probability distributions over Pi (respectively
Ai) be denoted by (Pi) (respectively (Ai));for each i 2 N: As Pi (respectively Ai) is
separable (in the usual topology) and (Pi) (respectively (Ai)) is endowed with the
topology of weak convergence, (Pi) (respectively (Ai)) is separable and metrizable
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by the Lévy-Prokhorov metric5.
Let ^i : (Pi) (P i) (A i) ! (Ai) (Ai); be a map that describes prefer-
ences over probability distributions over P and A i where for each  2 (Pi)(P i)
and s i 2 (A i); ^i;;s idescribes a preference relation over (Ai). For si and s0i
2 (Ai);the expression (si; s0i) 2 ^i;;s iis written as si ^i;;s is0i and is to be read as si
is preferred to s0i by player i when the distribution over the set of psycho-social states and
the actions chosen by other players is i and s i respectively.For any set X; note that
the set of Dirac probability measures6 over X is simply X itself. Let ^Di : P  A i !
Ai Ai denote the restriction of ^ito Dirac probability measures. We assume the pref-
erences of player i over probability distributions are consistent with her preferences over
pure actions, i.e. ^Di i. As before, dene the sets ^i;;s i(si) =

s0i 2 Ai : s0i^i;;s isi
	
(the upper section of ^i;;s i) and ^ 1i;;s i(si) =

s0i 2 Ai : si^i;;s is0i
	
(the lower section
of ^i;;s i). We write s0i =2 ^i;;s i(si) as si^i;;s is0i and s0i 2 ^i;;s i(si) as s0i^i;;s isi.
As before, there is a map i : AP i ! Pi that species the set of psycho-social states
consistent with the actions chosen by each individual and the psycho-social states of the
others. In this part of the chapter, it is assumed that i;a;p i is non-empty for each
a 2 A and p i 2 P i and i is a continuous function on A P i.
A (mixed) psycho-social equilibrium is a pair (s; ) such that for each i 2 N; (i) given
 and s i, ^i;;s i (si ) \ Ai = ? and (ii) for each i 2 N , and for each p such that
(p)>> 0, there is a 2 A such that s(a) >> 0 and i (pi)= i (i(a; p i)) = s(a).
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1(AS-1): For each i 2 N , both Ai and P are compact and hence, (Ai)
and (P ) are compact sets.
Assumption 2 (AS-2): For each i 2 N ,  and s i; both ^i;;s iand ^ 1i;;s iare open
relative to (Ai), i.e. ^i;;s i(si) has both open upper and lower sections.
Assumption 3 (AS-3): For each i 2 N ,  and s i, ^i;;s iis acyclic, i.e. there is no
nite set fs1i ; :::; sni g such that ski ^i;;s isk 1i ; k = 2; :::; n and s1i ^i;;s isni .
Assumption 4(AS-4): For each i 2 N , , s i; si and s0i, if ^i;;s i (si) \ Ai 6= ? and
^i;;s i (s0i)\Ai 6= ?; then ^i;;s i(si +(1 )s0i)\Ai 6= ? for each  2 [0; 1] (convexity)
Step 1. Dene a map 	^ : (A)(P )! (A)(P ),
	^(s; ) =










and for each i 2 N; s and ,
5The Lévy-Prokhorov metric is a metric (i.e. a denition of distance) on the collection of probability
measures on a given metric space. For more details see Billingsley (1999).
6The Dirac measure is a measure x on a set X (with any sigma algebra of subsets of X) that gives








8><>: i 2 (Pi) : 
(p) >> 0; i¤ 9 a 2 A
s.t. s(a) >> 0 and i (pi) = 

i (i(a
; p i)) = s
(a):
9>=>;
Step 2. Using a similar argument to the one used in Theorem 3, we know that 	^i1(s i; )
is non-empty and compact.
Step 3. Now we want to show that 	^i1(s i; ) is upper semi-continuous. As the range
of 	^i1(s i; ) is compact, 	^
i
1(s i; ) is upper semi-continuous if 	^
i
1(s i; ) has the closed








 i :   1
	
such that
lim!1 si = s^i; lim!1 s

 i = s^ i; lim!1 

i = ^i; lim!1 

 i = ^ i and for each
  1, si 2 	^i1(s i;  ), with  = (i ;  i) but s^i =2 	^i1(s^ i; ^); with ^ = (^i; ^ i)
i.e. s^i 2 	i;c1 (s^ i; ^) =

s0i 2 (Ai) : ^i;;s i(s0i) \ Ai 6= ?
	
. Again, by the assumption
that ^i;;s i(s^i) has an open lower section (AS-2), arguments similar to those used in
Theorem 3 show that there exists a non-empty neighborhood of s^i, N (s^i)  	i;c1 (s^ i; ^),
a contradiction as there exists a  > 1 such that for each  >  ; si 2 N (s^i) : Now for
each s0i =2 	^i1(s^ i; ^); there is a s00i 2 (Ai) such that s0i^i;^;s^ is00i i.e. s0i 2 ^i;^;s^ i(s00i ).
By assumption (AS-2), ^i;^;s^ i(s00i ) is open relative to (Ai) and therefore there is a
neighborhood N (s0i)  ^i;^;s^ i(s00i ). As si 2 	^i1(s i;  ), there is some s0i 2 	^i1(s^ i; ^)
and   1 such that for all  >  , si 2 N (s0i) and therefore, s0i is a limit point of the
sequence fsi :   1g ; a contradiction as all the subsequences of convergent sequence
must have the same limit. It follows that 	^i1(s i; ) has the closed graph property.
Moreover, by (AS-4) 	^i1(s i; ) is also convex.
Step 4. By the continuity of the map i(:), 	^i2(s;  i) is also a continuous function.
Step 5. It follows that 	^ satises all the assumption of Fan-Glicksberg x-point theorem
and therefore has a x-point (s; ), which by construction, is a random psycho-social
equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 9
















, i  4X
(C;C) is a "guilt-aversion" equilibrium i¤ for i = 1; 2:
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xi(C;C)  imax f0; xj(C)  xj(C)g  xi(D;C)  imax f0; xj(C)  xj(D)g , 4X 
6X   4Xi
, i  12
And it can be similarly shown that (C;C) is a "commitment" equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 10
The proof of this proposition is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 2, Ch.2
Proof. Proposition 11
Lets dene an appropriate best-response equivalent transformation of   as one in which:
x^i(ai; a i) =
8><>: xi(ai; a i) +Bi; for all ai 2 Ai given a

 i 2 A i; for all i 2 N ,
xi(ai; a i); otherwise
where Bi =  i(ai ; a i) and a = (ai ; a i) is a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium prole
of  .












So, computing the appropriate transformation of  , we have  ^ := fA1; :::; An; v^1; :::; v^ng













Note that   and  ^ are best-response equivalent but they are not fully-equivalent since
playerspreferences change with the transformation. For instance, player 1 prefers (U,L)
to (R,D) in   but prefers (R,D) to (U,L) in  ^.
Continuing with our proof for any normal form game, we shall show that a =
(ai ; a

 i) is a pure strategy Nash-equilibrium of the restricted  ^ for any restriction.
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i(ai)x^i(ai; a i), 8i 2 N
By denition of a pure strategy N.E, 9 a s:t: si (ai ) = 1 with si (a0i) = 0;8i 2





 i); and we know that, given
the particular transformation we have dened, x^i(ai ; a

 i) = 0.
Now lets analyze the equilibrium of  ^ for all possible restrictions.





 i), 8i 2 N
Then, si (a

i ) = 1 8i 2 N is a (weak) equilibrium of the restricted  ^.






 i), 8i 2 N
Then, si (a

i ) = 1 8i 2 N is a (strict) equilibrium of the restricted  ^
Case 3: Assume that i(si; s i) 6= si(ai )s i(a i)x^i(ai ; a i), 8i 2 N
Then, si (a

i ) = 1 8i 2 N is a (weak or strict) equilibrium of the restricted  ^
Proof. Proposition 12
To prove this proposition, it is enough to show that there exists some non-trivial restric-
tion such that a non-trivial non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium of the restricted
normal form game (G0) does not exist. For example, take any arbitrary a0i 2 Ai for each






s i(a i)si(ai)xi(ai; a i); 8aina0i, 8i 2 N
We can show that there is not a non-trivial normal form game under i(si; s i)
restriction, that could support a non-trivial non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium.
s = (si ; s

 i) is a non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium of G






 i) = 0; for a
0
i 2 Ai;8i 2 N and
(ii) si(ai) 2 (0; 1);8i 2 N and 8ai 2 Ai
For these two conditions to hold, we need xi(a0i; a
0
 i) = 0. But if this is the case, the
restricted game is trivial.
Proof. Proposition 13
To prove this proposition, it is su¢ cient to pick a game and show that there is an outcome
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that is not an equilibrium for all non-trivial consistent restriction. For example, take




player 1 p C 1,1 -1,2
(1  p) D 2,-1 ","
where  1 < " < 0: We shall show that any outcome with mixed strategies q = p 2
(1
2
; 1] can not be rationalized as an equilibrium of any non-trivial consistent restricted
game derived from p.d. game. Take the following 6 non-trivial consistent restrictions:
1) 11(s1; s2) = ( 1)(1  q) and 12(s1; s2) = ( 1)(1  p)
(p; q) is an equilibrium of the restricted game i¤: q = 2q + "(1   q) and p =
2p + "(1  p):Then p = q = "
" 1 . Since  1 < " < 0; then p = q 2 (0; 12).
2) 21(s1; s2) = q and 
2
2(s1; s2) = p
(p; q) is an equilibrium of the restricted game i¤: ( 1)(1 q) = 2q+"(1 q) and
( 1)(1  p) = 2p+ "(1  p):Then p = q = " 1
"+1
. Since  1 < " < 0; then p = q < 0.
3) 31(s1; s2) = q + ( 1)(1  q) and 32(s1; s2) = p+ ( 1)(1  p)
(p; q) is an equilibrium of the restricted game i¤: 0 = 2q + "(1   q) and 0 =
2p + "(1  p):Then p = q = "
" 2 . Since  1 < " < 0; then p = q 2 (0; 13).
4) 41(s1; s2) = 2q and 
4
2(s1; s2) = 2p
(p; q) is an equilibrium of the restricted game i¤: q + ( 1)(1   q) = "(1   q)
and p + ( 1)(1   p) = "(1   p):Then p = q = "+1
"+2
. Since  1 < " < 0; then
p = q 2 (0; 1
2
).
5) 51(s1; s2) = "(1  q) and 52(s1; s2) = "(1  p): @ q 2 [0; 1] and a p 2 [0; 1] s.t. each
player is indi¤erent between her actions.
6) 61(s1; s2) = 2q + "(1  q) and 62(s1; s2) = 2p+ "(1  p)
(p; q) is an equilibrium of the restricted game i¤: q 1(1 q) = 0 and p 1(1 p) =
0:Then p = q = 0.
The rest of the consistent restrictions are linear combinations of the six restrictions
above. It is easy to show that such restrictions generated by a linear combination will give




). Take for example the lineal combination of 11(s1; s2) and 
2
1(s1; s2) as 
1;2
1 (s1; s2; z) =
z(11(s1; s2)) + (1  z)(21(s1; s2)), for 0  z  1. Then, z( 1 + q) + (1  z)q =  q + "q
i¤ q =  z
" 2 . Since 0  z  1 and  1 < " < 0; then q^ = p^ 2 [0; 12 ] < q = p for a
xed value of  1 < " < 0. Analogously, we can show that this is the case for all possible
linear combinations of restrictions for all i:
Proof. Proposition 14
If a 2 A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the original game, then given a i;
ai 2 argmaxui(ai; a i); for all i 2 N and ai 2 Ai and a i 2 A i. Moreover, it must
be that given pi = (ai; a i) and a i, ai 2 argmax vi(ai; a i; pi) for all i 2 N and
ai 2 Ai and a i 2 A i. This is true, since in a loss aversion psycho-social equilibrium,
ui(pi) = ui(ai; a i), and by the characteristics of the reference-dependent utility function
vi, this implies that vi(ai; a i; ai; a i) = ui(ai; a i). Therefore, a 2 A is also a strategy
prole of a loss aversion psycho-social equilibrium (a; a) under approach 1. To show
that the proposition holds also for non-myopic loss aversion equilibrium, if there is a









i; a i) > ui(ai; a i) and
ui(a
0
i; a i) > ui(ai; a i), a contradiction, since a 2 A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
A.4 Results from Chapter 5
Proof. Proposition 15
Let ^(p; 0) be the value of  that solves the equation pb((p; 0) + 0)   c(0) = 0.
Evidently, as the LHS in eq. 5:2 is increasing in , eq. 5:2 holds i¤   ^(p; 0).
Moreover, (a) as expected payo¤s are increasing in p, a higher value of p implies a lower
value of ^(p; 0) is required to ensure that the equation continues to be satised, and (b)
as b(:) is (weakly) increasing in 0 and c(0) is decreasing in 0, a higher value of 0 implies
a lower value of ^(p; 0) is required to ensure that the equation continues to be satised.
Therefore, the probability that the decision-maker will choose a is 1   G(^(p; 0)). As
^(p; 0) is decreasing in both p and 0 and G(:) is a cumulative distribution function
(and therefore, an increasing function), it follows that G(^(p; 0)) is decreasing in both
p; 0 as well. Therefore, (i) given 0, higher values of p are associated with a higher
likelihood that the individual will choose a;(ii) given p, higher values of 0 are associated
with a higher likelihood that the individual will choose a.
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Proof. Proposition 16
Fix ; 0. Let p^ (; 0) be the value of p that solves the equation p (; 0) b( + 0) 
c(0) = 0. Evidently, as the LHS in eq. 5:2 is increasing in p, eq. 5:2 holds i¤ p0 
p^ (; 0). Moreover, (a) as b(:) is increasing in, a higher value of implies a lower value
of p^ (; 0) is required to ensure that the equation continues to be satised, and (b) as
b(:) is (weakly) increasing in 0 and c(0) is decreasing in 0, a higher value of 0 implies
a lower value of p^ (; 0) is required to ensure that the equation continues to be satised.
Therefore, the probability that the decision-maker will choose a is 1  F (p^ (; 0)). As
p^ (; 0) is decreasing in both  and 0, and F (:) is a cumulative distribution function
(and therefore, an increasing function), it follows that F (p^ (; 0)) is decreasing in both
 and 0. Therefore, (i) given 0, higher values of  are associated with a higher
likelihood that the individual will choose a;(ii) given, higher values of 0 are associated
with a higher likelihood that the individual will choose a.
Proof. Proposition 17
The decision-maker will anticipate that she will choose a i¤
p0b(
0 + 0)  c(0)  0
,
p0  p^ (0; 0) .
Therefore, the decision-maker will choose  = 0 if p0 < p^ (0; 0).
Proof. Proposition 19
Suppose the decision maker chooses a cognitive neighborhood [;  + d]. Then, the prob-
ability that the decision-maker will observe a signal
 
j; j1 = 
j0 + j0

for each j0 2












 + F (p^  j0; j0)p0:
Clearly, the decision-maker will choose a i¤ p1
 
j0
  p^ (0; 0) or equivalently i¤
 





























is decreasing and contin-
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uous in j0 while as
(1 F (x))
F (x)




ing and continuous in j0. Therefore, there exists d > 0 such that for all 
j




  p^ (0; 0) while for all j0 >  + d, p1  j0 < p^ (0; 0). It follows that there
exists " > 0 such that for all j0 2
 
   "; ,
 






















Therefore, if d =
   , with probability j ";jj j the decision-maker doesnt revise her
actions. By choosing d =
   ";  <    , the decision-maker reduces the cognitive
cost from C(
   ) to C(   "; ) without impacting on expected payo¤s at Step 2













< p^ (0; 0)





< p^ (0; 0)





Finally, note that the expected gross payo¤ gain from choosing the cognitive window





b (0 + 0)
d

dj0   c (0)






b (0 + 0)
d

dj0   c (0)  C(d)
with equality if d < d.
Proof. Proposition 20
Consider an individual i located at i0 choosing a = a with aspiration level  = 0.
Suppose for some 0 < " there exists an j 6= i such that i0   j0 < " and j chooses
an a = a and aspiration level  = 0. Then, given a continuous monotone similarity
function si(:; :) there exists 0 < "i such that if




i.e. the j belongs to the cognitive neighborhood chosen by i. Let " = mini "i >
0. Then, as long as the distribution of individuals in a society is " dense, 0 < " < ",





. This individual k will choose a = a and aspiration level  = 0.
Moreover, as the society is strongly connected, there is a path linking k to every other
individual j, j 6= k i.e. there is a nite chain of individuals i0; i1; :::; in^ with i0 = k
and in^ = j such that in belongs to the cognitive neighborhood of in+1, n = 0; :::; n^  1.
Therefore, each in, n = 0; :::; n^, chooses a = a and aspiration level  = 0. More
generally, the probability that all individuals in it choose a and have aspirations 0 is






Note that the adaptive dynamics will always converge to either a type I or a type II out-
come. Further, note that the basin of attraction for a type I outcome is [0; ^(p; 0)) while
the basin of attraction for a type II outcome is (^(p; 0); K]. Therefore, the probability
that the dynamics will converge to a type I outcome is G(^(p; 0)) (1  p) while the





As ^(p; 0) is decreasing in , it follows that there exists a ~ such that whenever




and a type I outcome will have a
higher probability of emerging while




and a type II outcome will have a




Predicted probability of Contributing 100% of the endowments to the Global Public




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predicted probability of being a 100% free-rider with foreigners as a function of









































































Figure B.2: Predicted Probability of Being free-rider
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